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CHAPTER I

INDIA'S POPULATION PREDICAMENT:

THE NEED FOR

A DUAL APPROACH

Introduction
Explosive population growth in India is generally considered the most serious obstacle to her social and economic
development and a major contributor to the world's population growth.

Although India encompasses only 2.4% of the

world's land area, it contains 15% of the world's population.

In mid-1978, India's population wai 638.3 million

(Nortman and Hofstatter, 1980:
in~reasing

10).

And it has been

at the rate of more than one million a month as

suggested by the preliminary estimates from the 1981 census
which placed India's population at 683.8 million (Visaria
and Visaria,1981:

3).

The major cause of this rapid popu-

lation growth is the gap in the timing of the decline of the
mortality and fertility rates.

Mortality has declined con-

siderably during the past few decades mainly due to significant improvements in world medical knowledge and public
health measures.

This improved mortality control technology

was quite readily importable since it is relatively independent of a country's level and pace of socio-economic devel1

2

opment. In contrast, fertility which is more heavily dependent on the social and economic forces of development has
not registered the same rates of decline, thus, creating
rapid population growth.

Mortality rates have declined from

48.6 per 1000 in the 1911-1921 decade to an estimated 15 per
1000 in 1978.

Birth rates, on the other hand, have just

declined to 34-35 per 1000 (estimate) in 1978 from a high of
45.5 per 1000 in the 1911-1921 decade. 1 The future direction
of India's population change will, therefore, depend mainly
on the trends in the birth rate.
A welcome trend in the levelling off of the nation's
population growth rates during the 1971-81 decade is evident
in the preliminary results of the 1981 census (Population
Council, 1981:

325-334).

According to the Population Coun-

cil report, the average annual growth rate for the 1971-1981
decade was 2.23%, slightly higher than the 2.2% of the
1961-1971 decade.

The states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and

Orissa are the main contributors to this stabilization in
the growth rate. 2 Among these three states, Kerala's experience is particularly significant in that the decline in her
growth rate between 1961 and 1981 has been the most pronounced.

Kerala's population grew at a high annual rate of

1 Data for the 1911-1921 decade were obtained from the
United Nations (1965) publication while the Nortman-Hofstatter (1980) compendium was the source for the 1978 data.
2

The average annual growth rates for Kerala, Tamil Nadu,
and Orissa during the 1971-1981 decade were 1.74%, 1.59%,
and 1.8% respectively.

2.34% in the 1961-1971 decade before dropping to a low of
1.74% during 1971-1981.

A detailed analysis of Kerala's

population experience in the 1970s may provide useful information and guidelines for an effective national population
policy.
Continuous reductions in mortality rates and lack of
significant opportunities for migration requires concentration on fertility declines as the principal source of the
decline.

Modernization and an effective family planning

program have been the two major components of the population
control policy at the national and state levels.

It is

hypothesized that modernization and the family planning program will influence fertility in two ways:

at the normative

level they may engender changes in individual's attitudes
toward and desires for large families; at the behavioral
level, they can lead to smaller family sizes.

Unfortu-

nately, these two approaches have been central to competing
rather than complementary propositions.
Modernization And Fertility Behavior
A major theme at the 1974 World Population Conference
in Bucharest was "Development is the best contraceptive."
Citing the fertility reductions attained during the industrialization of the West, reductions that were achieved
without family planning programs, the Third World argued for
more aid in their economic development from the advanced
nations (Tak, Haub, and Murphy, 1979:

31).

The central

4
thesis of the development or modernization argument is that
unless a small family is economically beneficial and hence
desired,

provision of family planning services will not be

effective in controlling fertility.

Modernization would

create the necessary conditions and motivations that are
likely to lead to a decline in fertility.
Moore (1974) and Desai (1976) discuss these necessary
conditions in terms of the core processes that modernization
involves.

The following are some of the processes that are

considered important indicators of modernization:

changes

in socio-economic status through improvements in education,
income, and occupation; shifts from rural to urban living
and from a predominantly agrarian to a predominantly industrial economy; better accessibility to modern health care
facilities, improvements in life expectancy and reductions
in infant mortality; improved work opportunities and status
for women, changes in the structures and role relations in
the family; and changes in the value orientations from a
traditional-fatalistic outlook to one in which the individual has more control (rational choice) over his actions.
Finally, demographic changes in the form of declining birth
and death rates are also considered integral parts of modernization (Moore, 1974:

100-102).

Social demographers who view modernization as the
prime mover of fertility decline use the theory of household
choice as a frame of reference.

One of its basic tenets is

that economic factors ultimately influence fertility deci-

5

sion making (Carvajal and Geithman, 1976:
doch (1980:

32-39).

As Mur-

26) stated it, "the great mass of poverty

stricken peoples of the world have large families because
they are poor and because having a large family is the economically rational decision for poor parents to make."3 In
other words, couples generally attempt to maximize the utility derived from children and other goods and services
within the constraints of price, time, and income.

The

changes involved in modernization, like improvements in
income, education, and work opportunities, especially for
women, reductions in infant mortality, and egalitarian family relationships, open up other functions, sources of
income, and means of personal satisfaction which are effective alternatives to childbearing.

For example, compulsory

education for children, legislation against child labor, and
mechanization of agriculture are a few of the modern elements that will reduce the economic productiveness of the
offspring in their childhood.

At the same time, when higher

education becomes an effective means to higher status,
parents would tend to invest more in a few children.

Fur-

~The analysis of the failure of the Khanna study in a
Punjab village by Mamdani (1972) provides a good example.
According to Mamdani, the villagers refused to use contraception that was offered to them because to do so "---would
have meant to willfully court economic disaster." (Mamdani,
1972: 21). Given the existing village economy, the only
means to a higher status for these poor villagers was to
have many sons. They could either contribute to the working
of the land in lieu of hired labor and increase savings to
be used in purchasing more land or they could find employment in the city in order to help the parents.
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limited extent.

Basic changes in the social and economic

structure will be necessary if parental motivation for having large families is to be affected.
Davis (1975:

31-32) also cites the case of Taiwan

where the birth rates declined dramatically from a high of

50.0 in 1951 to 32.7 in 1965.

Although several researchers

have attributed this decline to the family planning campaign
in Taiwan, the program was begun only in 1963.

In contrast,

argues Davis, "the decline represents a response to modernization similar to that made by all countries that have
become industrialized."

(Davis, 1975:

32).

Modernization

in Taiwan represented a combination of rapid economic growth
and population increase in a limited territory which made
large families disadvantageous.

These factors created a

high demand for abortions and other contraceptives at a time
when the family planning program was started.

Thus, even

the post 1963 decline in fertility is not completely due to
the program.
Much research has also been done to document the role
of socio-economic development in reducing birth rates.
Kasarda (1971), Heer (1968), and Ekanem (1972) are among
those who have used cross-sectional and time series data
from different nations to analyze the relationship between
economic development and fertility.

These studies assume

that people in the developed and rapidly developing societies would adopt family planning irrespective of whether a
family planning program exists.

They also postulate the
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thereby changing the structural influences on the motivation
for a large family, fertility reductions will not be
achieved.
Family Planning And Fertility
At the other extreme is the family planning perspective, best exemplified by the work of Tsui and Bogue (1978,
1979).

They utilized socioeconomic and family planning data

from 113 third world countries for the time period of
1968-1975 in evaluating
grams.

th~

role of family planning pro-

Although modernization was not substantial in these

countries between 1968 and 1975, they had succeeded in
reducing their fertility. Further, it was the countries with
higher 1968 birth rates that had achieved pronounced
declines in fertility.

This success, according to Tsui and

Bogue, was largely due to the organized family planning
efforts initiated in these countries in the early 1960s.
Hence, "instead of clinging to the doctrine that general
economic and social development is the dominant cause of
fertility decline, demographers should be willing to consider the possibility that a major factor in recent fertility declines in LDCs has been the massive intervention of
organized family planning programs" (Tsui and Bogue, 1979:
103) •
One of the classic examples of the role of family
planning program in fertility declines is that of Java and

10
Bali in Indonesia.5 According to researchers, it was the
family planning campaign vigorously initiated in 1971 in
Java and Bali that was responsible for seventy-five percent
of the fertility reduction between 1967-71 and 1976.

In

Bali the birth rate in 1976 was 28 per 1000, a sharp decline
from a high of 44 around 1968.

By the end of 1976, nearly

50% of the eligible couples were also using birth control
compared to practically no users in 1971.

At the same time,

there was relatively little change in fertility in other
parts of the country where the program was not as strong
during this period.
Tsui and Bogue propose a new theory of fertility to
take account of this new evidence (1979:

104-105).

If

through family planning programs individuals are informed
that limiting their family size will help in improving their
living standards, they will tend to do so under certain conditions:

if they believe the message; if they have the

required knowledge about contraception; if they believe that
the methods are effective, socially acceptable, relatively
harmless, and easy to use; and if the methods are available
readily and economically.

Thus, even if standards of liv-

ing, education, and other status characteristics are low,
family planning programs which create the required 'cognitive preparation' and which provide the necessary services

5The following discussion on Indonesia is taken from Murdoch, 1980: 54-55 and Tak, Haub, and Murphy, 1979: 33-34.
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will achieve the desired reductions in family size.
Although this theory is very appealing and promising, 6
no conclusive evidence exists that a family planning program, in itself, can lead to substantial declines.

An imme-

diate example is that of India which has had an official
program since 1952 and whose family planning budget has been
increasing every year so that in 1975 it was almost one and
one-half times its health budget (146%, Tsui and Bogue,
1978:

28).

Yet, the decline in its total fertility rates

has been only 8% between 1968 and 1975, one of the lowest
among the 113 countries studied by Tsui and Bogue (1978:
13).

At the same time, substantial declines in fertility

have been achieved in countries even before family planning
programs were begun, as in the case of Taiwan discussed earlier.

In Indonesia (Murdoch, 1980:

55), fertility declines

had begun before 1971, the year the family planning program
was begun.

These declines are attributed partly to the ris-

ing age at marriage of the 1960s, a trend that continued
into the 1970s.
Moreover, the advocates of the family planning perspective do not make clear whether the fertility declines
were attained by the programs in the absence of the changes
in motivation generally occasioned by modernization.

In

Indonesia for example, between 1965 and 1974, when fertility

6The source for the ideas concerning the pitfalls of the
family planning perspective in the following two paragraphs
is Murdoch, 1980: 55-56.
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declines were spectacular, per capita gross national product
also increased by an average of 4.1% per year, chiefly due
to the sale of oil.

Further, in Bali, where the fertility

decline has been greatest, a large proportion of women were
employed outside the home and demand for child labor was
reduced because of collective farming which was introduced
on a large scale during the same period.

Thus, the evidence

does not warrant the unequivocal conclusion of the primary
role of family planning drawn by the supporters of the family planning perspective.
This is especially true of Tsui and Bogue's analysis

(1978) of socio-economic and family planning data.

In a

regression analysis of the 1975 total fertility rates on the
level of socioeconomic development in 1968, status of family
planning in 1972, and the 1968 total fertility rate estimates, the model was found to explain 86% of the total variance.

76% of the variance was due to the 1968 total fertil-

ity rate, the strongest predictor.

The family planning

effort index accounted for 4.7% of the variance after the
effect of the 1968 total fertility rates and the socioeconomic variables had been considered.

The rest of the vari-

ance (5.5%) was attributed to the independent effect of the
five socioeconomic variables.

Therefore, Tsui and Bogue

contended that family planning has an independent and significant impact on fertility.

This conclusion, however, is

only one side of the picture.

An equally strong and inde-

pendent influence is seen in the case of the socioeconomic
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indices, eventhough they have to be considered collectively.
Moreover, there is no difference in the total variation

(5.5%) explained by the socioeconomic measures before and
after the family planning index was introduced. 7 Changes in
the regression coefficients of the socio-economic variables
after the introduction of the family planning index also
suggests an 'association between the extent of modernization
in 1968 and family planning status in 1972.

For example,

the standardized regression coefficients for the per capita
Gross National Product in 1968 was reduced in half from .125
to .067, after the family planning effort score was entered
into the equation.

Similar patterns are evident in the case

of infant mortality rates and percentage of females employed
in agriculture in 1968.

The regression coefficients became

much smaller after the family planning index was introduced.
It is, therefore, a strong possibility that the effect of
modernization on fertility is mainly indirect through its
influence on family planning.

A path analytic model, in

lieu of the multiple regression model used by Tsui and
Bogue, would have clarified the nature of the indirect role
of modernization on fertility through family planning.

Such

an analysis would have also minimized the possibility of
rash conclusions as to the predominant significance of family planning on fertility declines.

7unfortunately, the differences in variance explained by
the family planning index before and after the socioeconomic
measures were introduced are not available.
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Another caution in accepting Tsui and Bogue's
conclusion about the role of socio-economic development is
voiced by Murdoch (1980:

57).

Most research has indicated

that socio-economic development is one of the major influences on fertility levels around 1968. 8 Fertility levels in

1968 were the best predictors of the 1975 fertility levels
in Tsui and Bogue's analysis.

Therefore, the same processes

of modernization which influenced the 1968 fertility rates
should be relevant to the fertility levels in 1975 too.
Murdoch also criticizes Tsui and Bogue for omitting crucial
determinants of fertility, such as distribution of income,
literacy, and life expectancy, from their analysis.

When

critical factors are not included in the measurement of

.

socio-economic development, the proportion of variance
explained is bound to be smaller.
The major reason for these conflicting conclusions is
the differences in perspectives adopted in interpreting the
data.

Taiwan is a good case in point.

On the one hand,

researchers such as Davis (1975) and Li (1973) concluded
that the declines in Taiwan's fertility rates since 1956
were not induced by the family planning program initiated in

1963, but by the reduced infant mortality and improved educational status.

A revealing example is found in the exam-

8
Even though some countries initiated family planning
programs in the early sixties or even earlier, vigorous
implementation of the programs did not start until the late
sixties and early seventies when international attention
began to be focussed on population and modernization.
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ple of Taichung city, where fertility rates did not change
much inspite of the concentration of action programs.

In

fact, the decline in the fertility of women in the major
cities and rural towns of Taiwan was higher than that in
Taichung (Li, 1973:
(1977:

101).

On the other hand, Srikantan

227) and Schultz (1973), among others, contend that

the family planning program in Taiwan speeded up the fertility declines that had already begun much earlier under the
influence of modernization.
Complementarity Of Family Planning And Modernization
From the conflicting and complementary research on the
correlates of fertility declines in developing countries
discussed thus far, one definitive conclusion can be drawn.
Both modernization and family planning programs seem necessary if future declines in fertility are to be achieved
quickly and efficiently.

Modernization induces shifts in

motivation toward smaller families.

The family planning

programs not only legitimize these small family norms but
also provide couples the necessary means to actualize these
norms.
Historically, fertility declines, through voluntary
family limitation, started in Europe under a wide range of
levels in socioeconomic development (Walle and Knodel, 1980:
29-40).

For example, reductions in fertility began in Hun-

gary, France, and Bulgaria, when these societies were predominantly agrarian and had low literacy rates.

On the other
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hand, fertility declines through family limitation did not
begin in England and Wales until it was highly urbanized and
industrialized.
A mixed picture is also obtained in the case of
today's developing countries.

One of the best sources from

this point of view is the cross-country study done by Mauldin and Berelson (1978).

They analyzed the relation of sev-

eral indices of socioeconomic development around 1970 and an
index of the government's effort in family planning to
changes in fertility between 1965 and 1975 in 94 developing
countries.9 Singapore, Korea, and Costa Rica, for example,
which had a high level of modernization and a strong family
planning program experienced around 29-40% declines in fertility (clearly the largest) between 1965 and 1975.
Declines were modest in the case of countries with advanced
development but weak family planning programs (Brazil, 10%
and Turkey, 16%) as well as in nations with moderately
strong family

planni~~

programs, but low levels of modern-

9The index of socio-economic development comprised of
adult literacy levels, proportion of 5-19 year olds enrolled
in school, per capita GNP, proportion of adult males engaged
in non-agricultural occupations, percentage of population
living in cities with 100,000 or more, infant mortality
rate, and life expectancy at birth. 15 items were included
in the index of family planning effort reflecting the role
of government in the family planning effort, availability of
different methods of contraception, efforts to provide education, information, and methods and the sources used, and
the extent of program evaluation. The composite score
ranged from a low of 0 to a high of 30 since the responses
were given a value of 2 for yes, 1 for a qualified yes, and
0 for no.
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ization (India, 16% and Indonesia, 13%).

Mauldin and

Berelson's research indicates that "social and economic conditions in which family planning programs can be effective
may not be so stringent as once believed"

(Birdsall, 1980:

37).
Yet, while well organized programs that provide information and methods of family limitation have contributed to
the fertility decline in many countries, its efficacy would
be improved if there were concommittant modernization.
Research has shown that lower status individuals, i.e.,
those with lower education, income, and other socio-economic
statuses, generally have the least access to the modern family limitation services.

Birdsall (1980:

38-39) presents

data from the World Fertility Surveys for developing countries.

Those with less education and rural women were the

most likely not to use contraception, inspite of not wanting
any more children.

Rural-urban and educational differences

in contraceptive use were also examined by Birdsall after
controlling for the strength of the family planning program.
In countries with strong programs and relatively advanced
modernization, such as South Korea and Costa Rica, very few
residential and educational differences were noted compared
to the countries with weaker programs.

Stronger demand for

contraception and easier access to the modern birth control
measures on the part of the educated and urban women are
major reasons for the differences.

These discrepancies are

greater in countries where family planning is either not
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subsidized or administered by the government and development
is low.
The complementarity of modernization and family planning programs at the aggregate level has also been documented by Srikantan (1977) using data around 1970.

From his

analysis of the family planning programs of several developing countries, he concluded that well developed programs
speed up fertility declines initiated by socio-economic
development (as operationalized by declining infant mortality and increasing education of women).
Modernization and a family planning program are, thus,
clearly interdependent and complementary approaches to the
population problem.

Improvements in the social and economic

statuses of individuals influence motivation in favor of
smaller families and create a demand for family limitation
services.

It is also suggested (although not much

researched) that the influence of social and economic characteristics on motivation is mediated through social and
cultural factors such as the secularization of attitudes,
improvements in the status of women (van den Walle and Knodel, 1980), and openness to outside influences (Beaver,
1975).

In this context, a well organized family planning

program involving not only the provision of information and
services, but also education regarding the benefits for both
the individual and society to be derived from smaller families and aimed at all segments of society will help in actualizing these desires for small families.

Herein lies the
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need for integrating the family planning program with a
nation's program for modernization.

However, it is not nec-

essary to achieve a threshold level of modernization (which
in itself will vary among countries) before implementing the
family planning program.

As Tak, Raub, and Murphy (1979:

36) suggest on the basis of their analysis of data from the
World Fertility Survey, modernization through its influence
on education, age at marriage, and infant mortality on the
one hand, and family size desires and contraceptive use on
the other, is a long run and indirect tool in controlling
fertility.

In the short run, it is the universal provision

of contraceptive information and effective service that will
speed up the fertility declines that have already begun in
most countries.
Many of the third world countries, recognizing the
importance of population problems, have begun to incorporate
population policies into their national development plans
(Stamper, 1977).

For example, 63% (38) of the governments

of the 60 countries that Stamper studied do recognize that
rapid population growth adversely affects their socio-economic development.

Among these 38 countries, only 68%, how-

ever, have designed some specific policy to check the rate
of population growth.

Further, many of these policies do

not get implemented during the plan periods.

Thus, although

population growth is recognized as a problem, there are
severe discrepancies between policy and action.
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Modernization And Family Planning In India
Applying this framework to India, we find that some
modernization has indeed been accomplished, especially since
10
she gained Independence in 1947.
There has been increasing
urbanization induced by both industrial and non-industrial
forces (such as commercial and administrative).

The scale

of industrial production for various items has increased
considerably.

For example, production of coal tripled in

the period between 1950-51 (32.8 million tons) and 1974-75
(95.3 million tons).

Similarly, within this time period the

installed capacity of electricity increased 10 times (from
1.8 million kilowatts to 18.5 million) and there was also a
12 fold increase in the amount of electricity generated (5.9
thousand million kilowatts to 69.4 thousand million).

At

this stage, the nation possesses the capacity to produce all
types of goods and machinery, although not in the quantities
required by a modern nation (Johnson, 1979:

133).

Further,

village and small scale industries, which are more common in
India, create jobs and improve the level of economic activity in the smaller towns and villages while working closely
with the agricultural economy.

Thus, they are a significant

element in India's transition to industrial modernization.
In the field of agriculture too, the Green Revolution has

1

~

0

The data on the modernization and the family planning
status of India were obtained from the following sources:
Nortman and Hofstatter, 1980; Johnson, 1979; Tsui and
Bogue, 1978; Government of India, 1979; Gueruviere, 1973;
Stamper, 1977).
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played a significant role through the introduction of high
yielding varieties of grain and provision of irrigation
facilities, fertilizers, and other chemicals, and credit,
among other things.

For example, the total area under cul-

tivation of crops, such as cereals, pulses, oilseeds, cotton, and jute has increased nearly 45% from 1947-48 to

1974-75.
Aside from the agricultural and industrial sectors,
improvements have also been documented in the spheres of
education, land reform, health, and general standards of
living.

There has also been increasing political socializa-

tion leading to the development of political consciousness.
The caste system, the joint family, and the traditional
value system have lost some of their overriding influence on
the social structure.

These changes, however, have been

achieved through a continuous blending of selected traditional values with the ideology of modernization.

This

integration has been possible partly through the reinterpretation of Hinduism and its religious and philosophical foundations to fit the needs of modernization.

India's modern-

ization so far presents a unique pattern that challenges the
view of a complete replacement of traditional culture as a
basic prerequisite of modernization.
Nevertheless, India has a long way to go before she
can be fully modernized.

Despite her efforts to industrial-

ize, about 70% of her labor force is still engaged in agriculture and cottage/small scale industries.

The primary
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sector (agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining) is still
the major contributor to her domestic product.

There has,

however, been a 6% increase in the contribution of the secondary sector and nearly 8% in that of the tertiary sector
between 1950-51 and 1973-74.
A major setback in India's attempt at economic modernization is the rapid growth in population.

Total food pro-

duction doubled from a low of 55 million tons in 1950-51 to
110 million tons in 1976-77.

Trends in national income,

despite the lack of improvement, have been maintained at
nearly the same level of increase (an average of 16%) over
the various plan periods.

Yet, the doubling of population

between 1950 and 1977 has lowered the rate of increase in
the per capita income to 2.5% during the fourth plan period
(1969-1974) from 11% during the second five year plan.
A per capita income of Rs.850 at current prices or
Rs.340 at the 1960-61 prices also conceals considerable inequalities in the distribution of income.

For example, at

the 1964-65 levels, the richest 10% of the population made
an average income of Rs.2498 in 1973-74 in contrast to the
Rs.227 earned by the poorest tenth percent.

This top 10%

also owns nearly 56% of the land and property.

Similarly,

although educational facilities at all levels have been
expanded, 70% of the population is still illiterate and 55%
of the students in professional colleges come from 5% of the
families where the fathers are professionals.

Inspite of

the social and fiscal policies of the government, glaring
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inequalities exist in the standards of living and in the
access to the means to improve living conditions.

Recent

research (Murdoch, 1980; van den Walle and Knodel, 1980)
suggests that reducing inequalities in welfare is a crucial
component of the attempt to achieve fertility declines.
Other indices of the extent of modernization in India
indicate only very moderate successes.

In terms of produc-

tion, the per capita consumption of energy (coal) in 1976
was only 218 kilograms, a mere 2% of the consumption in the
United States (11,554 kilograms).

Further, by 1975-76, only

29% of the villages were electrified, an essential precondition to the modernization of agriculture.

Even the small

farmers and peasants, the group most in need of participating in the development process, has not benefitted much from
the Green Revolution.
Parallel to these developments, there have only been
marginal improvements in health and other social aspects of
modernization.

Infant mortality has decreased from 130 per

1000 in 1968 to 122 in 1975.

Conversely, people were

expected to live two years longer in 1975 (life expectancy
49.5) than in 1968 (47.2).

=

Literacy rates have also

increased 4% between 1968 and 1975, along with a 2% increase
in the proportion of females enrolled in shool (26.2% in
1975).
Another problem in India's modernization lies in the
nature of her urbanization.

While the urban population as a

proportion of the total population has not increased much
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(only 19.7% of the population in 1968 and 21.5% in 1975
lived in urban areas), in absolute terms the urban population increased by almost 26 million in the 7 years between
1968 and 1975.

This urban growth has occurred with a rela-

tively small level of industrialization, making available
fewer opportunities for employment in manufacturing and
related occupations to the city immigrants.

Moreover, it is

the excess of agricultural labor on land, and not the modernization of agriculture, that pushes the Indian villagers
to the city (Mookerjee and Morril, 1973:

17).

These peculiarities in the urbanization, industrialization, and economic growth in India also have important
sociocultural implications.

The cities in India provide a

picture of a small, highly urban sector with very new and
modern values coexisting with a mass of urbanites who are
not very distant from the rural culture and its social
structure.

Urban residence, higher socio-economic status,

and higher education of women were found to be related to
egalitarian relationship between the husband and the wife by
Conklin (1973).

But, since these characteristics are lim-

ited to a small proportion of the population, traditional
family relationships still prevail.

While attempts have

been made to improve the legal and social status of women in
India, changes in the former have been more significant than
those in the latter (Mehta, 1970).

That only 26.2% of the

females are enrolled in school in 1975 compared to 43.5% of
the males is one indication of the sex disparities in the
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access to education.
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only 7% is geared to information, education, and personnel
training.

This unfortunate emphasis on the contraceptive

methods is based on the assumption that there exists a
demand for contraception, an assumption which cannot be justified, especially in terms of the modest modernization that
has been achieved thus far.

One mitigating factor is that

as of 1978, IUD insertions and sterilizations are not only
provided free of cost, but the government provides some compensation to acceptors 1 3 of these methods for costs of
transportation and drugs, and for loss of wages incurred.
These and other contraceptives are provided by a system of
urban and rural welfare centers (N=7,240 in 1978), rural
subcenters (42,875), and postpartum centers (492).

There

were also 7 central training institutes and 46 health and
family welfare training centers in 1978.
How effective have these programs been in influencing
the extent of contraceptive use?

The total number of accep-

tors trippled in 1976 (12.8 million) from a low of 4.4 million in 1974 and then declined to 5.6 million in 1978.

A

promising feature is that more women are accepting contraception at a younger age and at an earlier period in their
pregnancy history.

For example, during 1965-69, the wife's

13 Even the term family planning 'acceptors' suggests that
the initiative for contraceptive use comes not from the couPles but from the program. In other words, individuals
accept the contraceptive methods offered to them by the family planning program, but generally do not request or
actively seek out the available services on their own.
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median age and the number of living children were 30.1 and
4.0 respectively for IUD acceptors which declined to 27.7
(age) and 2.4 children during 1977-78.

Similarly, the

median age and number of surviving children for the acceptors of female sterilization declined to 29.9 and 3.4
respectively in 1977-78 from a high of 34 years and 4.4
children.

Another indication of the success of the program

is seen in that the percentage of married women in the
reproductive age using contraception doubled between 1969
(8%) and 1976 (17%) and increased even more sharply by 6% in
the three years between 1976 and 1979. 14
While these figures appear very impressive, especially
in the context. of the slow pace of modernization, the actual
test of the success of the program lies in its effect on the
birth rates.

Inspite of these achievements, there was only

an 8% decline in the total fertility rates between 1968
(TFR=5671) and 1975 (TFR=5241) (Tsui and Bogue, 1978:

13).

The estimated birth rate in 1978 was 34-35 per 1000, still
higher than the 30 per 1000 target set for the end of the
fifth five year plan in 1979.
Many studies, nonetheless, indicate that there has
been a shift away from the large family norms, with 3-4
children generally being considered the ideal (University of
Kerala, 1965; Anker, 1973).

The two children family

14
The actual figures would be higher because this data
includes only acceptors from the public sector units.
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(replacement level fertility), the motto of the Indian
family planning program, and families with five or more
children seem to be much less popular.

The average ideal of

3-4 children held by a major section of the population is
still too large from the point of view of the nation's overall population.

Even if these women succeeded in limiting

their births to 3 or 4 children, it would still result in a
high rate of multiplication of the population and will postpone further the time when the national goal of replacement
level fertility will be reached.
Therefore, the first problem this study is concerned
with is the analysis of some of the factors associated with
differences in family size ideals in order to identify the
factors that have contributed to the lowering of family size
ideals.

The clue to some of the important variables is evi-

dent in Kingsley Davis'

(1975:

30) argument that the moti-

vation to have children is socially sanctioned and, therefore, cannot be changed merely through family planning
propaganda and mass communication aimed at educating the
woman as to the problems of numerous births.

In addition to

the program, basic changes in the social structure and economy are also necessary to achieve a reduction in the number
of children wanted.
Equally important from the perspective of national
population growth is how much couples have been able to
achieve their ideals, because sizeable differences exist
between family size that is considered ideal and the family
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size that is actually achieved.

This problem becomes even

more important in the context of the intensive programs that
have been launched in India, especially since 1970, in order
to popularize family planning.

The numerous KAP (Knowledge,

Attitude, and Practice) studies of family planning methods
show that knowledge of and favorable attitudes toward family
planning are quite widespread (Lahiri, 1974:

324).

The

next logical question, then, is why the knowledge and favorable attitudes are effectively utilized by only 23% of the
married women of reproductive age (1979 levels).

Ultimately

what is significant is the actual number of surviving children each family has.
Therefore, the second problem that this study deals
with refers to the identification of some of the factors
that distinguish the couples who have actualized their ideal
family size from those who have not.

The same factors--so-

cial structural, economic, and family planning--that may
help differentiate among the family size ideals can also be
effective in explaining the differences in actual family
sizes of couples and in distinguishing between couples who
have been able to achieve their ideals from those who have
not.

In other words, the two problems under consideration

in this study are related.

Modernization and an effective

family planning program which may bring about a lowering of
the ideal family size can also be expected to create a
stronger dedication to realizing the ideal, ultimately leading to success in obtaining the low ideal.

The broad policy
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implication of this study would be as follows:

if the char-

acteristics which help distinguish the small ideal-actualizers from the larger ideal-non-actualizers could be made as
universal as possible, considerable reductions in family
sizes and closing of the gap between mortality and fertility
rates could be achieved in India.
Kerala:

A Case In Transition

Kerala provides a striking example of the transitional
nature of Indian society.

It is unlike any other state in

that it is fairly well advanced in some aspects while lagging behind in others. 15 Per capita income in Kerala in
1972-73 was a third lower (Rs. 579) than the all India average (Rs. 850).

Corresponding to this, Kerala is one of the

few states in India that had 50% or more of its population
below the poverty level around 1970-71 with the rural component having an average of Rs.28 per month and the urban poor
an average of Rs.43 per month for consumption expenditure.
Hence, it is not surprising that the estimated average
caloric intake per day around 1973 was 2,200, nearly 200
calories lower than the average per capita calories required
for India in general.

A diet survey of a region in Trivand-

rum district suggests the possible socio-economic biases in
the high extent of undernutrition.

Lower income, lower edu-

l5The following sources were used for data regarding Kerala: U.N., 1975; Johnson, 1979; Nortman and Hofstatter,
1980.
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cation, and lower occupational statuses interact in
determining the large proportion of undernourished and the
severity of undernourishment.
The industrial backwardness of Kerala is a primary
cause of the poor living standards in the state.

Analysis

of the labor mobility, however, reveals a paradoxical situation.

On the one hand, given the low levels of per capita

income, there has been some decline in the proportion of the
population engaged in the primary sector from 64.2% in 1901
to 59.3% in 1971.

Yet, the labor force movement during this

period has been into the tertiary sector and not the secondary sector.

Some factors responsible for the growth of the

tertiary sector are the high density of population limiting
the capacity of the agricultural sector to absorb more people, and the increase in contractual employment.

At the

same time, industrialization in Kerala still involves processing of agricultural and other goods using labor-intensive methods.

Further, nearly a half of the manufacturing

is of the household type.

These trends have over the years

resulted in large scale and increasing unemployment, especially among agricultural laborers and the educated sections.

For example, in 1965 there was an 8.3% unemployment

rate among individuals over 15 years of age in the total
labor force.

Kerala also has the highest levels of literacy

and educational attainment in India,

But, the inadequate

growth of employment opportunities has resulted in higher
rates of unemployment among the educated in Kerala than
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elsewhere.
Another paradox in Kerala's economic situation is seen
in the growth of real wage rates by 238%, despite the growing unemployment, the largest increase among all the states
between 1956-57 and 1971-72.

Unionization of agriculture

and the rise of collective bargaining and land reforms are a
few factors responsible for the rise in wages.

This posi-

tive trend, in turn, has saved the consumption standards and
inequality rates from further deterioration which would otherwise have occurred given the inadequate growth in wage
employment.
Other policy measures adopted during the 1960s to
reduce inequalities in the living standards in Kerala

.

include a system of public distribution of food grains
through a network of fair price shops in both the rural and
urban areas, provision of free noon meals to low income
children in elementary schools, and land reforms designed to
eliminate the tenancy system and to set ceilings on land
ownership.

These programs, however, have not been effec-

tively implemented.

Inadequate supplies of food has been

the major weakness of the distribution program.

Loopholes

in the land reform legislation and the reluctance on the
part of both landlords and tenants to participate in the
reforms have slowed down the process of transferring the
rights of ownership to the tenants.

Even public works pro-

grams, such as the crash program for rural employment and
the one lakh housing scheme designed to create more employ-

~3

ment, while having short run remedial effects, have not been
self sustaining. 16
In the context of these mixed achievements in the
field of socio-economic modernization, it is necessary to
assess the demographic trends in the state.

Around

mid-1973, Kerala had the lowest crude death rates in India,
in both its rural (7.9) and urban areas (6.3).

Rural-urban

differences in the crude death rates are also the smallest
for Kerala.

Further, not only does Kerala have the lowest

infant mortality rate (50 per 1000 live births in 1971), but
also has the longest expectation of life at birth (61 years
in 1971). 17 A combination of low crude death rates and low
infant mortality rates suggest that the low death rate cannot be attributed solely to the younger age structure of the
population.

These successes, on the contrary, are primarily

due to the comparatively lesser inequalities in the access
to health care in both urban and rural areas achieved
through spreading out the health care facilities and health
expenditures to all areas.
Shifts in birth rates, on the other hand, have not

16
The one lakh (100,000) housing scheme was a public
works program undertaken by the Government of Kerala in
early 1972. It was designed to provide permanent housing to
landless and homeless agricultural laborers throughout the
state.
17 The corresponding rates for India are a crude death
rate of 16.9 per 1000 in 1972, an infant mortality rate in
1971 of 122 per 1000 live births, and life expectancy in
1971 of 47 years.
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been so dramatic.

As the data in Table 1 suggests, the

declines in birth rate between 1931 and 1960, although consistent, were slightly lower in Kerala compared to the all
India average.

But, since 1960 Kerala has achieved more

substantial declines in birth rates than the nation as a
whole.

In fact, birth rates in Kerala in 1974 were lower

than the national target of 32 per 1000 that was set to be
achieved by 1974 by the family planning program.

Further,

unlike the rest of India, rural fertility in Kerala has
declined as significantly as urban fertility. It is these
patterns that may provide a primary explanation for the low
average annual growth rate in Kerala's population during the
1971-81 decade as discussed at the beginning of this chapter.

Improvements in education and health conditions played

a major role in the decline, especially during the 1960-1968
period since the family planning programs did not become
widespread until the late sixties.
It is generally hypothesized that both family planning
and socio-economic factors have contributed to the declines
in fertility and population growth since 1970.

Very little

research has been done, especially at the individual level,
to determine the factors responsible for the declines in
birth rates and for the variations in fertility.

This

study, which analyzes cross-sectional data from Kerala, is
an attempt in that direction.

Analysis of Kerala's fertil-

ity patterns may provide guidelines for policies applicable
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TABLE 1
BIRTH &\TE TRENDS Ii.'i KERALA A1m INDIA:
1931-1978
(Per 1000) 1

Kerala

India

1931-1940

40.0

45.2

1941-1950

39.8

39.9

1951-1960

38.9

41.7

1968 (aural)

33.2

39.0

1970 (Rural)

31.9

38.8

1972 (est.)

31.8

36.6

1974 (est.)

27.0

dA

1978 (est.)

NA

34-35

Period

lsource:

United Nations, Poverty, Unemployment and
Develo ment Polic : A Case Stud of Selected
Issues with Reference to Kerala ~ew Yor :
Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
ST/ESA/29, 1975).
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to the rest of India.

Most of the progress in Kerala has

been achieved through progressive fiscal and social programs
of the government designed to reduce inequalities and
improve the standards in the living conditions of the people.

CHAPTER II

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY
AND ITS RELEVANCE TO KERALA

A useful framework for the analysis of the two central
concerns of this

study --identifying the factors involved

in the lowering of family size ideals and achieving the
smaller ideals--is provided by the Demographic Transition
model, especially as applied to the present stage in the
population history of India.

The transition theory is

intrinsically connected with the concept of modernization in
2

that "it seeks to characterize three 'stages' of fertility
and mortality levels, viewed as derivative from the fundamental economic and social changes of 'development or modernization"' (Teitelbaum, 1975:

174).

It is, however, nee-

essary to evaluate the extent to which the transition theory
is applicable to a developing society such as India.

A

brief discussion of the theory in the context of modernization and of the existing research with the transition theory
as an organizing principle will aid in this evaluation.
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The Demographic Transition Theory And Its Applicability
To Developing Countries
Among the theories that have been put forward to
explain changes in demographic behavior, the transition
theory is perhaps the most explicit and simple, and consequently has evoked the most analysis and criticism.

Unlike

many other theories, the transition theory has its basis in
actual historical experience.

It was originally developed

in order to explain the declining trends in mortality and
fertility in the Western world.

Later, its applicability

was extended to the developing countries, still in the early
stages of their transitions.

The theory, thus, became the

basis for the prediction of future population trends in
these countries.

In recent decades, however, the theory has

been subject to severe criticism, both in its applicability
to the Western world and to the developing countries.
Some of the pricipal proponents of this theory are W.S
Thompson, Blacker, Notestein, Cowgill, and Stolnitz.

As

these theorists postulate it, Stage I was characteristic of
primitive societies and is marked by a population equilibrium achieved through high birth and death rates because the
technology needed to control births and deaths is absent.
Mortality remains high because of the very precarious nature
of existence and the lack of modern means of transportation,
medical technology, sanitation, and other amenities.

The

continued survival of the population, therefore, necessitated the maintenance of high fertility rates commensurate
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with the high death rates.

Strong, institutionalized, pro-

natalist norms, backed by societal sanctions maintained the
fertility rates at a high level.
Once industrialization and urbanization set in and the
technology for death and birth control is developed, death
rates tend to be controlled first, since health and long
life are universal goals.

Stage II, the stage of population

explosion, is created by declining mortality rates and fertility desires or actual fertility rates that remain
unchanged.

It is only later that birth rates are reduced

leading to a third stage in which equilibrium is achieved
through low death and low birth rates.

Fertility declines

cannot occur until the pronatalist social and economic
institutions are replaced by new institutions which will
support the adoption of the small family

not~.

For example,

the shifts away from the extended agrarian family reduce the
importance of the family in the spheres of production, recreation, education, and other functions that weaken the pronatalist pressure.

With improvements in the educational

opportunities and the removal of children from the labor
force, the economic value of children is reduced.

Further,

once infant and general mortality levels decline, fewer
births will be necessary to maintain the desired family
size.
Within these general trends, differentials exist in
the rates of declines in different subgroups of the population.

By utilizing the appropriate control technology,
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deaths and then births will be controlled, first in the
upper social and economic classes and only later in the
lower classes.

Another differential exists in the tendency

for urban birth rates to decline faster than the rural
rates.

Similarly, birth rates decline faster in the nuclear

families than in the extended agrarian families.
Stolnitz (1964:

To quote

30), "All nations in the Modern Era which

have moved from a traditional, agrarian based economic system to a largely industrial, urbanized base have also moved
from a condition of high mortality and fertility to low mortality and fertility."
Research using both historical and current data, nonetheless, lends support to the theory only in general terms.
Transition theorists support the broad thesis that traditional societies are characterized by high mortality and
fertility levels in contrast to the low vital rates in the
industrialized societies.

It is in their transition to mod-

ernization, that societies experience the demographic transition.

Apart from this broad pattern, there is no uniform-

ity in the actual process of transition of the modern
societies.

According to Ansley Coale, a leading transition

theorist (1974:

64-65), "the weakness of the concept is

associated with the difficulty of defining a precise threshold (a checklist of essential characteristics, or a combined
score on some socioeconomic scale) of modernization that
will reliably identify a population in which fertility is
ready to fall."
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Ansley Coale

(1974:

56-63) and Teitelbaum (1975:

176-177) have summarized some of the major differences, not
only among Western societies in their premodern states, but
also among the developing countries of the present day and
the premodern societies before the Industrial Revolution.
These differences highlight the discrepancies in the specifics of the demographic transition.

For example, wide varia-

tions existed in the fertility levels of premodern societies.

During the early nineteenth century, family size was

as low as 5.0 in Sweden while it was estimated to be well
over 8.0 in many African groups.
rate of over

Similarly, a fertility

45 per 1000 in countries such as Tanzania and

Iran is much higher than the rate of

35 pet• 1000 that

existed in early nineteenth century Britain.

These differ-

ences between pretransition Europe and the developing countries is primarily due to the prevalence of late marriage
and smaller proportion married in nineteenth century Western
Europe.

The practice of early and universal marriage in

most of today's developing societies is in direct contrast
to the Western pattern.

As Coale suggests

(1974:

56), "the

difference between the highest and lowest pre-transition
fertility levels is a magnitude comparable to the change in
fertility during the transition itself."
Another exception to the general model lies in the
process of transition.

According to the theory, the rapid

population growth in the transition stage is due to the lag
in the decline of mortality and fertility rates.

Reductions
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tality there are simply more couples."
Advocates of the transition theory (for
meyer, 1970:

example~

Kam-

502) hold that the notion of some increase in

fertility as a result of improved living conditions is not
incompatible with the transition theory.

Increases in birth

rates due to the improvements in the official recording of
births has also been noted in countries, such as Japan
(Taeuber, 1960).

There is, however, a serious difficulty

with this critique of the transition theory.

The critics,

in their argument for the role of the increase in fertility,
generally tend to ignore the relevance of declining mortality, even if largely indirect, in the accelerated population
growth in the early stages of modernization.
Tabbarah (1971:

For example,

267-268) speaks about the beneficial

impacts of health measures on improving fecundity by reducing the incidence of mortality and morbidity associated with
childbearing and consequently raising fertility.

Thus, both

declining mortality and rising fertility were common in the
initial stages of the transition and together led to the
population growth.
There is, however, no doubt that fertility rates
declined after the transitional stage and even after a
slight increase in the modernized nations.

The transition

theory generally holds that these reductions were achieved
by these societies in the process of their industrial development and modernization.

Nevertheless, considerable varia-

tions exist in terms of the economic stage at which fertil-
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ity began to decline in the West.
(1971:

According to Goldscheider

135-181), the birth rates began to decline in France

in the late 1700s, almost sixty years before industrialization took place.

On the other hand, declines in the English

fertility rates did not begin until nearly fifty years after
the Industrial Revolution.

Goldscheider suggests that the

nature of England's industrialization was compatible with
her delayed response.

Industrialization provided opportuni-

ties for rural to urban migration, reducing the pressure on
land and the pressure to limit family.

Alternately, the

possibility of utilizing family labor in the early factory
system increased the economic benefits of large families.
In France, in contrast, the small rural land holdings, the
result of the redistribution of land under the Napoleanic
code, increased the agricultural density.

This, coupled

with the dearth of rural to urban migration opportunities
(due to the late industrialization), created sufficient economic pressure on families, especially in the rural areas.
Faced with a choice between maintaining a large family and
reducing living standards or vice versa, they chose the latter.
These patterns also explain why, unlike the projections of the transition theory, urban fertility was higher
than rural fertility towards the end of the nineteenth century in countries such as France, Spain, Bulgaria, and Sweden.

Economic pressures to reduce fertility were not as

strong in the urban as in the rural areas.

It also suggests
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an explanation for the absence of prolonged lags between
declines in the death and birth rates in these countries.
pr~vail

Some of these factors
countries too (Teitelbaum,

1975:

in today's developing

176-177).

For example,

there are very few possibilities for substantial international migration and for occupational and rural to urban
mobility in developing countries.

These factors pressured

European populations, such as France and Sweden, to control
their fertility during their demographic transitions because
smaller families were one of the most effective means to
achieving higher living standards.

Yet, they have not led

to any large reductions in fertility in a majority of the
third world nations, suggesting that the relationship
between economic development and demographic transition is
not automatic.

A major difficulty in providing opportuni-

ties for spatial and occupational, especially agricultural
to non-agricultural movement, is the rapid rate of natural
increase in these countries.

This natural increase, at a

rate which is much higher than the rates that prevailed during the European transitions, is caused by the high fertility and the momentum for further population growth inherent
in the huge population base.

Opportunities for women to

enter the labor force, an important variable in fertility
reduction, is also restricted by the rapidly expanding labor
force.

Growing populations also hinder the provision of

universal education, consequently limiting the impact of
education on family size.
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A significant lead as to why the socio-economic trends
just discussed have not exercised the same influence in the
developing societies as they did in some of the European
societies is available in the recent research on the European transitions.

Coale (1974:

62-63) cites historical

research in Spain which indicates not socioeconomic, but
regional or linguistic bases for marital fertility differences in the early 1900s.

In other words, adjacent prov-

inces with similar languages and history had similar levels
of marital fertility, inspite of having different proportions of literacy and agricultural labor force.
Similar research using Latin American data by Beaver
(1975) reveals a fairly close correlation between the openness of a culture to outside influences and the declines in
fertility achieved.

For example, Argentina and Uruguay with

strong European backgrounds and openness to outside influences had the lowest fertility levels.

The least amount of

decline was evident in countries that were most resistant to
external influences, such as, the Indian cultures of Bolivia
and Paraguay.

Beaver proposes that even if the necessary

economic circumstances conducive to reductions in birth
rates prevail in a society, cultural factors may still
determine the timing and extent of the declines achieved.
At the same time, as Murdoch (1980:

52) indicates, economic

development, irrespective of the cultural setting, has
played a significant role in the low fertility rates of
groups such as the Chinese in Asia, the Indians, Goans, and
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Pakistanis in Uganda, and the Indians and Malays in Malaysia.
These developments dispute the automatic adjustment of
fertility to decreased mortality, industrialization, and
improved standards of living suggested by the Transition
theory.

They also provide the possibility of identifying

the precise circumstances in which fertility control will
Hence, Coale (1974:

begin.

65) delimits three broad condi-

tions necessary for a significant decrease in marital fertility to occur:

(1) fertility decisions, made consciously

by weighing, either implicitly or explicitly, the benefits
and demerits of having children, should be an acceptable and
viable behavior pattern in a culture; (2) it should be
socially and economically advantageous (even if only perceived) for couples to have small families;

(3) birth con-

trol information and methods must be easily and widely
available to the husband and wife who are sufficiently motivated and who jointly decide to utilize fertility regulation
methods.
Coale's propositions shed further light on the differences between the third world countries and the transitions
of countries, such as France and Sweden.

In most of the

developing countries, small families are perceived as disastrous, both economically and religiously.

Further, deliber-

ate fertility decisions are not an acceptable form of behavior among large sections of the populations, especially in
the early stages of their childbearing history.

The subor-
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dinate role of women and the informal taboos surrounding
discussions of sex, procreation, and family planning also
hinder efficient and sustained use of fertility control
methods.
Coale's statement of the three prerequisites is an
important first step toward restating the demographic transition theory at the micro level.

Demographic transition

theory, in its traditional form and even after accounting
for the variations in the details of the transition,
focusses on fertility and mortality and their relationship
with modernization at the aggregate level.

To quote Schut-

269), "the aggregate focus of the transition

zer (1978:

framework --- does not permit the easy incorporation of the
results of microlevel demographic research with a motivational focus."

Emphasis on the motivation or desire for

children will be a useful corrective to the notion of the
automatic movement of societies through the stages postulated by the transition theory.
Schutzer (1978:

276-279) provides a restatement of

the demographic transition theory using a microlevel fertility variable

1

--completed

fa~ily

size.

He concentrates on

completed family size as the focus of his revision for two
reasons.

It is in the context of the family that most fer-

tility decisions are arrived at in conjunction with the eco-

1

A similar revision was provided by Tabarrah in 1971,
although it was mainly a classification device. Schutzer,
however, does not seem to be aware of the work.
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nomic and social status of the family, and tastes, preferences, and other personal attitudes of the couple.

Further,

the completed family size provides the final picture of the
aggregate decisions, choices, implementation of the decisions, and changes in the decisions, if any, regarding the
number of children and the spacing that have been made over
the entire childbearing history.
Three indices of completed family size are used in the
revision.

The first index is natural fertility which is

"the size of completed family that would occur in the
absence of any voluntary control of fertility" (Schutzer,

1978:

277).

Desired fertility, the second index, is

defined as "the completed family size that those making fertility decisions view as optimum at the time the decisions
are being made" (1978:

277).

The size of the desired fam-

ily will be intluenced by socioeconomic considerations,
availability of time, and other extra-familial opportunities.

Actual fertility is the third index and is the result

of "a series of discrete decisions or non-decisions, as well
as an adjustment for the actual and anticipated loss of
children through premature mortality" (1978:

277).

Natural

and actual fertility are similar in that they are both
responsive to variations in nutritional and health conditions; yet, actual fertility, unlike natural fertility
involves the couples' attempt at adjusting to the environment.
The demographic transition of a nation involves a
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movement from a stage in which the size of the actual family
is determined by fecundity to a state of demographic development where the former is influenced by the size of the
desired family.

A nation could be demographically developed

at either a high or low desired family size.

Due to the

high infant and child mortality rates and cultural
restrictions (such as taboos regarding intei"coui"se dui"ing
bi"eastfeeding) on childbearing, the natural family size is
small in the eai"ly phases of demogi"aphic development.

Popu-

lations in the early stages of development lack definitive
notions of desii"ed family size and genei"ally the noi"m is to
have as many as one can.

Hence, the actual number of chil-

di"en couples have depends on the level of natui"al fei"tility.
Fei"tility at this stage, accoi"ding to Tabai"rah (1971:

269)

is a biological phenomenon.
In the process of improvements in the socioeconomic
contexts of nations and the modernization of their traditional cultui"al patterns (such as, equality between the man
and the woman), couples become aware of a family size that
is desirable.

With the development of this awareness,

nations enter the second stage of development.

At this

stage, desired family size theoretically can eithei" I"ise,
remain stable, or decline.

In reality, howevei", with mod-

ei"nization and its I"elated developments, desired family size
has in the long run tended to decline, even if there is an
initial short term increase.

In the unlikely event that

desired family size either remained constant at a high level
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(continuing the predevelopment notion of the more the better) or even rose consistently, the second stage would be
characterized by an increase in the actual family size in an
attempt to meet the high desires.

The increase in actual

fertility is made possible by the improvements in living
conditions.

Better nutrition and higher health standards

improve fecundity by reducing the incidence of morbidity and
mortality associated with childbearing.

Populations enter

the third stage when the high family size desires are actualized.
Although, according to Schutzer's theory, such a culmination of the transition where both desired and actual
fertility remain high is a theoretical possibility, it is

.

unlikely that high fertility will persist in the context of
advanced modernization.

Nor is high fertility desirable

from the perspective of a nation's overall population growth
and economic development.

These developments, therefore,

cannot accurately be viewed as the third or final stage in
the transition.

It would be more appropriate to state that

societies characterized by such fertility patterns remain
'stuck' in the second stage.
If, on the other hand, desired family size declines in
the second stage, it will fall below the increasing biological fertility levels at some point in this stage.

At that

phase, actual family size will be higher than the desired
family size.

Again, demographic development will be reached

in the third stage when couples adopt various measures to
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bring their actual family size in conformity with their lowered desired family size.
According to Schutzer (1978:

278), family planning

programs providing birth control information and methods
will be most successful in reducing actual family size only
at the point where the actual family size of a group or a
population is in excess of what is desired.

Prior to this

stage, no sizeable reductions in actual family size can be
achieved.

Nevertheless, he argues that family planning pro-

grams could be used earlier to influence family size desires
by legitimizing the small family norm and to encourage the
practice of family planning even if only for spacing and
health reasons.

Since desired family size is determined

within the constraints of social, economic, and other psychological factors, fertility in the third stage is a socioeconomic phenomenon.

In the second stage it is partly soci-

o-economic and partly biological (Tabarrah, 1971:

269).

Schutzer cautions that this model does not apply to
individual couples in the sense that they do not move
through the various stages delineated above.

Rather, dif-

ferent populations, as a result of shifts in its members'
fertility aspirations and behavior undergo changes in the
patterns of their fertility.

Thus, it is possible to iden-

tify the stage of demographic development that a population
or a subgroup has reached, by analyzing their family size
desires, actual family size, and the level of their modernization.
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Most developing nations of today are in the second
stage of their demographic development, with a declining
desired family size pattern.

Several trends that prevail in

these developing countries have the potential of speeding up
their demographic development so that their actual family
size is brought in conformity with their declining desired
family size.

Teitelbaum (1975:

177) suggests some examples

of these positive trends such as the moderately rapid pace
of development, international aid in development, and the
role of governments in the national family planning programs
which can not only provide the methods of family limitation
but can also legitimize the small family as an economically
viable norm.
Role Of Modernization In the Demographic Transition Theory
Schutzer, in his attempt at modifying the transition
theory, was mainly concerned with using micro fertility
variables to postulate the process of demographic development.

He does not analyze in any depth the factors--for

example, modernization, development, and family planning--that bring about the changes in fertility.

Both macro and

micro fertility studies, conducted with the transition
theory as either an explicit or implicit organizing framework, incorporate indicators of modernization as explanatory
factors.

Conceptualization of the indices of modernization
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has closely followed the developments in modernization
theory.

Studies in the classical structural-functional

model of modernization use a macro-sociological approach to
explain how modernization involves changes in societal
institutions, in the interrelationships among institutions,
and in the cultural values of the society, and the structural consequences of these changes.

The transition theory,

in its original formulation used macro social and structural
changes--industrialization, urbanization, changes in the
occupational and income structure, changes in the cultural
norms, changes in the structure of the family--in accounting
for fertility and mortality declines.
While the structural models refer to modernization at
the societal level, the theorists in the social psychological model of modernization deal with those sets of attitudes, values, and behavior of individuals that are prerequisites for their participation in modern society or are
even acquired by such participation.

When applied to trans-

ition theory social psychological modernity was used as an
intervening variable (Miller and Inkeles, 1974) to spell out
the mechanisms through which societal modernization influenced fertility behavior.

Miller and Inkeles (1974:

171)

define social psychological modernity to include elements
such as openness to new experience, belief in one's ability
to control one's fate to some extent, emphasis on planning
and punctuality, independence from traditional parental
authority, and the acceptance of such ideas as those of mod-
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ern science, equality of women, and family size limitation.
These characteristics developed by individuals in the process of modernization motivate them to adopt birth control
and to limit their family size.
These models of modernization and the transition
theory have been criticized on several grounds (Tipps,

1973).

One major criticism is that classical theories are

ethnocentric.

They assumed that all societies would follow

a unilinear path and converge toward the model of the modern
capitalist (Western) society.

As discussed

earl~er,

critics

of both the modernization and transition theory point out
the considerable diversity in the timing and pattern of
changes in the development of the developed societies themselves.

In the case of modernization, for example, Goode

(1966) has discounted the obvious link between modernization
and the nuclear family system.

Industrial societies them-

selves reveal a wide variety of family systems and in some
societies the nuclear family system existed even before
industrialization.

Examples also exist of non-Western soci-

eities that have modernized and completed their demographic
transitions through paths different from those of the classical transitions.

In Japan, it was the committment to the

Emperor and to the family, a collectivistic orientation, and
lack of social mobility--factors that hampered economic
change in the West--that encouraged the modernization of the
Meiji period (Hagen, 1958).
Criticisms have also been brought against the classi-
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cal theorists' conception of the relation between tradition
and modernity.

The classical theorists viewed tradition and

modernity as mutually exclusive.

Therefore, when moderniza-

tion took place old traditions were weakened and replaced by
the modern.

Critics, on the other hand, point to the conti-

nuity between the traditional and modern eras.

Gusfield

(1967) discusses how the caste and joint family, considered
impediments to economic growth, have in fact proved to be
mobilizing elements in both traditional and modern India.
Similarly, Freedman (1979:

63-79) cites the case of Taiwan

where large scale adoption of contraceptives and the rapid
decline in fertility were achieved even when the family
maintained many of its traditional features and attitudes.
The extended family structure where older parents live with
their married sons, where children provide financial support
to their parents in old age, and where intergenerational
kinship ties predominate are some examples of these traditional elements.
A third difficulty with the classical model centers on
the inclusiveness of the concept of modernization rendering
it 'vague and confused' (Nettle and Robertson, 1966:

281).

The breadth of the concept precludes specifying the limits
of its application; consequently, it eludes a precise definition.

Goldberg (1975:

91) addresses the same issue in

discussing modernization in relation to fertility.

He

argues for selecting only those variables that have a direct
impact on fertility instead of using the large set of val-
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ues, attitudes, and behaviors that are attributed to modern
men.
These criticisms necessitated and have resulted in a
reformulation of the classical model of modernization and
its relation to the demographic transitions.

In the revised

model, there is a greater emphasis on the role that premodern conditions play in the future developments of these
societies and in their adaptations to borrowed elements.
The revisionist school does not subscribe to the automatic
spread of the modernization process, and consequently the
automatic completion of the demographic transition.

They

recognize the variations, the stresses and the strains, and
even reversals that may occur in the process of modernization.

The differences in starting points and the different

paths each society takes results in a constant interplay
between the traditional and modern forces, creating unique
features in the modernized and modernizing societies.

It,

therefore, becomes necessary to examine the divergences in
the modernization and the demographic transitions in different countries.

Distinctions have to be made between the

developed and developing countries.

Even among the devel-

oped countries, there is the need to differentiate between
the capitalist and socialist countries (Desai, 1976:
99-100) and to work out the specifics of each national modernization and demographic transition.

No single model--

-capitalist or socialist--can be replicated because of the
different nature of individual societies.
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Despite these variations, modern societies do possess
some common features.

O'Connel (1976:

summarizes them in three categories:

17-24) succinctly
(1) an analytical-cau-

sal and inventive outlook which refers to the development of
an inquiring mind and inventive attitude, both at the individual and societal level; this outlook results in (2) the
rapid accumulation of tools and techniques;

(3) and the

flexibility of will and the capacity of both the society and
the individual to accept and adopt to new changes without
breaking down.

In demographic terms, these modernized soci-

eties are characterized by low mortality and fertility.
With regard to fertility, the three broad elements (specified by Coale and discussed earlier) concerning the small
family norm, the nature of fertility decisions, and the
availability of birth control technology prevail in the modernized context.
Nevertheless, an overarching model, either in the
theory of modernization or demographic transition, does not
seem empirically feasible.

It appears feasible to develop

regional models, applicable to areas with similar cultural
histories or backgrounds.

The present study is to be viewed

as an attempt to specify a system of factors that will be
most relevant to the achievement of fertility declines in
Kerala and ultimately in India and may consequently lead to
the completion of the Indian demographic transition.
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Model Of The Modernization-Demographic Transition Tradition
In attempting to provide a causal explanation of the
demographic trends, transition theory, being a theory of
social change,

attemp~s

to link micro level changes implic-

itly or explicitly with macro level changes.

Using a frame-

work provided by r.Uller and Inkeles (1974), an inclusive
model could be stated as follows:

societal modernization as

indicated by changes in social institutions from the traditional to modern forms
modern institutions

-->

individual participation in these

--> emergence of modern attitudes and

aspirations which include small family size norms
rable attitudes toward limiting families
use of birth limitation

-->

--> favo-

individuals'

--> ability to actualize small fam-

ily norms --> societal modernization.

This model, thus,

links different levels of variables--macro social, social
psychological, and psychological--in explaining how fertility declines could be achieved.
Many studies, particularly those undertaken in the
tradition of the classical Demographic Transition theory,
remain purely at the macro level of analysis.

They use

macro structural indicators of the social, cultural, economic, ecological, and demographic situation to explain differences and changes in fertility rates.

However, these

variables, such as urbanization, industrialization, changes
in value orientations, and educational improvements, are not
viewed as influencing fertility per se; they are used as
indicators which implicitly reflect changes occurring in the
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life patterns of individuals or their households and which
collectively influence fertility in a given direction.

Most

of these studies merely indicate the extent of the relationship between social and economic modernization and fertility
rates.

They do not specify the causal nature of the rela-

tionship.

In order to specify how social and economic

development influences fertility rates, it is necessary to
incorporate micro level variables in the modernization-fertility relationship.

Development does not operate in a vac-

uum; it induces changes in fertility through its effect on
individuals.
At the other extreme are found studies that operate
only at the individual level in the case of both the causal
and fertility variables.

The micro economic theory of fer-

tility uses principles of consumer behavior to explain variations in individual fertility and behavior.

The micro-eco-

nomic independent variables, such as changes in income,
prices, and tastes, are viewed as manifestations of macro
level social and economic development.
In between the above two extremes are those studies
that attempt to link macrostructural indicators of urbanization, industrialization, and modernization with micro-fertility indices through intervening micro variables. The
model presented at the beginning of this section specifies
several kinds of intervening variables.
(1971:

Rosen and Simmons

49-51) discuss the rationale underlying this model.

Urbanization and industrialization, and their objective man-
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ifestations--the cost of raising a family in circumstances
where almost everything has to be bought in the market, the
declining economic utility of children, the cost of their
education, rising material aspirations--impose strains on
the economic resources at the disposal of the family and
make large families expensive.

But, these influences on

family size operate through values, attitudes, and capabilities that individuals acquire in these modern circumstances,
enabling them to respond more effectively to the challenges
and strains of urban industrial life.
argue (1971:

As Rosen and Simmons

50), "an analysis of fertility decline, there-

fore, should link social structural factors which influence
fertility with data about personal orientations and modes of
decision making which help men and women respond to social
circumstances."
Much research has been done in establishing many of
the relationships that can be delineated among the variables
considered above.

But, a majority of the research studies

is restricted in the range of variables considered simultaneously and as a coherent system.

Studies emphasizing the

psychological and social psychological aspects of modernization are limited in the range of variations in the macro
social contexts in which the relationships are examined.
Many studies examining the influence of social psychological
factors on family size ar-e restricted to the urban ar-eas.
Some examples are the Indianapolis study by Kiser and Whelpton (1958); Groat and Neal's study in Toledo, Ohio (1967);
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the study of fertility and family planning in Taiwan by
Freedman, Takeshita, and Sun (1964); Rainwater's study of a
sample in Chicago, Cincinnati, and Oklahoma city (1965);
Stoke's study on family structure and socioeconomic variations as related to fertility in Lexington, Kentucky (1973);
Michel's study of the French urban family (1967); Mitchell's
study of the family in urban Hong Kong (1972); and Khalifa's
study (1973) in Cairo, Egypt.

At the same time, studies are

also limited to rural areas alone (Crader and Belcher, 1975;
George, 1973).
Unlike most of the aforementioned studies which
include a sufficient range in the variations in social and
economic status, others (Miller and Inkeles, 1974) concentrate on certain educational and occupational strata.

There

is also another set of research in which social and psychological factors are omitted.

Such studies use only demo-

graphic and socioeconomic variables to explain differential
fertility (Loebner nad Driver, 1973; Kim, Rider, Harper, and
Yang, 1974). These lacunae have rendered difficult the task
of specifying the mediating mechanisms between the social
structural and social psychological levels of analysis.
Two additional patterns can also be delineated in fertility studies (Mitchell, 1972).

One group consists of

research on the causes and correlates of differentials in
family size desires and actual fertility.

The second trend

pertains to studies attempting to identify the social and
psychological factors that influence the knowledge and atti-
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tudes regarding family planning technology and the motivation to adopt it.

Many of the studies in the latter tradi-

tion, especially those pertaining to India, are limited to
the adoption of specific methods of contraception, mainly
IUD and sterilization.

The KAP surveys, dealing with birth

control knowledge, attitudes, and practices, conducted in
many countries are another example of the primary emphasis
on family planning.

Even research dealing with both kinds

of variables--family size norms/actual family size and attitude to/practice of family planning--tend to conceptualize
them separately as two ways of operationalizing the same
variable, fertility.

Consequently, they examine the rela-

tionships of independent variables first to family size
norms and behavior and then to the family planning variable
or vice versa.
It is important to examine the interrelationships
between these two aspects of fertility behavior.

Research

has documented that when a larger number of children are
desired, the need to accept family planning and to practice
it diligently is less imperative (Sagi, Potter, and Westoff,

1962).

In accordance with Schutzer's (1978) modification of

the transition theory (see also Davis, 1975:

33), the

emphasis on the provision of family planning itself, without
the necessary changes in family size norms, is not sufficient to achieve substantial declines in actual fertility.
At the same time, the role of favorable attitudes to and
practice of family planning in reducing actual fertility
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also needs to be analyzed.

Such an analysis would provide a

test of the efficacy of family planning programs in realizing its ultimate goal of reducing the number of children
each couple has.

Unfortunately, much of the research on

this relationship between family planning and fertility has
been limited to the aggregate leve1.

2

Most of the other fertility research deals with limited subsets of relationships within the broad model set
forth at the beginning of this section.

Some examples are

studies dealing with the impact of education on family size
(Janowitz, 1976), female labor force participation and fertility (Havens and Gibbs, 1975), the role of husband-wife
communication and conjugal role relationships in acceptance
of family planning in the rural-urban context (Mukherjee,

1975; Olson-Prather, 1976), the age at marriage-fertility
relationship in the context of socioeconomic differentials
(Bumpass, 1969), and the influence of infant mortality on
the size of the family (Balakrishnan, 1978; Devi, 1978).
There are a few studies that in different ways incorporate macro structural factors, data on personal orientations, and decision

makiP~

patterns in order to explain fer-

tility differentials (including all the relevant fertility
variables).

One such early study was the Puerto Rican study

by Hill, Stycos, and Bach (1959).

2

They began with a wide

The most important examples are Mauldin and Berelson's
research (1978) and Tsui and Bogue's study (1978) discussed
in Chapter I.
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range of variables representing different levels of analysis--macro structural or background variables, value orientations, specific family size attitudes, family

a~tion

pos-

sibilities, and knowledge, and attitudes toward means of
family limitation--and related them to different measures of
fertility.

But in the course of the analysis, several of

the independent variables which were empirically established
at the beginning as being related to fertility were omitted
through the use of the factor analytic model.

Further use

of the factoring technique brought out just husband-wife
communication as a significant variable, while the social
status factors were related to fertility only indirectly
through communication.

A further disappointment was that

the range of variations in social status was limited to the
lower classes.

Thus, as Goldberg (1975:

87) remarked, "The

empirical potential of the study was destroyed.

And proba-

bly more important, some of the better hypothesis were
pushed to the sidelines."
Goldberg's study of Ankara (Turkey) and Mexico City

(1975) is another attempt to use background variables and a
set of intervening variables as they relate to expected number of children and practice of family planning considered
separately.

The background variables he used were wife's

place of birth, wife's education, and husband's income; the
intervening mechanisms were focussed on women's activities,
her perceptions, and attitudes (which together he calls the
Truncated Modernism Index, TMI), and other exposure to mod-
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ernization variables.

He found that TMI and wife's educa-

tion, which has only an indirect effect through TMI, dominate the relation to expected number of children, while TMI
and possession of modern objects dominate the relationship
to use of family planning.

While Goldberg is obviously

interested in providing a broad pattern of the relationships
between variables that are causally related to fertility
declines in two developing countries, he does not pay too
much attention to the relationship between factors closer to
the ultimate outcome desired--reduced family size.

More

specifically, he treats expected family size 3 and use of
family planning data separately as two dependent variables.
The significance of analyzing the relationship between these
two variables, especially in the context of the effectiveness of the family planning programs undertaken by most
developing countries, can hardly be overemphasized.
Finally, Rosen and Simmons' study (1971) on Brazil
also sets forth a model including structural, social psychological, and psychological variables as they relate to family size.

They acknowledge that their framework specifies

only some of the intervening links between industrialization
and fertility.

Most notably missing are data related to the

means of family limitation.

Brazil still firmly believes in

larger populations as economic and political assets and did

3 Expected family size is used as a proxy for actual family size.
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not launch a

fo~al

family planning program until 1974 (Tak,

Haub, and Murphy, 1979:

37) while the study was conducted

during 1963-1965.
Theoretical Significance Of The Study
On the basis of the preceding discussion and the
review of the available literature, the theoretical significance of this study can be identified clearly.

There have

been only a few studies that simultaneously incorporate both
macro social and micro level variables in explaining fertility.

Although these studies have been done in developing

countries, no attempt has been made to set forth and study a
coherent system of interrelated factors that may influence
family size in India, the largest of such countries.

The

relevance of this approach for India lies in the problems
that the rapid population growth poses for her social and
economic development, which necessitates analyzing the problem from as many different angles as possible.
Secondly, India is in the state of transition from a
traditional to a modern society.

This transition period

provides an advantageous set-up for studying the extent to
which the structural changes in India correspond to changes
in attitudes, beliefs, and cultural values, and how these
changes affect related fertility behavior.

Given the uneve-

ness of modernization across the Indian society, wide variations are available to study the effects of India's transition to a modern society on fertility changes at the
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normative and behavioral levels.

Besides, some of the

unique features of the Indian social structure--such as the
caste system, the joint family, and religious diversity--have survived the modernizing trends and continue to operate in modified forms in modern India.

These institutions

play an important role in the life of an Indian and need to
be incorporated in the study of Indian fertility.

The uni-

queness of both the traditional and modern social structures
in India warrant the special consideration of the Indian
demographic transition and the identification of the factors
that will help bring about reductions in fertility.
Further, the studies that simultaneously incorporate
variables operating on different levels of analysis have
been done among predominantly Catholic populations, such as
in Puerto Rico, Brazil, and Mexico city, with Goldberg's
Ankara, which has a majority Muslim population, as the major
exception.

Religion exerts an overriding influence on val-

ues, attitudes, and behavior, in general and particularly
with regard to procreation and its control.

This is partic-

ularly true of traditional and modernizing societies.

This

study with its concentration on Hindus and non-Catholic
Christians of Kerala, India, would provide a cross-religious
reference.
Finally, as was discussed in the previous chapter,
Kerala, the state in which the study is conducted presents
an anomalous situation with regard to the problem that is
being investigated here.

Apart from the social and economic
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characteristics detailed in Chapter I, Kerala, also has the
highest proportion of female literates and mean age at
effective marriage among all the states in India.

It was

also the first state to push for intensive family planning
programs through the organization of camps and other services.

Its people possess a high level of political con-

sciousness and it was the first state to vote a communist
government into power democratically.

Kerala is, therefore,

modernized in certain respects although it remains traditional (for example, the poor living standards) in others.
Despite the relative economic poverty, Kerala has succeeded
in reducing its rate of population growth and birth rates to
some extent.

It, thus, provides an opportunity for identif-

ying the factors that have contributed to the initiation of
the downward trend in fertility.

At the same time, Kerala's

experience also demonstrates that concommittant improvements
in at least most of the relevant societal aspects (such as
living standards) are necessary to speed up further the fertility decline that has already begun.

CHAPTER III

A MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF FERTILITY DIFFERENTIALS

A brief review of the Demographic Transition theory
and the existing literature in that tradition presented in
Chapter II suggests the need for conceptualizing both macro
and micro variables as a relevant system in the analysis of
the determinants of fertility.

In accordance with this

argument, several sets of variables will be used in this
study as causes and correlates of fertility decline.

They

represent the two phenomena--modernization and family plan-

.

ning--which have been the focus of competing schools of
thought regarding variations

in fertility.

Figure 1 pres-

ents the model and the causal relationships among the variables to be investigated in this study.
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Background Or Structural Variables
The background variables are essentially group variables reflecting the influence of group norms on individual
behavior.

Anker (1973:

64) for example, argues that social

groups, such as caste, village, and tribes, are highly cohesive in developing countries.

These groups regulate the

attitudes and behavior patterns of their members, including
fertility.

Hence, it can be hypothesized that membership in

a societal group will influence family size norms and behavior of couples over and above their individual characteristics.
Rural/Urban Area Of Residence
Rural or urban area of residence is the first structural variable.

Rural and urban areas represent different

levels of modernization and industrialization.

At the same

time, they also provide different economic, social, cultural, and demographic opportunities to their members.
Early research in the classical demographic transition
framework conceived of urbanization and industrialization as
direct influences on fertility •

In the rural areas, where

children were productive at an early age, they constituted
an important source of income to the family.

Urban chil-

dren, in contrast, represented higher costs than benefits to
their parents.

It was, therefore, assumed that urban cou-

ples would have fewer children than rural couples.

73
The evidence on the effects of rural and urban
residence on fertility is mixed.

Birdsall (1980:

31-32)

presents data from the recent World Fertility Survey for
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka which indicate very little difference in rural and urban family sizes.

Couples with higher

levels of education (more than primary school in Bangladesh
and grades 10-11 in Sri Lanka) are the only exception.

On

the other hand, in many Latin American countries (Murdoch,
1980:

46-48) and Thailand (Birdsall, 1980:

31) urban fer-

tility has been and is still lower than rur.al fertility.
These differences are due mainly to the higher standards of
living in the cities.

Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Indonesia,

where differences in rural and urban fertility are minimal
are contrasting examples of countries in which economic welfare has been extended to the rural areas also.

Residence

in the city or village in itself may, therefore, not be an
important differentiating factor in fertility.

It is the

differences between the rural and urban areas in the access
to modern institutions (manifested in higher education,
higher income, lower infant mortality, higher status of
women, and openness to new ideas among urban respondents)
and the participation in these institutions that seem relevant.
Kerala, the focus of this study, has succeeded in
reducing the inequalities, specifically in the access to
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health care and education, among its cities and villages.
While Kerala has achieved significant reductions in its
aggregate rural fertility, it is not clear whether differences in urban and rural fertility, especially at the individual level, have been eliminated.

Further, urban resi-

dence is still a precondition for easier access to higher
education and other modern amenities and values.

Hence,

this study will consider rural and urban area of residence
as a structural variable.
Religion
Religion, the second background variable, is a pervading traditional influence in the life of every Indian.

Hin-

duism, in particular, attaches social and religious significance to children.

For example, a barren woman, and even a

woman without sons, is socially ostracized, although secularization processes are gradually eroding these traditional
patterns.
Research on the effect of religion on fertility (as
presented in Murdoch, 1980:

49-50) reveal only a slight

impact of religious background, such as Catholicism, Christianity, and Islam, on fertility.

When differences exist,

as in the case of non-Catholic Christians in Lebanon, whose
family size is lower than that of Muslims, they are limited
to the poorer classes.
This study concentrates on the Hindus in comparison to
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the Protestants in Kerala.

The Protestant ethic of these

non-Catholic Christians is in direct contrast to .the sense
of resignation central to traditional Hinduism.

These dif-

ferences and their effects on fertility may be reduced
within the secular atmosphere of the cities.

In the rural

areas, the attitude of resignation to one's destiny may be
reflected in higher fertility among the Hindu women in comparison to the Christians.
Caste Status
Closely allied with religion is the caste status of
individuals, which has both religious and social significance.

In traditional India, the caste system exercizes a

very conservative influence.

Membership in a caste was. (and

still is) determined solely by birth; consequently, access
to the educational, occupational, and other social opportunities provided by a caste group was limited to its members.
There were, thus, no opportunities for individual mobility.
Given the low economic and social status of the lower
castes, their higher fertility (Loebner and Driver, 1973
using 1958 data and Anker's study in eleven villages of
Gujerat state, 1973) was predictable.

However, moderniza-

tion and the preferential policies in the field of education
and jobs, aimed at helping the lower castes may have had
some modernizing consequences for the fertility behavior of
the lower castes, especially in the cities.

Hence, the
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caste status of respondents is the third structural variable
in the model.
Age Of The Respondent
The last background variable, age of the respondent,
represents a demographic grouping, with important fertility
relevant implications.

Age of the respondent, which aids in

evaluating cohort differences in fertility is important for
two reasons.

The older cohorts tend to be more conservative

than the younger cohorts who have had a better chance of
participating in the modernizing processes that began in the
early 1950s, after India gained Independence.

They also

differ in their exposure to the organized family planning
program, the vigorous implementation of which began in the
late sixties and early seventies.

The older respondents

would have been exposed to the program later in their childbearing than the younger women, necessitating control for
the differential exposure.

It also provides a time dimen-

sion to the problem of the impact of modernization and family planning on fertility.

In other words, smaller families

of the younger women will suggest shifts towards lower fertility over time.
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Intervening Social And Economic Characteristics
Each set of intervening variables in the model deals
with specific opportunities provided by the rural and urban
areas which may have an impact on fertility.

Social and

economic characteristics of the respondent's family and of
the respondent herself comprise the first set of intervening
variables.
Family's Socio-Economic Status
The family is one of the most cohesive social groups
in a developing country, such as India.

It is the source of

identity, social, economic, and personal, for the individual, and particularly for the woman.

Hence, the status of

the family needs to be incorporated in the analysis of fertility.
How does the status of the family affect fertility?
Theoretically, it can be argued that the influence of industrialization, urbanization, secularization, and increased
social mobility will be mediated partly through the shifts
toward opportunities for the kind of education, occupation,
and income that are typical of modernizing societies.

More

specifically, improvements in the educational and occupational status of the family reduce the parents' dependence
on children as additional sources of income or even as
security in old age (Tak, Haub, and Murphy, 1979:
Birdsall, 1980:

32-33; Murdoch, 1980:

39-41).

31-32;
Higher
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socio-economic status of the family, by alleviating poverty
and insecurity, also renders future planning and a sense of
control over one's life (including family size) a realistic
possibility.

For individual couples, improvements in socio-

economic status open up opportunities for other lifestyles
and material goods and services that may compete with children.

Families with higher status are also aware of the

advantages of higher education and occupation for their own
children, creating incentives to spend more time and money
on a few children.

Thus, improvements in the social and

economic status of the families affect changes in the
tastes, outlook, preferences, consumption styles, and receptivity to new ideas.

These changes, in turn, will create

the motivation for small families.

They will also aid in

the realization of these changed desires because information
on methods of family limitation is generally more accessible
to the educated and the literate.
Three indices of socioeconomic status are used in the
preliminary analysis of this study:

husband's education,

his occupation, and extent of modern items owned.

Husband's

education, the social status variable, is measured in completed years of education.

Occupational status is opera-

tionalized as a continuum ranging from the unemployed to the
professionals (see Table 12 in Chapter

5).

The modern item

index, the economic component of socio-economic status, is
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defined as the number of modern items owned by each
household.

These items range from airconditioners, washing

machines, telephones, and cars to refrigerators, radios,
clocks, and steel utensils, among others.

The assumption

underlying the operationalization of this variable is that
those who own the more expensive and modern items, such as
airconditioning and telephone, would also own the less
expensive items.
Previous research on the influence of the family's
socio-economic status on fertility suggests a largely indirect relationship between the two, irrespective of whether
husband's education, his occupation or modern items is used
as an index of status (Rosen and Simmons, 1971; Loebner and
Driver, 1973; Goldberg, 1975; Graff, 1979).

Some of the

intervening factors in the socio-economic status-fertility
relationship have been age at marriage, conjugal role relationships, and preferred family size.
Respondent's Socio-Economic Status
The social and economic characteristics of the respondent form the second set of intervening variables.

Women

are more directly responsible for bearing and rearing children; consequently, the costs of children, in terms of time
and lost opportunities are greater for women.

Hence, the

woman's status can be expected to have a separate effect on
fertility.

Three indices are used to measure the respon-

Ro
dent's status.

The respondent's education, measured as the

number of completed years of education, is the first index
of her status.

Her labor force participation status, i.e.,

whether she works (coded as 1) or not (coded as zero) is
used as a second measure.

Further, it can be argued that

not just her employment, but the nature, and therefore, the
status of her employment will also be significant in studying fertility variations.

Respondents' occupational status

is, thus, the third index of her socio-economic status.
Women's education is generally accepted as one of the
strongest and most persistent modernizing influences on fertility.

Murdoch (1980:

42) presents data around the early

1960s for Puerto Rico, Chile, India, Thailand, Taiwan, and
Ghana to demonstrate the negative relationship between
female education and family size.

Invariably, the family

size of higher educated women is closer to replacement fertility while that of lower educated women is more than double the replacement level.

This inverse relationship has

persisted into the 1970s as the World Fertility survey data
indicate (Birdsall, 1980:

31).

Similar to men, higher edu-

cation induces changes in the values and norms of women, as
women critically evaluate the traditional customs and behavior of their parents.

Even more important for the women is

the relatively independent social status and the opportunities for advancement outside the home that higher education
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confers on them.

Given that women have a more direct

involvement in childcare, the educated woman stands to lose
more opportunities than her less educated counterpart and
even men with the same qualifications.
as Birdsall (1980:

For these reasons,

29) concludes, women's education has a

stronger modernizing influence on family size than men's
education.
Another major source of higher social status for the
woman, and which consequently would have a suppressive
effect on fertility, is her labor force participation.

Giv-

ing up her job or taking time off to raise children is an
indirect cost that the working woman incurs and this indirect cost will adversely affect her family size decisions.
Her employment outside her home also opens up other

non-fa~

ily oriented means of personal satisfaction, such as financial gains, companionship, recreation, and other activities
outside the family.
There is, however, a limitation on the women's employment-fertility relationship.

For example, data from Turkey

(Stycos and Weller, 1967) suggest that female employment
reduces family size only when the working role of the woman
is incompatible with her role as wife and mother.

In other

words, women's employment in agricultural or cottage industries, particularly in the rural areas of developing countries, will not have a strong effect in lowering fertility
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because
child~en

he~ wo~k

would

pe~it

simultaneously.

he~

to take

Thus, it is not

ca~e

of her

me~ely

her labor

force participation, but her employment status too, that is
the major determinant of family size (see also Havens and
Gibbs, 1975).
Generally, women in higher status occupations--white
collar and professional jobs--also tend to have higher education.

It is, therefore, possible that part of the modern-

izing effect of female employment on fertility is due to the
influence of education.

42-43), however,

Murdoch (1980:

cites Puerto Rican data to demonstrate that women's employment has a negative influence on family size, even after the
effect of their education has been accounted for.
Rosen and Simmons (1971:

Thus, as

51) suggest, the nature of the

work a woman is engaged in will have a suppressing impact on
fertility by altering her perception of

he~

role in the

society and in her family.

Intervening Demographic Variables: ~At Marriage and
Infant Mo~tality
Age At Marriage
Age at which women marry is another

inte~vening

mecha-

nism through which education and employment of women influence

fe~tility.

Higher education leads to postponement of
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marriage, because marriages are generally delayed until
women complete their education.

Women with higher education

also tend to seek employment, which again delays their marriage.

Age at marriage, in turn, can influence fertility in

two ways.

The socio-economic effect of age at marriage is

mediated by the antecedent factors of wife's education and
her occupation.

Women who marry later tend to have higher

education and tend to be employed in higher status occupations.1 This higher status provides her with non-familial
oriented opportunities and interests, which exercise a negative influence on fertility.
Age at marriage also has a quantitative influence on
fertility, particularly when a society experiences very little extramarital fertility, as is the case in India.
Delayed marriage shortens the reproductive life of women
within marriage and reduces their exposure to the risk of
pregnancies, thereby leading to fewer births.

At the socie-

tal level, rising age at marriage slows down the rate of
1The variable occupational status refers to the occupation at the time of the interview. Yet, it can be hypothesized to affect causally age at marriage in Kerala. Generally, women tend to get employed, if they ever do, before
they get married for two reasons. Employment enhances their
chances of finding a good husband, particularly in terms of
his socioeconomic status. Second, given the extremely tight
employment situation, if a woman does not seek and get a job
immediately after her education, her chances of finding
employment later would be almost nonexistent. Hence, it can
be assumed that the vast majority of these women who have
jobs had them before they got married.
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population growth by increasing the number of single women
and lengthening the interval between generations (Birdsall,
1980:

33).
Evidence on the age at marriage-fertility relationship

is mixed.

Pathak (1980:

412-414), after reviewing several

studies undertaken in different regions of India between
1961 and 1974, found women who married between the ages of
15 and 19 to have had on the average one child more than
those marrying after 19 years of age.

Yet, Birdsall (1980:

33) presents data indicating that age at marriage did not
explain any significant additional variation in the fertility rates of countries, once life expectancy and adult literacy were introduced.

Hence, according to Birdsall,

delayed marriage in itself cannot cause lower fertility,
which in effect upholds the socio-economic influence of age
at marriage.
Studies, such as the one done by Kim, Rider, Harper,
and Young (1974) in Korea, in contrast, consider age at marriage to be a strong predictor of family size, even after
the effects of socio-economic variables, such as education,
rural-urban residence, economic status, and exposure to mass
media, have been controlled.

Such research lends support

for the quantitative effect of age at marriage on fertility.
At the same time, another study conducted in India in
1958 (Loebner and Driver, 1973) demonstrated a weak positive
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relationship between age at marriage and family size, when
the duration of marriage, number of years husband and wife
lived together, and women's age were controlled.
to Loebner and Driver (1973:

According

340), the positive relation-

ship was an indication of the prevalence of adolescent sterility in women who married early.

They also suggested that

women who married late probably tend to "catch up" for lost
years by having frequent births.
It is possible to make some sense of these contradictory results.

As the authors of the Mysore Population study

(U.N., 1961) indicated, a threshold level of age at marriage
exists which can aid in separating the positive and negative
effects of age at marriage.

In the case of women who marry

very early, fertility in the early years of their marriage
will be low because of the lag between the marriage and its
consummation and subfecundity following menarche.

In such a

society (which probably was the situation at the time Loebner and Driver's sample was entering marriage), reducing the
number of very early marriages is likely to result in an
increase in fertility.

Moreover, since delaying marriage

tends to affect the health of the woman favorably, it may
again increase fertility in later years.

In contrast, it is

when marriages are delayed beyond a threshold level that the
negative effect of a briefer reproductive span on fertility
will become evident.

Research attempting to calculate the
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family size reductions achieved by raising the age at
marriage in India generally use 18-20 years as an average
threshold in drawing comparisons (Pathak, 1980). 2 In the
Korean sample (Kim, et. al, 1974), in which the quantitative
influence was established, the mean age at marriage for
women around 1970 was 25 to 26 years.

The mean age at

effective marriage for women in Kerala was 20.9 around 1971,
the highest among all the states in India.

Hence, both the

socio-economic and quantitative effects of age at marriage
on family size can be expected to prevail in this study.
Infant Mortality
Each of the aspects of modernization described thus
far contribute to the promotion of responsible parenthood
and to the protection of the health of the mother and the
child.

The extent of infant mortality, an important indica-

tor of the health of children, is therefore an index of modernization.

It also is a correlate of fertility because in

the long run, declines in infant mortality are consistently
associated with reduced fertility (Mauldin and Berelson,
1978; Oeschli and Kirk, 1975; Balakrishnan, 1978; Devi,
1978).

For example, Mauldin and Berelson found a strong

correlation between the level of child mortality in 1970 and

2

The minimum legal age at marriage for women in India was
15 since 1955 and it was raised to 18 in 1976.
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the declines in birth rates between 1965 and 1975.

In other

words, countries that had lower levels of infant mortality
had experienced greater fertility declines.
High rates of infant mortality is generally hypothesized to have two types of effects--replacement and insurance effects--on fertility (Balakrishnan, 1978).

Families

which suffer child mortality may attempt to replace their
losses.

At the same time, personal experiences or even per-

ception of the extent of infant mortality in their community
may lead couples to have larger numbers of children as an
insurance against future losses.
On the other hand, a reduction in infant mortality can
lead to a decline in fertility in two ways (Murqoch, 1980:
44-45)·.

Breast-feeding the surviving infants is a common

practice in developing countries.

The cultural and biologi-

cal constraints against conception associated with breastfeeding reduces the chances of further pregnancies (Taylor,
Newman, and Kelley, 1976).

Lower infant mortality can also

have motivational effects on fertility.

When the chances of

infant mortality are reduced, the motivation to have 'insurance births' will also be reduced.
The impact of modernization and the reductions in
infant mortality in reducing the number of births becomes
evident only in the long run, although the time lag is not
too long.

Beaver (1975) used data over a twenty year period
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for selected Latin American and Carribean countries to
demonstrate how infant mortality was strongly associated
with fertility a decade later.
1980:

Other studies (Murdoch,

44-45) have also found the lag between the decline of

childhood mortality and the initiation of fertility decline
to be an average of ten years.
In the meantime, the short run effects of reductions
in infant mortality, by increasing the number of surviving
children, would be to increase the size of the family (Birdsall, 1980; Murdoch, 1980).

Conversely, since couples gen-

erally do not replace all the child deaths, higher infant
mortality could result in smaller families.

This short run

effect, however, soon becomes supplanted by the modernizing
effects of reduced infant mortality.

Modernization and its

concommittants--higher education and higher social and economic status of women--will not only enable couples to have
the number of children they desire, but will also reduce the
size of the family desired.

Intervening Social Psychological Characteristics:
Role Relationships

Conjugal

Having analyzed the role of social, economic, and
demographic modernization on fertility, the next important
relationship to be specified is the effect of these vari-
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ables on the relationship between the husband and the wife,
the two individuals directly connected with childbearing.
several studies have used conjugal role relationships in
explaining fertility differentials (Hill, Stycos, and Bach,

1959; Rosen and Simmons, 1971; Mukherjee, 1975).

Earlier,

the argument was made that the woman who participates in the
opportunities (education, occupation) provided in urban-industrial areas has a strong interest in limiting her family
size.

Under these conditions, it is the woman who bears the

major responsibility for childcare and who may feel the
financial strain more keenly.

Hence, a large family will

conflict with her role obligations outside the home, leading
her to desire a smaller family.

The lower family size

desires of the wife can be actualized only in a family context in which she has a voice in decision making and where
possibilities for communication and discussion exist between
the couple.

Further, the wife's role in decision making,

and particularly joint decision making, reflects a modernizing shift from an attitude of resignation by the wife to her
sense of control over events in her life, which also
includes the number of children born to a couple.
Another aspect of the husband-wife role relationships
that has a bearing on family size is the flexibility or fixity of the husband and wife's roles in the family.

The tra-

ditional pattern of strict division of labor, where the hus-
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band

perfo~s

the male jobs of bread earning and decision

making while the wife performs the household tasks fit well
in the traditional society.

But, in a modernizing context,

with the women taking up additional responsibilities and
activities outside the home, the trend would be toward joint
participation in interchangeable functions and roles.3 Such
a modern set-up would provide additional incentives to the
couple to limit their family size.
Conjugal role relationships is operationalized as the
extent of jointness in relationship so that a higher score
indicates greater jointness in relationships.

Seven indi-

vidual aspects are included in the role relationship index--decision making, extent of sharing in household activities,
oarticipation in dealing with outsiders, participation in
religious activities, extent of disagreement on various
issues, outcome of disagreements, and pattern of solving
(See Appendix A for a detailed description of the seven
items.)

These seven items are aggregated to form the com-

posite role relationship index.

~

The concept of conjugal role relationships was first
developed by Bott (1971).
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Intervening Family Size and Family Planning Variables
Modernization and its indirect effect on fertility has
been the focus of the model described thus far.

In specify-

ing further the nature of the effect of modernization on
family size, indicators of family size and family planning
which directly impinge on actual fertility need to be considered.

Two attitudinal variables pertaining to (a) family

size norms (large or small norm), and (b) disposition to the
use of family planning constitute the first set of the indicators of family size and family planning.
Family Size Norms
Family size norms is the focus of the first problem of
identifying the factors associated with differences in family size ideals to be investigated in this study.

It will

be used as an intervening attitudinal variable in the second
problem concerning fertility performance.

The significance

of shifts in family size values was evident in the discussion of the theoretical framework presented in the preceding
chapter.

Couples have large families either because they

actively desire large families or because they do not conceptualize a specific family size.

Hence, as Schutzer

(1978), Davis (1975), and others have concluded, unless couples can visualize a family size that is ideal for them and
unless this ideal is small, actual family size will not be
reduced.

Changes in motivation toward smaller families is
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an important prerequisite to changes in fertility behavior.
several studies (Katiyar,
Bhatia,

1976; Rele and Kanitkar, 1976;

1978) have attempted to specify the socio-economic

correlates of small family norms in India.

Some of the sig-

nificant factors have been higher education, higher income,
higher occupational status of the respondent, and younger
age.
Empirically, several alternate measures of family size
norms exist, such as preferred family size, expected family
size, and ideal family size.

In this study, the concept of

ideal family size (or desired family size) is used to operationalize norms about family size.

The following question

was asked regarding the family size that respondents considered ideal:

"If your married life were to start all over

again, you had as much money as you possibly need and you
could have just the number of children you want, how many
children would you want to have?"

This definition involves

two elements which renders it suitable for this study.

A

major criticism of the concept of ideal family size has been
that respondents tend to rationalize their existing family
size as ideal.

Specifying hypothetical conditions concern-

ing their married life, economic circumstances and biological conditions will minimize, although not totally eliminate, the influence of actual fertility on the norm.
Preferred family size and expected family size, in contrast,
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are based on the actual family size.

Preferred family size

refers to the number of children wanted in addition to the
children the respondent already has.

Similarly, expected

family size includes the number of children the respondent
expects to bear by the end of her childbearing history.
Preferred and expected family size not only include the family size achieved at the time of the interview, but the
expectations and desires for the future are stated in the
context of the past and present experiences of the respondents.
Ideal family size is a stronger measure of motivation
and shifts in these motivations.

Couples who idealize two

children or fewer, even in ideal conditions, could be
expected to be more strongly committed to a smaller family
size.

This is especially true in comparison to those cou-

ples who idealize small families only due to economic
restrictions and impaired fecundity.

Since the nature of

the family size norms is an important aspect of the population problem investigated in this study, the ideal family
size concept is the most suitable and reliable measure of
shifts in the family size values.
The hypothetical nature of the ideal family size question also provides a solution to another criticism concerning the validity of the family size norm.

For example, Hau-

ser (1967) questions the meaningfulness of ideal family size
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in a society where children and life in general are
determined by nature and God.

This criticism, however, will

not be valid, if it can be shown that the majority of the
respondents can conceptualize a specific family size and can
do so even under hypothetical conditions.
Another criticism of the ideal family size concept
refers to the possibility of mechanical answers by individuals who have been influenced by the family planning slogan
of two or three children (Bhatia, 1978).

Earlier research

(Knodel and Prachuabmoh, 1973; University of Kerala, 1965)
provides some tests that were included in the design of this
study to evaluate the meaningfulness of the data on ideal
family size.

Questions regarding family planning and addi-

tional children wanted constitute two such tests.

If the

concept of ideal family size possessed intrinsic meaning for
the respondents those whose actual family sizes exceed or
are equal to their ideals generally will not want any more
additional children and will be using some form of birth
control to avoid additional births.

Previous studies (Rele

and Kanitkar, 1976; Knodel and Prachuabmoh, 1973; University
of Kerala, 1965) have proved the relevance of this index.
discussion of the validity of the concept of ideal family
size in this study will be provided in the next chapter.
Related to the quesion of mechanical responses is
another criticism by Ryder and Westoff (Rele and Kanitkar,

A
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1976) concerning the limited utility of the ideal family
size due to its small variance.

Rele and Kanitkar (1976:

313), however, argue that fecundity indirectly restricts the
size, the range, and consequently the variance of the ideal
family.

Further, most research on ideal family size in

India until 1973, reviewed by Rele and Kanitkar indicate a
family of 3 to 4 children to be the average ideal.

Ideal

family size of the respondents of this study undertaken in

1977, the end of a period of intense family planning program, will provide an interesting comparison with the apparent earlier norms.
One final issue requiring clarification concerns the
nature of the relationship between ideal and actual family
size.

Earlier, it was noted that ideal family size will be

used as an intervening variable in analyzing fertility
behavior.

However, since ideal family size was ascertained

at the time of the interview, the problem of delineatig the
time ordering in a causal model remains.

In other words, it

is necessary to determine, theoretically, that the ideal
family size is antecedent to actual family size.
An important distinction between actual and ideal family size may provide some aid in delineating the time ordering.

Actual family size is a cumulative index of a series

of childbearing events spread out over a period of time.
contrast, the ideal family size concept refers to the most

In
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desirable final product, at the end of the childbearing
process.

There is no means of deciding whether the respon-

dent entered her childbearing period with this ideal.

But

the evidence available (and presented in the next chapter)
suggests that the respondents had some notion of their ideal
at least before their last birth or even earlier.

For exam-

ple, in the case of women whose actual family size corresponded with their ideal, future pregnancies were deliberately avoided because they were satisfied with the sex
combination or number of children, or because of economic
and health reasons, among others.

Similarly, the majority

of women whose actual fertility exceeded their ideal family
size desired to stop bearing children at an earlier stage in
their pregnancy history, especially once their ideal was
attained.

Finally, the reasons stated by respondents for

their inability to achieve their ideal (such as biological
and economic difficulties) also suggest some prior conceptualization of an ideal.

These respondents, thus, did concep-

tualize an ideal size, before the process of childbearing
was ultimately completed.

Ideal family size can, therefore,

be used as an intervening variable in the modernization-fertility relationship.
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Family Planning Attitudes
The second normative variable--attitude to the use of
family planning--represents an important precondition to the
acceptance or rejection of methods enabling deliberate control of family size, viz .• family planning.
A favorable disposition to deliberate control over
reproduction, in turn, presupposes a change in the values
concerning family size.

Hence, it is theoretically possible

that family size norms may influence attitudes to family
planning.

The indicators of modernization used in this

study--group variables, socio-economic status of the family
and the wife, her age at marriage, extent of infant mortality, and role relationships--may similarly be expected to
influence family planning attitudes, both directly and indirectly through their effects on norms regarding family size.
For example, Mukherjee (1975) found husband-wife communication about family planning to have a significant influence
on awareness and favorable disposition to family planning.
At the same time, Miller and Inkeles' (1974) data allow only
indirect effects to education, occupation, urban residence,
living standards, and mass media exposure.

The effects of

these modern experience variables are mediated through psychological modernity (a system of modern values) which has a
strong direct effect on favorable attitudes to family planning.
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While considerable research has been undertaken to
identify the correlates of attitudes to family planning, the
latter's relationship to fertility behavior has been neglected.

In this model, ther•efore, attitude to family plan-

ning is studied from two perspectives.

It is conceived,

first as a dependent variable, whereby the role of modernization and family size norms in creating favorable dispositions to family planning are analyzed.

Secondly, it is also

necessary to assess the role of favorable attitudes towards
family planning, both as a direct and an intervening mechanism, in the modernization-fertility relationship.
Respondent's attitude towards family planning is an
ordinal variable with responses ranked as follows:
(!)indispensable; (2)favorable;

(3) favorable to some meth-

ods only, while definitely not to all;

(4) favorable, if

used to space children only; (5) indifferent; (6) unfavorable only because of after-effects;

(7) unfavorable; (8)

totally opposed. 4

4Items #3 and #4 in the attitude to family planning index
represent conditional approval and from a policy perspective
are more advantageous than indifference. Hence, they were
ranked before indifference. Further, item #4 does not
involve the notion of limiting the size of the family, an
important goal of the family planning program and was placed
after #3. Item #6 was placed before item #7 because the
former implies a favorable disposition to a method, if there
are no after-effects. In contrast, item #7 indicates that
the respondent does not favor using any method irrespective
of whether it has after-effects or not.
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The Practice of Family Planning
A final set of factors with the most direct effect on
fertility behavior deals with the practice of family planning.

Once again, and as mentioned in the previous chapter,

the impact of the practice of family planning on actual fertility, involving conscious control of childbearing, has
been neglected in previous research.

Numerous attempts have

been made to explain why couples adopt various methods of
family limitation and the effectiveness with which they use
these methods (Mitchell, 1972; Anker, 1973; Mukherjee, 1975:
Goldberg, 1975; Olson-Prather, 1976; Jolly, 1976).

Unfortu-

nately, such studies, either explicitly or implicitly treat
the practice of family planning as a proxy for actual fertility.

In the process, they ignore the basic goal of

adopting family planning, namely, the reduction of family
size.

They also do not consider the effect of family size

norms on family planning practice.

For, as noted earlier,

unless the ideal size of the family is reduced, adoption of
birth control will not lead to smaller family sizes in practice.

In this study, therefore, family planning adoption is

conceptualized as a direct correlate of fertility behavior.
Concommittantly, it is another intervening mechanism through
which modernization, both structural and individual, and
family size and family planning norms affect fertility.
Three indices of family planning practice are included
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in the model.

Parity at which birth control was initiated

is the first variable and is operationalized as the birth
after which the method was adopted.

It takes a value of

zero if the method was used before the first pregnancy.
a respondent has

If

never used a method, she was given a value

of the total number of pregnancies plus one.5
Starting deliberate control of fertility early in the
childbearing process presupposes modern experiences and
exposure to modern values, a notion of a family size that
would be ideal, and a desire to conform to that ideal.
Hence, it is hypothesized that respondents who enjoy a more
modern status and those with smaller ideals, less intense
preference for sons, and more favorable attitudes to family
planning will tend to initiate family planning use earlier
in their pregnancy history.

These respondents, in turn,

would have smaller actual families compared to those who
postpone initiation of family planning.

It is when couples

desire small families that planning and controlling their
childbearing as early as possible becomes essential to make
fertility behavior congruent with their norms.

5 one drawback of this measure is that it does not distinguish between women who began using birth control after several pregnancies and those who had relatively few children
despite not using any method. It is, however, very unlikely
that women with small families would not have used birth
control at all.
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Family Planning Effectiveness
If close conformity between behavior and norms is to
be achieved, early use of family planning alone is not sufficient.

The overall effectiveness with which the methods

are used and the pregnancies planned are also essential to
achieve the desired outcome--a smaller family size.

Modern

experiences, favorable values concerning family size and
family planning, and early use of family planning are conceptualized as pre-requisites for high effectiveness.
Family planning effectiveness is conceptualized as the
success in the couple's efforts to prevent unplanned and
unwanted conceptions (Stokes, 1973:

300).

Following

Stokes, family planning effectiveness can be measured by
classifying each pregnancy as planned or unplanned.

The

pregnancy is planned if use of family planning devices is
consciously not initiated so as to have a child or is deliberately stopped to have a child.

The rest of the pregnancy

categories denote lack of planning in various degrees.

A

pregnancy is unplanned if the pregnancy occurred even though
some method(s) was being used regularly, in which case it is
termed an accidental pregnancy.

It is defined as unintended

if it occurred while use of a method had to be stopped for
reasons such as health, side effects, and running out of
supplies.

If the pregnancy occurred before a method was

used, but the child was not wanted immediately, it is also

102
called an unintended pregnancy.

Such a pregnancy, however,

would be ranked below the previous unintended pregnancy in
its effectiveness because the former had not initiated use
of any methods when the pregnancy occurred.

Finally, the

'never-thought-of-it' pregnancies are those which just happened in the course of the marriage without any of the above
considerations.
Sterilization Status
The third and final index of family planning use deals
with whether or not the respondent or her husband have
adopted sterilization, a permanent method.

Sterilization

status is a different measure of family planning behavior
from family planning effectiveness.

Although sterilization

is the most effective contraceptive in terms of avoiding
future births, it does not provide a picture of the status
of planning effectiveness throughout the pregnancy history.
Moreover, since it involves a one time decision at the time
of acceptance of the method, it is not as dependent on modernization as family planning effectiveness and parity of
birth control initiation are.

This may be particularly true

of the present sample, a large proportion of which were
exposed to the intensive family planning campaigns and programs of the seventies.

As a result, predictions about the

fertility behavior of sterilized as opposed to non-sterilized respondents are difficult to derive.

Yet, some indi-
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family size, it is necessary to use respondents who have
completed their family size.

Given the low age at marriage

in India, it is assumed that by the time the respondents
reach the 30-45 age group, they will have completed their
childbearing or will at least have made final decisions
about family size.

The couples who have resorted to steri-

lization form a group which has definitely completed their
childbearing.
The area of research is the city corporation areas of
Trivandrum and Ernakulam districts and one typical rural
block in each the two districts situated not very near the
two cities.

The third city in Kerala--Calicut--was omitted

because it is mainly a commercial area and is less developed
in comparison to the other two cities as a result of which
the necessary variations in the relevant variables (such as
education, occupation) under consideration will not be
available.

Moreover, the majority of the city's population

is Muslim and the district in which this city is located is
on the whole less modernized compared to the Ernakulam and
Trivandrum districts.

Thus, this study includes the whole

range of variations with regard to the rural/agriculturalurban/industrial continuum and socio-economic characteristics such as education, occupation, and income.

The inter-

view schedule was the tool for data collection with
questions covering the relevant variables included in the
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study.

A copy of the schedule in presented in Appendix

c.

Family planning workers associated with the primary
health centers of the two rural areas and the family planning centers of the two cities maintain lists of couples
residing in their jurisdiction who are eligible to use birth
control.

From these eligible couple lists, sampling frames

consisting of couples satisfying the following criteria were
prepared in each of the four areas.

The first group in an

area consisted of couples who had not accepted sterilization, who were either Hindus or Christians, and where the
wife was thirty years of age or older.

Those who had

adopted sterilization formed the second group in each of the
areas.

Again, both Hindu and Christian couples were

included in the list of sterilized couples.

Since these

couples had completed their childbearing, there were no age
restrictions in the case of the wives in the sterilized sample.
Once the sampling frames were prepared, two samples of
~00

couples from each of the two cities and 200 couples from

each of the rural groups were selected using the systematic
sampling technique with a random start.

The desired sample

size was 500 so that 150 couples from each of the cities and
100 couples from each of the rural areas were to be
selected.
this study.

The wives were the subjects of the interview in
They were visited in their homes by the
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~esea~che~.

Ir a

~espondent

was not available, she was

with the next woman on the list until the

~eplaced

desi~ed

sample size had been achieved.
Both the medical
wo~ke~s

in the rour

~espondents

and the ramily planning

orrice~s

a~eas

we~e

helprul in locating the

in the sample lists.

The

~esearcher

asked to

speak with the respondent privately and was generally well
received.

A rew or the older women rerused to talk about

their ramily planning histories because the researcher was
younger and unmarried.

Another woman could not respond on

her own because her husband insisted on being present at the
interview and took the initiative in answering the questions.

The session was, thererore, terminated midway

through the

inte~view

and the respondent was dropped rrom

the sample.
Aside rrom these rew problems, the women were generally interested in talking about the issues
auestionnaire.

~aised

in the

The rinal sample includes 168 women rrom the

city and 105 women rrom the rural area or Trivandrum district.

The urban sample rrom Ernakulam district consists or

158 respondents and its rural sample has 109 women.

In

accordance with the study design discussed above, the total
sample or 540 respondents was also stratified to include 275
sterilized and 265 non-sterilized women.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN THE STUDY
OF FAMILY SIZE

India, as documented in the earlier chapters, is currently experiencing a low mortality rate and a high fertility rate.

In terms of the demographic transition theory,

India is in the growth stage of the transition and if she
were to follow the stages postulated by the transition
theory should move into the last phase and develop a lower
rate of fertility.

Reductions in fertility translated into

smaller family sizes at the individual level, is not only
the historical experience of most developed societies, but
is the most viable means to checking rapid growth in population.

Opportunities for extensive outmigration which pre-

vailed in developed countries during their transitions and
which tempered their population growths are not available to
today's developing countries.

Further, unlike the gradual

declines in mortality rates experienced by developed countries during their transitions, mortality reductions have
been much faster in the developing countries, thereby escalating their population growth rates.

Yet, raising the mor-

tality rates to curb population growth is not merely ethically unacceptable, but is socially destructive.
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India's high fertility results in part from people's
desires for large families which are supported by the structure of social institutions.

Thus, voluntary reductions in

fertility will come about only as a result of significant
social and cultural changes.

Hence, any comprehensive popu-

lation control policy should address itself to both fertility desires and behavior and to the social structures sustaining them.

In assessing the fertility differentials that

exist in this sample population, both family size orientations and achieved family size will be considered.

The two

concepts are complex and difficult to operationalize in such
a fashion that they are uncontaminated by other factors.
Before investigating fertility in the context of modernization and family planning, it is necessary to discuss some of
the methodological and substantive issues surrounding the
concepts of ideal family size, actual family size, and the
gap between them.
For the Indian woman, having at least two to four
children is a crucial aspect of her marriage.

For example,

only 1% of the respondents felt it was right for married
couples who are physically able to produce children to
choose to have none at all.

69% of the women considered

children a source of meaning and happiness in life and
viewed a family without children incomplete.

In a society

with no formal social security system, it is not surprising
that

29% of the women consider children a source of security

in old age.

Children are, moreover, perceived as being nee-
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essary for the perpetuation of the family line and the familY property (11%).

A small proportion of these respondents

(4%) even consider having children the duty of women.

Finally, some women (3%) attach extremely negative implications ('it is a sin,

'

'it is abnormal,

I

'it is selfish') to

the notion of couples deliberately choosing not to have any
children. 1
The attribution of both economic and non-economic benefits to children is consistent with other studies on the
value and costs of children (presented in Espenshade, 1977).
One study in particular, the Value of Children (VOC) project
of the East-West Center in Hawaii dealing with the perceived
costs and benefits of children, has direct relevance to the
present research.

The VOC study (conducted in 1975) sug-

gested that in the more developed countries, such as Taiwan,
Japan, the U.S., and Korea, the emotional value of children
was more important than the economic.

In the Philippines

and Thailand, which in contrast are less developed, the economic benefits were more significant.
a developing society, falls in between.

Kerala, despite being
As in other poorer

societies, women in Kerala do perceive children as a source
of economic security.

Yet, they place greater emphasis on

the emotional satisfaction that children provide their
parents.

1

The non-economic value attached to children in

The percentages add up to more than 100 because 17% of
the women gave multiple responses.
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Kerala has its basis in the collectivistic orientation of
the society.

Unlike most developed societies, Indian soci-

ety is very group oriented with the individual finding fulfillment and happiness through institutions that will
directly benefit the group.

Marriage is one such institu-

tion because marriages in India are contracted primarily for
the sake of the perpetuation of the family through procreation.

Satisfaction of the individual's needs are only sec-

ondary in marriages.

Hence, it is not surprising that for

many of these. women children provide meaning to and happiness in life along with a sense of completion of their marriages.

This is particularly true for traditional women who

find personal fulfillment mainly vicariously through their
progeny.

Changes in the economic structure alone, there-

fore, will be insufficient to induce shifts in fertility
norms and behavior.
Ideal Family Size
While children are very important to women in Kerala,
the next logical questions are how many children do these
women ideally desire to have and how many do they actually
have.

The ideal family size of each respondent is opera-

tionalized as the number of children (surviving) that she
would want to have if she could begin her married life all
over again from the start, she could have as much money as
she could possibly need, and she could have just the number
of children she wants.

It is probable that responses to a
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question on ideal family size will be influenced by the
respondent's actual fertility.

The danger of rationalizing

the family size already achieved would be greater if the
question was phrased "what is your ideal family size?"
Deter-mining family size ideals in hypothetical and optimal
conditions would encourage the respondent to disassociate
her response to some extent from her experience, although
its influence cannot be totally avoided.
To aid the respondent in distinguishing between the
family size norm for her family and a general nor-m, two more
questions concerning family size were asked.

The first

referred to the ideal for an average family in Kerala and
the second to the ideal for a family like the respondent's.
These questions should help the respondent in conceptualizing a situation other than her experience when responding to
the question on ideal family size under ideal conditions.
It will also, to some extent, prevent her from voicing the
general nor-m of two children advocated by the family planning propaganda and think of a personal ideal.
Ideal family size under ideal conditions is used as
the index of family size norms in later analysis.

For rea-

sons discussed above, it is the least contaminated by the
respondent's fertility performance and by the general norm.
Ideal family size determined under optimal conditions is
also a better measure of the intensity of the desires than
the other two norms applicable to the average family and to
a family like the respondent's.

If women idealize smaller
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families (one, two or three children) even in optimal circumstances, it can be expected to represent a genuine break
from the desire for large families.

The ideal under ideal

conditions is also the only personal norm among the three
indices referring to the respondent's own family.

When com-

parisons are to be made between the woman's fertility norms
and behavior, it is, therefore, logical to use her personal
ideal.

The two other measures of family size norms will,

however, be used for further comparison and analysis (in
relation to the ideal under ideal conditions) in order to
delineate the meaning of the ideal family size concept for
these women.
Analysis of the family size desires presented in Table

.

2 suggests that most of the respondents have a clear idea of
the family size that would be ideal for them under ideal
conditions and the two other ideals.

In all three

instances, less than 1% of the women refused to speculate,
stating that they would want as many children as God gives
or that such matters were not in their hands.

A larger pro-

portion (albeit still a small overall percentage) of women
refused to talk about a definite family size when the question referred to the ideal family size under ideal conditions than under the other two frames of reference.

It

reflects their inability or unwillingness to visualize hypothetical situations as opposed to the rest of the two questions which involve more real assumptions.

More specifi-

cally, for this small group of women, family limitation is

TABLE

2

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF IDEAL

&~D

ACTUAL FAt.ULY SIZE

Ideal Family
Size in Ideal
Conditions

Ideal Family
Size for
Average

0 - 2

40.0%

41.7%

61.5%

27.1%

3 - 4

54.6

55.5

36.2

50.0

5+

4.5

2.4

2.3

22.9

As Hany as God
Gives

0.9

0.4

0.2

N

100%
(540)

100%
(540)

Ideal Family
Actual Family
Size for a
Size
Family like
the Respondents'

100%
(540)

100%
(540)

1-'
1-'

w
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not legitimate unless it is the result of other conditions,
such as economic hardship.

Alternately, it would suggest

(similar to Heer, 1968) that if the economic conditions
improved, family size would increase at least in the short
run.

But, unlike earlier predictions of critics (Mauldin,

1965 and Hauser, 1967), the number of respondents who were
unwilling to give a numerical answer, even in a developing
society, was small.
How many children do the respondents think constitute
an ideal size?
~%)

Table 2 indicates very few women (less than

have an ideal of more than four children even under

ideal conditions.

Yet, the fact that 55% idealize three or

four children, double the replacement level, does not augur
well for Kerala's population future.

But compared to the

67% who had an ideal of three or four children in a study
conducted in 1965 in three villages in Trivandrum district
of Kerala (University of Kerala, 1965:

24), the proportion

idealizing a similar family size is lower in this study. 2
Further, while only 28% of the women in the 1965 project had
an ideal of two or fewer, the corresponding proportion is

40% in this study.

A definite shift toward smaller family

size during the last decade is, thus, evident.
There is also a close similarity in the various family

2

These three villages were also the target population of
the Family Planning Communication Research Project of the
University of Kerala and hence were subject to an intense
Family Planning Education Program.
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sizes idealized under the three frames of reference (Table
2).

About

95% of the respondents have an ideal of four or

fewer in all the three instances.

However, differences

exist in the proportions with replacement level or smaller
ideals.

Ideal family size under optimal conditions involves

the most hypothetical assumptions and under these ideal economic and biological (fecundity) conditions, more women
desire to have three or four children than two.

The ideal

for an average family, although not as hypothetical as the
ideal under ideal conditions, refers to a more general unit
than the reference point involved in a family like that of
the respondent's.

This generality may explain why more

respondents also tend to idealize larger families in this
situation than in the case of a family like the respondents'.

In contrast to these two ideals, nearly 20% more of

the women idealize a family size of two children or fewer
for a family similar to theirs.

Of the three norms, the

ideal for a family like the respondent's is the closest
approximation to reality.

It is, therefore, not surprising

that economic considerations are a major part of the establishment of this particular type of family size ideal as is
evident in Table 3 which describes the reasons for the different ideals.

In the case of the ideal for a family like

the respondent's, economic difficulties are the most common
reasons cited, irrespective of the size of the ideal family.
Why do these respondents consider these family sizes
to be ideal?

Economic problems seem to be a major reason

TABLE

3

FREQUEi~CY OF DISTRIBUTION OF REASONS FOR IDEAL FA!1ILY SIZEl

Family
Size
Reasons for
Ideal
Economic

Ideal Under
Ideal Conditions

!.~orm

Health of Parents
(Mother)

Ideal for Family
Like Respondents'

0-2

3-7

0-2

3-7

0-2

2-7

91.9%

76.6%

88.1%

79.3%

93.2%

82.3%

3.3

0.9

6.8

11.6

6.2

2.0

Better Care;
Better Education
Accepted

Ideal For
Average Family

0.9

1.9

3.2

2.5

Care of Parents;
I11heritance of
Property

1.2

1.1

Infant Mortality

0.5

3.5

1.2

7.2

1.9

Company for leids

3.2

10.1

1.2

6.9

3.3

2.6
100%
(348)

0.9
100%
(215)

Custom; Gift of God;
Completion of Household
N

. . .
100%
(224)

4. 9
100%
(368)

100%
(243)

100%
(336)

1 Total number is higher than 540 because few people gave multiple reasons.

~

0\
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for limiting the size of the family to two children or less
in all the three questions (refer Table 3).

Under ideal

conditions too, economic considerations tend to predominate,
presumably because the respondents realize the economic
implications (benefits and disadvantages) of large families
even under the best circumstances.

Apart from economic rea-

sons, the next major concern of women who idealize three to
four children (under ideal conditions) is the necessity for
a child to have the company of another child.

Respondents

do not favor single children because these children would be
deprived of the psychological and social advantages of growing up with siblings.
One additional item in the case of the reasons for the
ideal in a family like the respondent's needs to be speci- •
fied.

As mentioned earlier, economic considerations predo-

minate in this instance too.

It is also the only situation

in which better care and education of the children are cited
more often as reasons for limiting the size to a certain
level.

In other words, when the frame of reference is clos-

est to the respondent's own experience, economic concerns
and factors that indirectly lead to higher economic status
(education) become important.

Thus, the data lend support

to one of the conclusions of the VOC study (Espenshade,
1977:

17) that economic factors underlie individuals' deci-

sions to limit their family size.
Although the majority of these women stated a numerical size in response to the questions on ideal family size
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and suggested reasons for their norms, it is necessary to
assess the meaningfulness of these responses.

For this pur-

pose, the respondents were also asked how many children, in
addition to the surviving number, they would want to have
(University of Kerala, 1965; Knodel and Prachuabmoh, 1973).
If the family size ideals that they stated had some intrinsic significance for them, the majority of the respondents
whose family size has exceeded or is equal to their ideal
would say 'no more children' while those with smaller
size than ideal would want to have more children.

fa~ily

Event-

hough this comparison is between a hypothetical (ideal) and
real situation, a comparison is still feasible.

The ideal

family size under ideal conditions would provide the ceiling
of the family size norms of these women.

If a respondent

considers three children the norm under the most ideal conditions and she already has three children in actuality when
circumstances are far from perfect, she can be logically
expected not to want any additional children.

Extenuating

circumstances, such as dissatisfaction with an existing sex
combination, could lead such a respondent to want more children even though she has achieved her ideal.
A crosstabulation of the additional number of children
wanted by their actual family size is presented in Table 4
for each of the ideal family size categories.

The data lend

credibility to the ideal family size responses of these
women.

For example, a vast majority of the respondents with

an ideal family size of two and an actual of two or fewer

4

TABLE

CROSSTABULATION OF ]Ui1:3ER OF ADDITIOi~AL CHILDREi.~ BY ACTUAL F&ULY SIZE
AND BY IDEAL FM1ILY SIZE

Ideal

Actual
Family
Size

F~~ily

Size

Ideal Family
Size = 2

Ideal Family
Size
3

Ideal iamily
Size = 4-6

=

Numher of Additional Children Wanted

'

~

+0

+1

+2

100%
(53)

69%

29

2

-

100%
(54)

88%

12

-

100%
(11) 100%

+0

+1

+2

0 - 2

72%

2'6

2

3 - 4

96/~

4

5 - 11

91%

9

N

l~
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-

+0

+1 +2

100%
(35)

78%

22 -

100%
( 9)

-

100%
(34)

81%

19 -

100%
(21)

-

100%
(26) 100%

-

100%
(16)

N

95

-

N

46

t-'
t-'

\()
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children stated that they wanted no additional children.
Two groups deserve special menton in this connection.
out of fifteen

Seven

(47%) of the women with an ideal family size

of two and four out of six

(67%) with an ideal family size

of three, prefer not to have any more children, despite having just one surviving child.

These two groups, even though

small, represent a significant deviation from the traditional view of high fertility desires and behavior that is
expected to prevail in a developing society.

If this trend

becomes more widespread, it- could, to some extent, cushion
the exponential effects of normative and actual fertility
that are above the replacement level of two on population
growth.
Some data is also available on why respondents do not
want additional children.

81% of the women cite economic

reasons for not wanting any more or more than one additional
child while 15% fear for the health of the mother.

It is

possible that these respondents would desire more children
if economic and health conditions improve.

Yet, their

responses to the ideal family size determined under ideal
conditions when economic and health restrictions were hypothetically absent, provide some indication that even if this
ideal situation were to be actualized partially, the
increase in desired family size would not be too drastic.
On the contrary, dissatisfaction with the existing number or
sex combination of their children and family pressure to
have more children are reasons for wanting more children.
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These results support one major conclusion of the
Value of Children study (Espenshade, 1977:

17), viz., that

economic factors constitute the primary basis for decisions
regarding family size.

Specifically, respondents desire to

limit their ideals to a size that is compatible with their
financial means and that will enable them to derive the maximum benefit from a given economic situation, even if it is
an ideal one.

Further, compared to earlier research, the

data also presents evidence of the increasing popularity of
the small family norm, a welcome trend in the population
history of Kerala.

The responses to the ideal family size

questions also appear quite meaningful, even if some respondents may have rationalized their achieved fertility.
Actual Family Size
Changes in family size norms are an important prereauisite for slowing down the growth rate of the population.
Yet, the actual fertility performance of women is by far the
most concrete indicator of population change.

Actual family

size is measured as the total number of surviving children
at the time of the interview.

When couples envision a fam-

ily size, they generally refer to the number of living children who can either provide them economic security or emotional support or any other benefits that parents attribute
to children.

Further, it is the number of surviving chil-

dren that would either accelerate or decelerate the rate of
growth in population.

Hence, the decision was made to use
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the number of surviving children rather than the number of
live births as the index of fertility behavior.
Operationalizing fertility performance as the number
of surviving children at the time of the interview, however,
involves a methodological problem.

The actual family size

variable underestimates the level of fertility performance
of the respondents because many of them have not yet completed their childbearing.

Certain safeguards were, how-

ever, built into the study design to counter the problem,
although they by no means provide a perfect solution.
Slightly more than half the respondents (51%) have undergone
sterilization and consequently have terminated their pregnancy histories permanently.

The problem of underestimation

is, therefore, limited to the non-sterilized respondents.
Of the 265 non-sterilized respondents, about 5% have
completed their childbearing since they are over the age of
45.

As for the rest (N= 253), the non-sterilized sample

included only women who are thirty years of age or older
(Table 5).

Nearly 50% of these women were married at the

age of twenty or earlier and consequently have spent at
least ten years, if not more, in childbearing.

On the other

hand, only 12% of the women were married after the age of
25.

Given the relatively high chronological age and low age

at marriage of these respondents, it could be assumed that
most of these women would have completed a major part of
their childbearing at the time of the interview or at least
that by then final decisions about family size will have
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TABLE

5

FP~QUE~CY DISTRIBUTIO~ OF AGE A~D AGE AT
HARRIAGE OF ~0:-1-STERILIZED RESPONDEi.nS

Age of The ResEondent
Age Sroups

F (%)

Age of Harriage
of The ResEondent
Age Groups

F (%)

30 - 34

42.6%

10 - 17

28.

35 - 39

33.6

18 - 20

27.9

40 - 44

19.2

21 - 24

31.3

25+

12.1

45+

4.5
100%
N

(265)

100%
]"

(265)

7~~
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been made.
Additional evidence on the length of time since the
last pregnancy lends further support to the assumption that
most of these women had to a large extent completed their
childbearing at the time of the interview.

For example, 52%

of the non-sterilized women below the age of 45 (total
N=253) had not had pregnancies for at least five years.3
Another 35% fell in the intermediate range of two to four
years since their last pregnancy.

The relatively long peri-

ods during which these women had not experienced pregnancies, coupled with their low age at marriage, and high chronological age substantiate the assumption that the actual
fertility of these respondents at the time of the interview
closely approximates their ultimate fertility.
A rough idea of the extent of underestimation involved
in the measurement of achieved family size can be obtained
through, a comparison between preferred family size and
actual family size (Table 6).

Preferred family size is

derived by adding the additional number of children wanted
to the actual family size.

There are no major differences

between the actual and preferred family size of the respondents in any of the age categories.

The largest difference

is among the youngest women (the 30 to 34 age group); but
even for this category the average addition is only 0.3

iThe actual range of time since their last pregnancy
varies from five to twenty years.

TABLE

6

HEAN ACTUAL FAMILY SIZE, ADDITIO~~AL NUMBER JF ClliLDRE~ ~-JA:~TED,
AND PREFERRED FAHILY SIZE BY AGE OF ]ON-STERILIZED RESPO:WENTS

(1)
Age of the Respondents

(2)
Actual Family
Size

(3)
Number of Additional Children
Uanted

4 = (2+3)
Preferred
Family Size

(5)
N

General

3.3

0.2

3.5

265

30 - 34

2.8

0.3

3.1

113

35 - 39

3.3

0.2

3.5

89

40 - 44

4.4

0.02

4.4

51

45+

4.3

0.0

4.3

12

......
N

\JI
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children.

Thus, it can be assumed that actual family size

is a fair approximation to the number of children the
respondents will ultimately have.

To examine this thesis

further, the difference between actual and ideal family size
will be analyzed in some detail.
If a comparison of the distribution of the actual and
ideal family size

4

presented in Table 2 is analyzed, it sug-

gests clearly that the fertility performance of these women
generally exceeds the norm.

For example, while 40% of the

respondents idealize replacement level fertility (two children or fewer), only a third of the sample has an actual
fertility of two or less.

Conversely, although a mere 4.5%

of the women consider five or more children as constituting
the ideal family size, nearly five times that proportion
have that many surviving children.

The closest correspon-

dence between ideal and actual fertility lies in the family
with three or four children.

Although this is the most corn-

rnon family size with regard to fertility norms and actual
fertility, it is double the replacement level.

Persistence

of these fertility values and behavior patterns will postpone further the attainment of the goal of zero population

4The ideal family size under ideal conditions is used as
the index of fertility norms. For reasons discussed earlier, of the three types of ideal family size (ideal under
ideal conditions, ideal for an average family, and ideal for
a family like the respondent's) that were ascertained, ideal
under ideal conditions would be the least influenced by the
respondent's fertility behavior. It is also the only personal ideal referring to the respondent's own family.
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growth.

Thus, despite the limited success that has been

achieved in popularizing smaller family size values, much
more work is needed before replacement level fertility
becomes the modal family size.
The Gap Between Actual And Ideal Family Size
Thus far the discussion centered on the comparison of
the fertility norms and behavior of the respondents as a
group.

It is also necessary to evaluate the individual fer-

tility performance of these, women in relation to their personal norms.

In the earlier analysis of ideal family size,

it was noted that family size norms of the respondents were
generally smaller in comparison to the findings of previous
research.

Comparing actual fertility with ideal fertility

will signify the extent to which that trend toward small
family norms has been accompanied by changes in fertility
behavior.
The gap is basically a measure of the difference
between actual fertility and ideal fertility for each of the
respondents.

Three groups of women can be identified in

terms of the differences between their ideal and actual family size:

those whose actual family sizes are equal to

their ideals; those whose actual family sizes exceed their
ideals; and those whose actual is lower than their ideal.
Of the three groups, the second--those whose .actual fertility exceeds their ideals--is the most problematic from the
standpoint of population growth.

Eventhough they generally
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consider four or fewer than four children as the ideal
family size (see Table 2), these women represent a classic
situation where they have more children than they desire.
Changes in their behavior apparently lag behind shifts in
their values toward the smaller family.

Barring attempts at

rationalizing their actual family size, respondents whose
actual fertility corresponds with their ideal are more modern in their fertility behavior.

In other words, these

respondents have lower ideals (four or below) and they have
(at leas.t at the time of the interview) restricted their
actual family sizes to their ideals exemplifying correspondence between their values and behavior.

The third group

would also be effective contributors to curtailing population growth, especially if they decided not to complete
their family size ideals.

These comparisons of norms with

behavior would, thus, provide an indication of the intensity
and permanence of the popularity of the smaller families.
Actual Family Size Equal To Ideal Family Size
Among the non-sterilized respondents, there are 24%
whose actual family size corresponded with their idea1. 5

49

(79%) of these respondents have been using some form of
birth control to avoid further pregnancies.

!:)

Moderately

There are a total of 265 non-sterilized respondents of
which 64 have a gap of zero between their actual and ideal
family size. The relevant data on contraceptive methods
used and influence of sex combination on family size were
available from only 62 of these women.
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reliable methods (condoms and rhythm method, Khalifa, 1973:
437) are the most commonly used by almost 71% of these women
who used some method.

Only 4 of these respondents used a
6
combination of two methods. The rest of the respondents

used abstinence as a means to avoid future pregnancies.
Judging from their past history of family planning, however,
these women whose actual fertility is equal to their ideal
fertility have been the most successful in effectively planning their families.

They have the highest family planning

effectiveness score (see Appendix B for a description of
this measure) among the three gap categories which suggests
a high probability of their avoiding future unwanted
births. 7 Thus, the agreement in the ideal and actual fertility of these women appears to be not a matter of chance, but
of deliberate choice.

They have used family planning effec-

tively in order to limit their actual family size to their
norms.

These women can be considered modern in their fer-

tility behavior.

Besides, the chances of their having addi-

tional children appear slim, thereby limiting the probability of underestimating their actual fertility.
While 21% (N=l3) of the women whose actual family size

6 Condoms and pills, condoms and rhythm method, rhythm
method and abstinence, and rhythm method and withdrawal are
the four combinations used.
7

Hean family planning effectiveness scores for the nonsterilized sample and the three gap groups are as follows:
overall=2.7; actual less than ideal=2.8; actual greater than
ideal=l.95; actual equal to ideal=3.6. For the sterilized
respondents it is 2.3.
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was equal to their ideals did not use any method, a discussion of their reasons for not using family planning indicates that some of them (N=4) definitely do not intend to
have more children.

Two of these respondents are biologi-

callY subfecund and the husbands of the remaining two women
were undergoing vasectomy fairly soon after the interview.
Among the rest (N=9), a third of them discontinued practising any form of family limitation because of the side
effects of the contraceptives they used.

The remaining

(N=6) have not used any contraceptives due to their dissatisfaction with the sex combination of their families and
wanting an additional child.

These women, thus, will most

probably have an additional child.

Yet, since they form a

very small percentage of the total non-sterilized sample
(3%), the additional pregnancies, if they do occur, would
not drastically alter the results obtained using actual family size at the time of the interview.
The respondents were also questioned about their reasons for the conformity between their ideal and actual fertility.

Satisfaction with the sex combination of their fam-

ily size was the reason why the fertility norms of 49% of
the respondents corresponded with their performance.

8 Among

the rest (N=30), health problems (57%), economic difficulties (27%), satisfaction with the number of children irres-

8

The N here is 59 because responses were not available in
the case of five women.
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oective of the sex combination (13%), and their husband's
desire for just two children (3%) were the reasons cited for
the equivalence between actual and ideal family size.

Hav-

ing children of both sexes, and not just children, is of
considerable significance to these women.

It also suggests

that if the desired sex combination had not been reached,
they would have had more children in an attempt to acquire
the right combination.

Thus, even though these women appear

modern in their fertility behavior, traditional concerns
(such as offsprings of both sexes) are still an integral
oart of their family size decisions.
Actual Family Size Greater Than The Ideal
Achieved family sizes exceed ideals in the case of

46%

of the non-sterilized respondents, constituting the largest
of the three gap categories.

However, their pregnancy his-

tories were not completely haphazard processes since

75% of

these women did say they wanted to stop having additional
children at some earlier point in their childbearing, but
for reasons discussed later they either could not or did not
stop.

Nearly

51% desired to stop after their second child

while another 37% wanted to stop at least after the third
child.

The parity at which they desired to stop corresponds

closely with their ideal family size as seen in Table

7.

Views about their ideal family size, thus, do not appear to
be responses that these women provided on the spur of the
moment.

They, in all probability, had some notion of the
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TABLE

7

CROSSTABULATION OF THE BIRTH AFTER ilHICH THE RESPONDE:n
WISHED TO STOP CHILDBEARING BY

HE~

IDEAL

F~~ILY

SIZE

FOR NON-STERILIZED tvOHEN WHOSE ACTUAL FAi1ILY SIZE
EXCEEDS THEIR IDEAL

Ideal Family Size

Parity
At ~fuich
:lespondent
Wished to
Stop

2

2
93.8%

3

6.2

3
6.1%

L~

-

5

93.9

4

. .

. .

72.7%

5

. .

. . .

18.2

6

. .
~

100%
(48)

9.1
100%
(33)

100%
(11)
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family size that would be suitable for them earlier in their
pregnancy histories.
Although these respondents desired to stop their pregnancies after a certain child, very few of them (15% or 18
respondents) adopted some method of family limitation to
actualize their desires.

Nearly 53% of this group used mod-

erately reliable methods, such as condoms and rhythm, while
only 32% used reliable methods (IUDs and Pills).

The major

reason why they conceived despite using a method of birth
control was that 74% of them were, by their own judgement,
not very careful or were irregular in using the methods.
This is also evident in their low family planning effectiveness score (1.95).

Another 21% had to discontinue using

birth control measures because of side-effects.

Finally,

there was one case in which the woman had become pregnant
due to a vasectomy failure.9
On the other hand, 85% (104) of the respondents whose
actual family size exceeded their ideal did not take any
measures to limit their family size, even though they wanted
to stop at some point.

One of the most common reasons for

their inaction was that they were dissatisfied with their
sex combination.

In a developing society, with its male

dominated culture, it is not surprising that more women
wanted one more boy (23%) than a girl (14%).

q

Another third

This respondent's husband did undergo vasectomy for a
second time on the day of the interview.
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(28%) of the women stated that they lacked information about
family planning methods at that time and hence did not know
what measures to take to prevent pregnancies.

Health prob-

lems (15%) and husband's or relatives' objection to using
birth control methods (13%) were some of the other reasons.
This group, thus, presents a typical example of the
conservative women who for various traditional reasons were
motivated to have large families, and very often, ended up
with more children than they said they wanted.

Two of the

most common characteristics of these women need to be mentioned again because they suggest elements that would
require special attention in any population policy.

Further

education with regard to systematic and careful use of birth
control methods is essential if fertility is to be controlled.

Dissatisfaction with the sex combination, reflected

particularly in the desire for more boys has its basis in
the social and economic structure of the society.

The

patrilineal system of lineage and inheritance predominates
in Kerala.

It also places the responsibility of providing

economic security for their older parents on the sons since
a formal social security system is not available.

Thus,

alternative means of economic security will have to be
devised, if the undue emphasis on sons is to be lessened.

135
Actual Family Size
g~oup

The last
comp~ises

than

Smalle~

among the

Than Ideal Family Size
non-ste~ilized

~espondents
smalle~

those women whose actual family size is

thei~

ideal.

Although they

comp~ise

30% (N=78) of the

non-ste~ilized sarnple, 10 68% (N=50) of them did not intend
thei~

to complete

decided about it.
the most common
thei~

ideal.

family size while one

why the women could not complete

g~oup

is especially significant

thei~

pe~spective

actual family size.

thei~ fe~tility

small family size cannot be
the outcome of
ext~aneous

delibe~ate

ci~curnstances

But

behavio~,

that

a

as

the

theo~etical

pa~ticula~ly

cha~acte~ized

choice.

f~om

f~om

p~actically

methodological point of view because they have
completed

had not

(44%) is one of

Biological difficulties

~easons

This

~espondent

mode~n
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beyond
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On the contrary, the rest of this group was motivated
not to have any more children for two reasons.
difficulties were the reason why
not to complete their ideals.

Economic

46% of the women decided

Even among these women who

cited economic reasons 19% (4) were also hindered by biological difficulties in having more children.

The lack of

time at the disposal of the working mother for child care
was the second major reason why 8% of the women decided not
to complete their ideals.

10

Unlike the women whose family

In this section, data is available only for
dents.

74 respon-
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size was involuntarily limited by subfecundity, this group
seems to recognize the economic disadvantages of large families.

Employment of women which is also perceived as incom-

patible with large families, presents another effective
means of fertility control.
Among the women (N=74) whose actual family sizes were
smaller than their ideals, 23 (31%) of them intended to have
more children.

Dissatisfaction with the sex composition of

their actual family size is the reason why 65% of these
women intend to complete their ideal family size.

However,

unlike the women whose actual fertility was higher than
their ideal, a larger proportion of these respondents who
had a smaller actual family size than ideal wanted one more
girl (37%) as opposed to wanting one more son (28%).

One

probable cause for this preference of daughters over sons
could be that more of these women have experienced deaths of
female infants.

Higher infant mortality for girls than for

boys along with a shorter life expectancy for females over
males has been recorded in India (U.N., 1973:

115).

In

short, desire to have one or even two children of each sex
is very predominant among these respondents and is one of
the important reasons contributing to larger families.

Very

few women (9%) intend to have more children for the sake of
having more children.

At the same time, 17% of the women

fear the possibility of infant mortality and intend to have
more children to counteract the potential loss.

Finally,

the pressure from their husbands or parents to have more
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children is another reason why 9% of the respondents intend
to complete their ideals.
Once again, although the probability of these women
having an additional child or two is high, they form only 9%
of the non-sterilized sample.

Thus, the chances of underes-

timating the actual family size, while not completely eliminated, is considerably reduced.

At the same time, it is not

merely children that these respondents are interested in.
They desire to have a definite proportion of sons and daughters and they will attempt to attain that desired sex compo~ition.

As noted earlier, sons are perceived as a source of

security.

Daughters, on the contrary, are expected to pro-

vide emotional fulfillment because girls, these women contend, will maintain their familial ties, particularly to the
mother, even after marriage.

This division of functions or

benefits attributed to sons and daughters is rooted in the
social fabric of India and is another factor that contributes to the higher fertility rates.
Sterilized Respondents
While dissatisfaction with the sex composition was one
of the most significant inducements to having additional
children among the non-sterilized respondents, it is satisfaction with the overall number of children that was the
most common motivation for respondents to undergo sterilization (75%).

Of these 205 women, only 18% accepted sterili-

zation because they were also satisfied with their sex com-
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position.

Another important reason for undergoing

sterilization was health problems (20%), although almost
half (48%) of these women also mentioned satisfaction with
number of children.

It is possible that the sterilized

respondents, in their attempt to achieve a definite sex combination, had more children than they could afford to and
wanted to have.

Some indication of this is evident in a

comparison of their ideal with their actual family size.
There are more sterilized (59%) than non-sterilized respondents (46%) whose actual fertility exceeds their ideals.
Alternately, the proportion of sterilized women whose fertility performance is below their ideal is smaller (19%) in
comparison with their non-sterilized counterparts (30%).
Further, the sterilized respondents have, on the average,
also been less effective in planning their families (effectiveness score=2.3).

Hence, instead of risking further

pregnancies, it appears that they decided to undergo sterilization.
In any event, very few (16%) of these women have
regretted their decision to opt for a permanent method like
sterilization.

Among those who did regret, side-effects,

both physical and psychological, is the most commonly stated
reason (51%) for regret.

Insufficient number of children

(21%) and dissatisfaction with their sex composition (28%)
are further causes for regret.

Nonetheless, what is more

significant is that 84% of the women who are sterilized,
irrespective of the reason for which they adopted that
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method, are happy with their choice.
Earlier it was noted that a larger proportion of sterilized respondents (59%) than the non-sterilized (46%) have
exceeded their ideals in their fertility behavior.

More

sterilized respondents (43%) also wanted to stop after their
third child compared to the non-sterilized women (37%).
conversely, fewer sterilized women wanted to stop after two
children (43%) in comparison to the non-sterilized respondents (51%).

Yet, like their non-sterilized counterparts,

although a majority (81%) of them wanted to stop having
additional children earlier in their pregnancy history,
almost 83% did not do anything to prevent their pregnancies.
Once again, dissatisfaction with their sex combination 11

(36%) and not knowing what to do (27%) seem to be the most
common reasons for their inaction.

Lack of means (money and

facilities for operation--15%) and the objection of husbands
or relatives (15%) are the other reasons for not using birth
control earlier.

Thus, prior to sterilization, the steri-

lized women do not differ much from the non-sterilized women
in their motivation for not using any methods even when they
desired to stop, resulting in more children than they wanted
for both groups.
Among those who used some method prior to steriliza-

11
The influence of the respondent's desire to have either
a boy or a girl on their decision to postpone using any
method of birth control lends support to the earlier explanation with regard to the predominance of satisfaction with
the number of children as a reason for sterilization.
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tion, a majority of them

(67%), like the non-sterilized

women, still conceived because they were not careful in
using the method of their choice.

Another

29% of these

women had to stop using contraceptives because of side
effects.

Further, more of the sterilized respondents

(54%)

used only moderately reliable methods of condoms and rhythm
in contrast to the reliable methods of IUD and Pills

(37%).

In short, three factors--dissatisfaction with the sex
composition of their children, lack of information on contraceptives, and inefficient use of contraceptives prior to
sterilization--have been important contributors to higher
fertility than desired in the case of the sterilized respondents as well as with their non-sterilized counterparts.
Given these similarities between sterilized and non-sterilized women whose actual family sizes exceed their ideals,
the question can be raised whether many of these non-sterilized women would adopt sterilization in the future.

If the

evidence presented in the next three chapters is any indication, the answer would be 'no,' because adoption of a permanent method, such as sterilization, is not an example of
modern status and modern family planning behavior in Kerala.
In other words, significant socioeconomic and family planning status differences are found between the sterilized and
non-sterilized women.

These issues will be discussed in the

following chapters.
However, before proceeding to that discussion it is
important to reiterate that the notion of having children in
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marriage and having a desired sex composition seems crucial
to the women of Kerala.

Any population control policy will

have to be concerned with this basic premise.

The goal of

the population policies is not to eliminate the desire for
children altogether, but to effectively reduce the desire
for many children and the practice of having large families.
Even more significant is the desire to have at least one son
and a daughter, if not two of each sex.

Educational pro-

grams aimed at popularizing the concept of two children as
opposed to one of each sex will have to be designed.

Ironi-

cally, the existing posters depicting an ideal family with
two children involves a couple with a son and a daughter.
Grass-root level campaigns will also be needed to disseminate on a regular basis both the available information
regarding various birth control methods and contraceptives.
Further, policies designed to provide supplementary sources
of meaning and happiness, especially in the life of the
woman, such as increasing opportunities for careers and some
security in old age, will be necessary to offset the importance attached to large families.

CHAPTER V

MODERNIZATION, FAMILY PLANNING, AND FAMILY SIZE:
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

The preliminary discussions, both theoretical and analytic, presented in the preceding chapters leads to the
basic conclusion that one of the most urgent tasks facing
India in her attempt to curb rapid population growth is to
lower her birth rates.

Modernization and an effective fam-

ily planning program are two major aspects of a coherent
solution to the population problem.
can influence fertility in two ways:

Both of these factors
at the normative

level, they may bring about changes in individuals' attitudes toward and desires for large families; at the behavioral level, they can lead to smaller achieved families.

An

effective family planning program in the context of modernization can be operationalized as representing structural
and individual causes and correlates of fertility decline.
The model used in this study, therefore, progresses from the
structural aspects of modernization through several layers
of intervening modernization and family planning variables,
with each successive layer impinging more directly on family
size.

In establishing the empirical validity of this model,

the first step is to examine the direct relationship of the
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explanatory variables to fertility and the relationships
among the independent variables.

This procedure would also

orovide a description of the sample in terms of these micro
and macro level factors affecting fertility.
Background Variables
Four background variables are used in the model as
macro-structural indicators of modernization.

Rural or

urban area of residence is probably one of the most basic
structural variables influencing fertility, both directly
and indirectly.

It directly represents diverse levels of

urbanization and industrialization; at the same time, each
area offers its members different opportunities for participating in its economic, social, cultural, religious, and
demographic sectors.

Because they represent different lev-

els of modernization, rural-urban differences need to be
assessed throughout.

or

the 540 respondents in the sample, 326 were

selected from two city corporations, with 168 respondents
from Trivandrum city (an administrative-industrial center)
and 158 from Cochin city (a commercial-industrial center).
105 women were selected from the rural area in Trivandrum
district and 109 from the rural area in Ernakulam district,
making a total of 214 rural respondents.
Religion, the second background factor, is a significant traditional influence in Indian life, although secularization processes (another aspect of modernization) are more
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evident in the cities.

The western influence in Indian

Christianity lend plausible the hypothesis that Christian
respondents would be more modern in their life experiences,
including their fertility behavior.

It could also be

hypothesized that the secular effects of Christianity may be
more intense in the cities.
Caste status of the individuals, with its religious
and social influences, is another significant background
variable.

In the context of modernization, caste status may

influence fertility through the process of secularization
and through the availability of economic and social opportunities to members of different caste groups.

The Hindu

respondents in the sample belong to either the Brahmin,
Nair, Ezhava, or Scheduled castes.

In the ritual hierarchy

of castes, Brahmins have the highest caste status.

Though

the Nairs are lower than the Brahmins in the ritual hierarchy, they are the dominant caste in Kerala in terms of
oolitical and economic power, a feature which may be significant in its relation to social and economic status and fertility.

Ezhavas, an economically backward caste, are next

to the Nairs in the caste hierarchy.

The lowest caste, the

Scheduled caste (called so because they are listed by Presidential orders under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, Government of India, 1972:
'untouchable' castes.

121), comprises all the

Affirmative action programs of the

Indian government since Independence have altered their
opportunities for participation in the modernization pro-
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cesses in the country.
Corresponding to the Hindu caste ordering, caste distinctions are found among the Christians too.

The Jacobite/

Marthomite denomination in the Christian church, the powerful landowning group, occupies the highest status in the
Christian hierarchy followed by the C.S.I. (Church of South
India) denomination, and last by the Nadar Christians.

Two

factors are generally considered relevant in the Christian
status:

the preconversion caste status and the timing of

the conversion.

If a group had a higher status before con-

version to Christianity, it maintained a commensurate status
in the present hierarchy.

Upper caste Christians also claim

to have been converted earlier than the lower castes.
Table 8 presents the distribution of respondents by
area of residence, religion, and caste status.

The general

distribution by religion roughly approximates the distribution in the state of Kerala.

1

In the case of caste status, a

greater proportion of the lower castes--Ezhavas, C.S.I., and
Nadar Christians are in the rural than in the urban sample,
which has a larger percentage of the upper castes--Brahmins,
Marthomites/Jacobites--and Scheduled castes.

Nairs are

almost in the same proportion in the rural and urban samples.

This distribution partially projects the traditional

rural-urban differences with a possible selective migration

1

According to the 1971 population figures only 5.6% of
the total Kerala population is non-Catholic Christian (Government of India, 1979).

TABLE 8
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY RELIGION,
CASTE, A..~D AREA OF RESIDENCE
-~---
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Hindu
(H = 509)
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(N = 31)

N

~f
e

---------

Residence

---

--------

· Urban
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Rural

Brahmins

11.3%

2.3%

Nairs

30.5

31.3

30.0

Ezhavas

29.4

38.3

23.3

Scheduled Castes

22.9

18.2

26.2

'

17.4%

Marthomite/Jacobites

1.7

. . .

2.8

c.s. I.

0.4

0.9

. . .

Nadar Christians

3.8

8.9

0.3

100%
(214)

100%
(318)

100~~

(532)

t:

<l'
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of the scheduled castes to the cities where better opportunities are available.
The mean age of the respondent in the sample is 34.6
while the average age of the rural respondents is lower
(32.7) than that of the urban respondents (35.6).
ference suggests two possible modernization trends:

This dif(a) the

lower age of the rural women may be a reflection of the
higher rural fertility (traditional) and the consequent
younger populaton; (b) it may also denote selective retention of older couples in the cities, especially in the
higher status groups.

Seniority is still a dominant cri-

teria for upward movement in the Indian occupational structure.

Another interesting aspect of the age of the respon-

dent is the traditional pattern of a larger age gap between
the respondent and her husband for older women that is evident in the rural area alone (r=.12; <.05).

That this rela-

tionship is absent in the cities connotes a modern trait of
smaller age differences between husband and wife.
What are the implications of these patterns for fertility orientation and actual fertility?

Contrary to the

modernization hypothesis, the rural and urban areas do not
differ significantly in their ideal and actual family size
and consequently in the gap between the two.

The average

ideal family size for rural and urban areas is 2.9 and 2.8
respectively and the mean actual family size is 3.5 in both
samples.

Compared to an ideal family size of 3.1 found in a

1965 study of three villages in Trivandrum district (Univer-
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sity of Kerala, 1965) or of 3.7 children found in the least
developed village and 3.1 in the highly developed village in
Gujerat (Anker, 1973), the rural and urban ideals in this
study are low.

Differences in the actual family size

between this study's sample and earlier studies (for example, an expected family size of 5.4 in the Trivandrum village study and 6.0 in the Gujerat study) is even more pronounced.

Even when the average family size of sterilized

respondents in this study is considered (rural sterilized=3.5 and urban sterilized=3.8), it is lower than that
of the two previous samples.

Yet, the achieved family size

of the respondents in this study is higher than their ideals
suggesting a slower responsiveness of family size behavior
to modernization and the family planning program compared to
the norms.
These rural urban similarities, however, conceal significant variations within each area.

For example, signifi-

cant religious and caste differences in ideal family size
are found in the rural area.

Cities, in contrast, provide a

secular atmosphere facilitating favorable reception to the
intensive family planning propaganda on the necessity of
having two children or less across the religious and caste
groups.
Religious and caste differences in the rural ideals,
however, are not completely in the hypothesized direction.
Rural Christians are not only more conservative in their
ideals than their urban counterparts, but are so in compari-
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son to the rural Hindus too.

2

Christianity appears to be

more traditional than Hinduism in the rual areas.

The flex-

ibility of Hinduism in adopting external elements (such as
family planning propaganda) and reinterpeting them according
to its principles is evident in the similarity in ideal family sizes of urban and rural Hindus. 3 Lower caste status of
the rural Christians (who are either C.S.I. or Nadar Christians--the two lower castes) may be an additional explanatory factor.

2 Mean ideal family size for the different religious
groups are:
Rural

Urban

Christians

1.4

2.8

Hindus

2.9

2.8

~As Bondurant (1963) pointed out, the concept of Dharma
(duty) is central to the Indian social and religious structure. Every individual has a specific dharma commensurate
with his status in society. But, a given individual's
dharma may change depending on circumstances and hence norms
are laid down to guide actions under extraordinary conditions. Though an individual's behavior under these stressful conditions may be very different from what is regularly
required of him, he still will be acting 'dharmically.' At
the societal level too, dharma is viewed as changing from
age to age and each era has a different value system.
Social and political leaders like Ghandhi are considered
competent in interpreting when an age has ended and another
has begun. Thus, the accomodative nature of dharma and Hinduism, which permits change without destroying its basic
principles is an important aspect of India's modernization.
It is in this context that the smaller ideal family size of
the rural Hindus, which is in direct contrast to the religious and social values placed on a large number of children
needs to be understood.
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While the Christian castes in the villages do not
differ from each other in their family size norms, the differences among the rural Hindu castes do not conform to the
traditional hypothesis.

The Scheduled castes, the lowest

castes, have the lowest mean ideal family size (2.5) followed by the Nairs (2.8), Brahmins (3.0), and Ezhavas (3.1).
These differences need to be explained in terms of both the
ritual and secular aspects of caste. In the rural areas,
caste status has a traditional influence (higher ideal family size) in two instances:

when the basis of upper caste

status is purely ritual or religious, as in the case of the
Brahmins and when the basis of lower caste status is both
ritual and economic as with the Ezhavas.

In contrast, upper

caste status becomes a modernizing force when the high ritual and secular statuses coincide as in the case of the
Nairs.

Modern fertility orientations of the lower castes--

-may be a reflection of the mobility aspirations of these
once down trodden groups, in the context of the affirmative
policies of the government.

Incidentally, these opportuni-

ties are not available to the Ezhavas.

Once again, it is a

secular factor--government intervention--that differentiates
the two ritually lowest castes.

This is a clear example of

the unique nature of Indian modernization and consequently
of its demographic transition.
Unlike ideal family size, the variations in the actual
family size and the gap between the actual and the ideal
among the religious and caste groups are not statistically
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significant.

Yet, the actual family size of these women are

consistently higher than their ideals, resulting in a positive gap.

This pattern may be because ideals, which are

opinions, are more easily influenced by modernization and
fmaily planning propaganda than achieved family size, particularly when the frame of reference is a group.

It sug-

gests a lag in behavioral changes following the shifts in
norms.
Finally, modern orientations of the younger respondents and their earlier exposure to the family planning program4 is expected to be reflected in their ideal and actual
family size, and the ensuing gap between the two.
nrovides a time dimension to the problem.

It also

Differences

between the older and younger cohorts, if they exist, may
represent changes over time.

Further, older respondents, by

virtue of their age, have experienced greater numbers of
childbearing years too.

Analysis reveals significant posi-

tive correlations between age of the respondent and the family size variables suggesting more traditional ideals and
behavior of older women and vice versa (Tables

9, 10).

Apart from the effect of the number of childbearing years,

4There is no direct evidence in this study for the role
of family planning program in influencing fertility norms
and behavior. Yet, the programs were revitalized and have
been implemented vigorously since the late sixties and early
seventies. This is bound to create differences in family
planning practices over time. For example, the percent of
married women in the reproductive age using contraception in
India doubled between 1969 (8%) and 1976 (17%)
(Nortman and
Hofstatter, 1980: 73).
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modernization of fertility values and behavior (shift toward
smaller family) seems to have occurred in the two districts
over time.

All three relationships are consistently

stronger in the rural areas implying more pronounced fertility differences between the older and younger rural women
than the urban.

This is consistent with the modernization

argument that older rural women would participate in and
benefit least from the changes occurring through time in the
Indian society.

Because of their urban location, older

respondents in the city have a better chance of participating in the modernization trends.
In general, the influence of the background variables
on fertility (whenever significant) lends support to the
general argument that modernization, especially in its religious and demographic (age of the respondent) aspects, does
lower fertility aspirations and aids in their realization.
However, it should be noted that rural-urban area of residence, the geographical aspect of modernization, is not
directly relevant to family size in this sample. Mere residence in a rural or urban area does not differentiate individuals in terms of their family size.

The influence of

residence is, perhaps, indirect since it is the difference
in opportunities (economic, social, and cultural) the cities
and rural villages provide that explain differences in fertility orientations and behavior.
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TABLE 11
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS( A~D THEIR HUSBANDS'
EDUCATIONAL STATUS BY AREA OF RESIDENCEl

Wives'
Education

Husbands'
Education

Educational
Categories

Rural

Urban

Rural

Urban

Below High School

76.2%

42.6%

78.0%

57.7%

High School

14.5

28.2

13.1

27.6

9.3

29.1

8.9

14.7

Above High School
N

100%
(214)

x2

a

Gamma

100%
(326)

100%
(214)
a

.58

1a = significant at

.40
<.001 level.

100%
(326)
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TABLE 12
DISTRIBUTION OF HUSBANDS' AND WIVES' OCCUPATIONAL
STATUS BY AREA OF RESIDENC£1,2,3

Husbands'
Occupation

Occupational
Categories

Rural

Unemployed

Wives'
Occupation

Urban

Rural

'Jrban

1. 8%

Unskilled Labor

53.3%

21.2

Si<.illed Labor

20.1

10.1

77.8%

28.1%

Clerical and Service
Occupations

14.0

34.7

3.2

28.1

:1anagerial and
Professional
Occupations

12.6

32.2

19.0

43.9

N

100%
(214)

x2

a

a

Gamma

.52

.66

1a

.
. f.Lcant at
= sLgnL

100%
(326)

< . 001

100%
(63)

100%
(57)

level.

2unemployed women were omitted from the distribution in
this table.
3The first categorv in Women's Occupational status
refers to both ~nskilled and skilled labor.
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TABLE 13
EXTENT OF OWNERSHIP OF MODERH ITENS BY
AREA OF RESIDE~CE 1

Area, of Resi.dence.
No. of Items
Owned

0 Items

General

Rural

Urban

31.3%

52.3%

17.5%

1 - 3 Items

45.4

43.5

46.6

4 - 7 Items

17.6

3.7

26.7

8 -17 Items

5.7

0.5

9.2

N

100%
(540)

100%
(214)

x2

a

Gamma

.70

la = significant at

< . 001 level.

100/o
(326)

TABLE' 14
l~ANS,

STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND RESULTS OF T-TEST FOR
SELECTED VARIABLES BY AREA OF RESIDENCEl
Area of Residence
:1ean
Standard
·-.-.Uroan
Rural

Variables
Background
Variable

Riiral-c~-.-.

Age of Respondent

. Education of Husband
~ocioe<:ono~~clownership of H<;>dern Items
.i.1odern~zat~on Education of W~fe
Demographic !Age at First Marriage
11odernization Infant Mortality
Social-Psycho
logical
AodernizationiConjugal Role Relationships
Family
Planning
Variables

Son Preference
Parity of FP Initiation
Family Planning Effectiveness

1 a = H.:ural-Urban differences
b = ltural-Urban differences
c = Rural-Urban differences

Dev~at~on

Urban

32.7

35.8a

4.7

5.2

6.1
0.9
5.5
18.8
11.5

9.6a
3.oa
7.9a
'19. 5c
11.4

4.0
1.3
3.9
3.5
16.6

4. 7b
2. 7a
4.1
4.lc
18.2

126.2

141.2a

29.5

32.7

12.7
2.6
2.3

9.9
2.9
2.7a

18.2
1.9
1.3

19.6
2.2
1. 5c

significant at
significant at
significant .at

-

-

< . 001 level.
<. 01 level.
<. 05 level.

1-'
0"\

w
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sary infrastructure (electricity, good roads) disallows possession of some of the modern items.
High intercorrelations among the three indices--education, occupation, and ownership of modern items--also provide a consistent picture of the socioeconomic structure of
the families (Tables 9,10).

As might be expected, higher

education, higher occupational status, and higher material
status are consistently associated with each other, both in
the cities and the rural areas.5
It is also necessary to assess the role of religion
and caste in the socioeconomic achievements of the sample.
Contrary to the expected pattern, Hindus and Christians generally do not differ significantly in their opportunities
for participation in the social and economic development.
Caste status, on the other hand, is significant in
explaining variations in socioeconomic status, even in modernizing India (Table 15).

The data supports the expected

pattern of the higher socioeconomic status of the upper
castes and vice versa, particularly in the cities. 6 Inspite

5Hence, only husband's education will be used as an index
of the family's socioeconomic status in the later analysis.

nThe following are the Chi-square and Gamma values for
the relationships between caste and occupational status in
the rural areas and cities:
Rural Areas:

Chi-square=p<.OOl
Gamma=-.01

Cities:

Chi-square=p<.001
Gamma=-.31

TABLE 15
l'1EANS AND RESULTS OF ANOVA ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF CASTE WITH HUSBAiW '· S EDUCATION.
MODERN ITEi'1S. AND WIFE'· S EDUCATION BY AREA OF RESIDENCEl·
Area of
Residence

Caste

Variables

Husband's
Education

Urban

Education of
Respondent

(N)

He an

on

10.4a
Brahmin
Nair
7.4
Ezhava
5.3
Scheduled Caste
5.2
i1arthomite/ Jacobite . . .
C.S.I
8.5
Nadar Christian
5.2

( 5}
(67)
(82}
(39)
( 0)
( 2)
(19)

1.4
1.2
0.9
0.6

( 5)
(67)
(82)
(39}
( 0)
( 2)
(19)

7.oc
6.7
5.0
4.9

11.1 a
10.8
8.7
7.6
12.3

(55)
(95)
(74)
(83)
( 9)
( 0)
( 1)

3.5
3.6
2.9
2.1
5.4

(55)
(95)
(74)
(83)
( 9)

8.7a
9.0
7.6
6.4
10.6

3.0

( 0)
( 1)

9.0

J:1ean

Rural

Modern Items
Owned

Brahmin
Nair
Ezhava
Scheduled Caste
Marthomite/Jacobite
C. S. I.
Nadar Christian

. . .

10.0

1 a = Differences among castes
b = Differences among castes
c = Differences among castes

significant at
significant at
significant at

. . .

1.5
0.7

. . .

He an
·

. .

5.0
4.5

. . .

nn
( 5)
(67)
(82)
(39)
·c o)
( 2)
(19)
(55)
(95)
(74)
(83)
( 9)
( 0)
( 1)

<. 001 level.
<. 01 level.
<. 05 level.
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of the governmental policies, the upper castes still have a
greater share in the fruits of modernization.
These modernization trends could, theoretically, have
significant influences on fertility (Tables 9, 10).

As

might be expected, higher socioeconomic status is systematically associated with lower ideals, lower actuals, and
smaller gaps between ideal and actual family size.

Higher

fertility, both in orientations and in behavior, implies a
traditional value system as well as the economic (supplementary income, old age security, and inheritance of wealth)
and social necessity of having more children in the poorer
families.

Additional dimensions of these negative socioeco-

nomic status-fertility relationships are evident under further analysis.

Socioeconomic differentials (indexed by edu-

cation and occupational status) in ideal family size in both
rural areas and cities are not as pronounced as the differences in actual family size.

In other words, upper and

lower class respondents are more similar in their fertility
norms than in their fertility behavior.

Since the overall

family size norms are small, it could be concluded that not
everybody who subscribes to small family ideals has conformed to them in practice.
Distinctions in family size norms among the socioeconomic groups are stronger in the urban than in the rural
areas.

Cities, as noted earlier, have a wide range in their

socioeconomic continuum and consequently the family size
norms of the top strata are significantly smaller than the
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ideals of the lowest strata.

On the other hand, the compar-

atively narrower range in the rural socioeconomic status
precludes wide disparities in the rural ideal family size.
Yet, the socioeconomic differences in achieved family size
are equally strong in both the rural and urban areas,
despite the small rural socioeconomic range.

Apparently,

wider differences in actual fertility exist between the
upper and lower classes in the rural areas than in the cities.

Stated differently, rural women from lower status fam-

ilies have a higher actual family size in comparison with
their city counterparts.

Rural residence and lower socioe-

conomic status, thus, interact in contributing to their traditional fertility behavior.
Socioeconomic differentials in the gap between the
ideal and actual family size can be deduced from the patterns in ideal and actual fertility.

The gap is the excess

in achieved family size over the ideal family size.

There

is a larger difference between the socioeconomic variations
in ideal family size and in actual family size in the rural
areas than in the cities.

Consequently, the impact of

socioeconomic status on the gap between ideal and actual
fertility is also stronger in the rural area.

In other

words, there is a larger proportion of lower class rural
respondents who have lower fertility norms but higher actual
fertility.

At the same time, there is a closer correspon-

dence in the fertility norms and behavior of upper class
rural women.

In the cities, in contrast, there is closer
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conformity between ideal and actual family size.

Higher

status urban women who idealize smaller families have
smaller achieved families, while lower status women have
higher ideal and actual families.

Thus, the socioeconomic

patterns in the gap seem to be a reflection of the socioeconomic variations in fertility norms and behavior.
The third index of socioeconomic status, the ownership
of modern items, is a more effective correlate of rural fertility than urban fertility (Table 10).

Given the tradi-

tional socioeconomic structure of rural areas, the opportunities and means for acquiring and using modern items
be more limited in the rural areas than in the cities.

will
Only

those with very high educational and ocupational statuses
(and probably those who have either worked in foreign countries or have children employed abroad) could afford large
numbers of modern items.

This will differentiate them from

poorer respondents much more clearly than will be the case
in the cities.

The stronger impact of higher economic sta-

tus in the reduction of rural fertility complements the
argument made earlier for rural economic development as a
tool in the population control program.
Socioeconomic characteristics Of The Respondent
The second set of intervening social and economic
characteristics concern the respondent and her status.
Since the woman has a direct role in childbearing, it may be
hypothesized that her own socioeconomic achievements, apart
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from those of her husband, will have an independent
influence on fertility norms and behavior.

The respondent's

status is measured by three indices--her education, her
labor force participation, and her work status.
As might be expected in a male dominated traditional
culture, women, both in the urban and rural areas, have
lower educational levels than women (Table 11).

Moreover,

just as with their husband's education, rural women are less
educated than their urban counterparts.

This fits in with

the traditional rural and modernizing urban structures
described earlier (Table 14).
The labor force participation pattern of women complements these conclusions.

Although a larger proportion of

rural women (29%) than urban women work (17%), a majority of
the former is in the lower status occupations (Table 12).
Employment of poorer women in the unskilled and other lower
status occupations may be expected in the non-industrial
rural economy.

In contrast, the pattern of urban women's

employment typical of modernizing cities involves a smaller
proportion employed, but in jobs covering the entire occupational spectrum.

Limited employment opportunities for women

and the lack of sufficient outside help in household jobs
often require the urban women to stay at home.

Yet, urban

women with higher education tend to be employed more than
(gamma=.66) the rural women with similar education
(gamma=.07). Another interesting aspect of the woman's
socioeconomic status is the stronger correlation between her
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education and work status compared to her husband's (Table
10).

In a context where it is still not customary for the

woman to be employed, when they do get a job, they engage in
occupations more compatible with their education.
Intercorrelations between the socioeconomic characteristics of the husband and the wife indicate a coherence in
the family's socioeconomic structure (Tables 9, 10).

Women

with higher education tend to marry men with higher education, higher occupational status, and higher economic status.

This pattern is less consistent among the rural fami-

lies than in the cities suggesting a gradual shift in
emphasis from family's status to individual's status as a
criteria in urban marriages.

In the modernizing cities,

parity in educational achievements of husband and wife is
becoming as important a criteria in contracting a marriage
as traditional ones, such as caste status and family's heritage.
Rural-urban differences in labor force participation
of women and their work status (that a greater proportion of
rural women tend to work, bur they work in lower status
occupations) is carried over into the relationship between
the husband and wife's socioeconomic characteristics.

Rural

and urban areas differ in their motivations and opportunities for women's employment.

Economic factors seem to be

the basis of the rural women's labor force participation.
Their employment is not a matter of choice, but of necessity.

In the cities, however, women's employment seems to
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be an expression of their higher status and the consequent
emphasis on their non-traditional roles.

Thus, it is only

in the urban samples that women whose husbands have higher
education (Gamma=.28), higher occupational status
(gamma=.ll), and higher economic status (gamma=.lO) are more
likely to be employed than are women whose husbands have
lower status.

Husband's education and economic statuses are

not significant differentiating factors in the women's labor
force participation in the rural areas while husband's occupational status is.

The negative relationship of husband's

occupation to wife's labor force participation (gamma=-.33)
supports the argument made earlier that monetary considerations require rural women to work, even if it is in lower
status jobs.

Since education is not a direct or necessary

index of economic wealth, it is not a determining factor of
whether the rural wife works or not.

At the same time, vil-

lagers generally possess fewer modern items which may
explain the irrelevance of the economic index in the rural
areas.
When women are employed, their occupational status is
consistent with their husband's status (Tables 9, 10).

But,

unlike women's education, there are no rural-urban differences in the higher correlations between their work status
and their family status.

While education is fairly wide-

spread in Kerala, the infrequency of women's labor force
participation may explain the equally close correspondence
between the husband's status and wive's work status in the
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rural and urban centers.

The stronger rural correlation

between wive's work status and modern items also reflects
the monetary contribution that their employment makes toward
the purchase of the scarce goods available in the villages.
Wife's socioeconomic characteristics can also be
linked back to the background variables.

The influence of

religion on the socioeconomic status of the respondent is
comparable to its influence on her family's status.

There

are no significant differences among Hindu and Christian
women in their education and employment.
Caste distinctions, once again, are operative in
women's socioeconomic achievements lending additional support to the results found in the case of the family's status.

Inspite of the efforts of the government, upper caste

women are still more educated than the lower castes (Table
15).

Given the traditional rural structure, it is not

suprising that the caste distinctions in women's education
are not as pronounced in the rural areas as in the cities.
These patterns are also consistent with the transitional
status of Indian cities.
Caste differences in women's employment further exemplifies this modernizing structure.

Although slightly more

of the lower caste rural women tend to be in the labor force
(gamma=.09) they are engaged in lower status occupations
than the upper caste women (Table 16).

Status considera-

tions may prevent some of the upper caste women, even if
highly educated, from working; but the lower caste respon-

TABLE 16
DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATIOi:~AL STATUS OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES
BY CASTE AND AREA OF RESIDENCE1,2
Area of
Occupational
Residence
Status
Unskilled Labor
Skilled Labor
Clerical and Service
'51 Aanagerial and
&!
Professional

~
j

§

~

Upper
Castes
55. 47o
6.8
16.2
21.6
100%
( 74)

N

Rural
Ezhavas
59.8%
18.3
15.9
6.1
100%
( 82)

Lower
Castes.
41. 4io
39.7
8.6

Upper
Castes
12.7%
5.7
36.9

43.9
100%
(157)

10.3
100%
(58)

x2

a

a

Gamma

-.01

-.37

Blue Collar
Clerical and Service
i•1anagerial and
Professional

28.6%
7.1

64.3

(1£2~

N

Urban
Ezhavas
27.8%
11.1
34.7
26.4
100%
( 72)

Lower
Castes
31.3%
19.3
31.3
18.1
100%
( 83)

94.4%
2.8

a4.6%

4.8%
33.3

25.0%
25.0

58.8%
17.6

2.8

15.4

61.9

50.0

23.5

100%
( 36)

100%
( 13)

100%
(21)

x2
Gamma

a

b

-.69

-.56

1a =Significant at

<.001 level; b =Significant at

100%
( 16)

100%

( 17)

<.01 level.

2upper castes include Brahmins, jairs, ~·Iarthomites/ Jacobites, and C. S. I. ;
lower castes include Scheduled castes and Nadar Christians.

1-'

"'-.1

w
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dent is engaged in lower status and traditional occupations
constrained by lower educational attainment and required for
economic purposes.

As expected, caste restrictions in

securing higher status jobs seem stronger in the rural
areas.

The absence of caste distinctions in the labor par-

ticipation of urban women may be an aspect of the developing
nature of the cities.

Simply, changing family structures

(toward the nuclear family) which limits the help in household jobs available to the urban wife limit her chances of
seeking outside employment.
status restrictions:

This may also be reinforced by

until a certain societal threshold in

women's employment and modernization is reached, social and
economic improvements among the higher castes may increase
their conservatism, especially in the question of women
seeking outside employment.

At the same time, contrary to

the traditional pattern, some of the lower caste women in
the cities are engaged in higher status occupations (Table
16).

These diverse trends, once again, reveal Kerala's cit-

ies in their transition toward modernization in contrast to
the rural areas, which though developing, lean more toward
the traditional end of the continuum.
Analysis of the correlations between age of the
respondent and her socioeconomic characteristics provides a
time dimension to the problem (Tables 9, 10).

Since the

older cohorts of women grew up in a more traditional set up
and lacked the chances for participating in the post-independence development processes, their experiences and
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achievements can differ.

However, as in the case of their

husbands, no significant changes have occurred in the educational achievements of women suggesting a selective participation of the upper castes and classes in the modernization
processes.

Data on the labor force participation of the age

cohorts and their work statuses further reveal the juxtapositioning of the traditional and the modern elements in the
traditional cities.

Though the younger urban women (only)

tend to be employed more frequently (gamma=-.13), they are
engaged mainly in lower status jobs (Table 10).

Seniority,

and not merit, is still a dominant evaluation criteria in
the occupational structure for both men and women.
Although no significant improvements in the socioeconomic status of women are evident over time, changes have
occurred in their fertility patterns.

Earlier, it was noted

that the younger women have significantly lower fertility
ideals, actuals, and gaps than the older women.

The organ-

ized family planning program and cohort differences in their
exposure to them may be relevant factors here.
These patterns in the socioeconomic status of the wife
are expected to influence fertility norms and behavior in
ways similar to that of the impact of her family's status
(Tables

9, 10).

Higher educational and occupational status

of women have a modernizing influence on fertility as evident in their lower ideals, lower actuals, and smaller gaps.
But, as with their families' status, women's socioeconomic
traits are stronger correlates of actual family size than of
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fertility ideals in both the rural and urban areas.

Once

again, the movement toward the small family norm is not
accompanied by similar trends in fertility behavior, especially for the lower classes.

Women's education, however,

has a stronger modernizing effect on family size norms in
the cities with women's occupational status being its counterpart in the rural areas.

In a traditional rural context,

where the economic status of the family and the social
standing of the women are low, higher status jobs are
required to modernize women's fertility norms.

Higher edu-

cation of women in itself is not sufficient in lowering
ideal family size in the rural areas.
Women's socioeconomic status has effects similar to
those of the family's socioeconomic status on actual fertility.

Despite the narrower range of the rural women's

socioeconomic status, rural fertility differentials are as
pronounced as in the cities.

In other words, lower class

rural respondents have significantly larger numbers of children compared to lower class urban women.

Just as with the

family's status, rural residence interacts with lower class
status in contributing to traditional fertility behavior
among the lower class in the rural areas.
The nature of the relationship between respondent's
socioeconomic status and the gap between their ideal and
actual fertility can be deduced from the socioeconomic patterns in fertility norms and behavior.

For example, there

is a larger difference between the educational variations in
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ideal and actual fertility in the rural areas than in the
cities.

Consequently, the effect of women's education on

the gap between the ideal and actual family is also stronger
in the rural areas.

Specifically, more rural women with

lower education have experienced a larger gap--considerably
higher actual fertility than ideal--compared to the upper
class ruralites whose fertility behavior corresponds more
closely to their norms.

In the cities, in contrast, there

is greater conformity between actual and ideal family size
among w0men with varying levels of education and hence, the
smaller the range in the gap.

Thus, the socioeconomic vari-

ations in the gap can be understood by analyzing the nature
of the effect of women's socioeconomic status on ideal and
actual family size separately.
Wife's labor force participation has a modernizing
influence only on actual family size and the gap, and that
too only in the cities.

Employed urban women have signifi-

cantly smaller achieved families (Mean=2.8) and gaps (-.04)
than the unemployed (actual family size=3.7; and gap=0.9).
Cities provide a modernizing framework (higher education of
both husband and wife, higher occupational, and economic
status) in which the urban working woman operates.

Labor

force participation is not of much consequence for the rural
woman engaged in low status occupations and constrained by
poor economic conditions.

Once again, as with the family

status, more pronounced differences exist in fertility
achievements than in opinions.
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In short, distinctions in the rural and urban patterns
indicate that improvements in the socioeconomic status of
women could be achieved in the process of modernization.
such improvements also seem effective in reducing fertility
at the normative and behavioral levels.
Intervening Demographic Characteristics
This set of intervening variables includes two factors
that may influence fertility both at the normative and quantitative levels.

Age at marriage, the first variable, quan-

titatively affects fertility by determining the number of
childbearing years.

As an intervening variable in the mod-

ernization-fertility relationship, age at marriage becomes a
medium through which educational and occupational statuses
of women affect fertility.
Wife's Age At Marriage
While socioeconomic status can be considered an index
of primary modernization, age at marriage is an index of
early secondary modernization since it is improvements in
the social and economic status of women that tend to postnone marriages.

Differences among the rural and urban areas

in women's age at marriage indicates that not only are the
cities characterized by a higher age at marriage, but also a
wider range in marriage ages than the rural areas (Table
14).

Larger variations in age at marriage adds another

dimension to the transitional nature of cities.
Further specification of the modernization-age at mar-
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riage relationship is possible in the analysis of the interrelationships between the socioeconomic status of the wife
and her age at marriage.

As expected, the higher the educa-

tional and occupational status of the respondent, the higher
is her age at marriage (Tables 9, 10).

There are no differ-

ences between the cities and villages in the effect of education on age at marriage.

Even in the traditional rural

structure, higher education postpones age at marriage,
partly explaining the modernizing effects on rural fertility.

On the other hand, it is only in the cities that work-

ing women have significantly higher age at marriage
(mean=22.8) than the unemployed women (18.8).

Differences

in age at marriage among women in higher and lower status
occupations are also more pronounced in the cities.

Rural

areas are characterized by a pattern of early marriage among
its women (Table 14) as well as by a traditional occupational structure.

As noted earlier, while a larger percent-

age of rural than urban women were in the labor force, a
majority of the former were engaged in lower status jobs.
These factors may explain the absence of significant differences in age at marriage among working and non-working rural
women and the weaker rural correlations between age at marriage and wife's work status.
There is a close similarity between the impact of the
family's and the wife's socioeconomic characteristics on her
age at marriage (Tables 9, 10).
dent in this analysis are:

Two such similarities evi-

higher socioeconomic status of
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the family is associated with higher age at marriage; and
higher status operates as a modernizing agent not only in
the cities, but even in the traditional rural context.

How-

ever, correlations between family's socioeconomic status and
age at marriage are stronger in the rural areas indicating a
greater disparity between higher and lower status rural families than urban families.

Although this pattern does not

fit in with the thesis of the transitional nature of cities
versus the more homogenous structure of the rural areas, the
weaker urban correlation suggests the facilitating influence
of the cities in secondary modernization.

More specifi-

cally, women from urban families with low socioeconomic status tend to marry later than their rural counterparts.

At

the same time, improvements in the rural family's socioeconomic status is as strongly associated with higher age at
marriage for their women as for their urban counterparts.
In order to complete the analysis of the extent of
secondary modernization of the sample, it is necessary to
relate wife's age at marriage to the background variables.
The absence of socioeconomic differences (both family's and
respondent's) between the two religious groups is carried
over into the (lack of) religion-age at marriage relationship too.

In contrast, caste differences in age at marriage

may be traced back to the different socioeconomic statuses
of the upper and lower castes (Table 17).

Families and

respondents of the upper caste tend to have higher socioeconomic status leading to higher age at marriage of the women

TABLE 17
HEANS AND RESULTS OF

A~WVA

OH

WIFE~ S

AGE AT HAR.RIAGE

BY CASTE AND AREA OF RESIDENCEl
~

------

A~a~

n~

~aci~an~o

-----------

Caste

GenerRl

.Hean Age at l1arriage
( N)
( N)
Rural

Urban

( N)

19.8c

(60)

18.6C

( 5)

19.9a

(55)

Nair

19.6

(162)

19. 2.

(67)

19.9

(95)

Ezhava

19.1

(156)

18.6

(82)

19.7

(74)

Scheduled Caste

18.6

(122)

18.9

(39)

18.5

(83)

Marthomite/Jacobite

22.3

( 9)

.

( 0)

22.3

( 9)

c.s. I.

18.0

( 2)

18.0

( 2)

. . .

( 0)

Nadar Christian

18.1

(20)

18.1

(19)

18.0

( 1)

Brahmin

la :::
c ::=

..

<.001 level of significance.
<.05 level of significance.

1--'

(X)

1--'
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in the cities.

But caste disparities in age at marriage are

not as marked in the rural areas.

A plausible explanation

may lie in the economic component of the caste-socioeconomic
status association in the rural area.

There were no signif-

icant differences among the rural caste groups in their economic status (Table 15).

Given the relatively low standards

of living and the difficulty in obtaining a number of modern
goods in the rural areas, both the husband and wife would
have to work to afford some of them.

But the upper caste

woman generally does not work and eventhough the lower caste
woman works, both she and her husband are engaged in lower
status jobs.

Thus, the weaker caste differences in age at

marriage may be a function of the lack of economic differences among the rural castes.

Caste distinctions are also

not too pronounced in the rural areas leading to the similarities in age at marriage among the rural castes.
Finally, no significant changes are evident in the age
at which older and younger cohorts of women in the sample
were first married (Tables 9, 10).

This could also be

linked back to the lack of age differences in their respective socioeconomic status.
Having established the positive relationship between
socioeconomic modernization and wife's age at marriage, it
is necessary to assess the latter's role in influencing fertility (Tables 9, 10).

As expected, a woman who married

later generally has a smaller ideal and actual family size,
and a smaller gap between the two in both the cities and the
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rural areas.

The similarity in the strength of the rural

and urban relationships of age at marriage with ideal and
actual family size, despite the smaller age at marriage
range in the rural areas, points out another traditional
pattern among rural women.

Rural women who marry early

idealize and have larger families compared to the urban
women who marry early.

Moreover, continuing the trend

noticed in the case of both the family's and the respondent's socioeconomic status, age at marriage distinctions in
actual family size are stronger than distinctions in ideals
possibly due to the small variations in the ideal family
size.

Raising the age at marriage of women in India, thus,

can be an effective tool in achieving fertility declines
both directly and indirectly as a consequence of improved
socioeconomic status.
Infant Mortality
Extent of infant mortality experienced by a family is
the second demographic variable in the model.

Like age at

marriage, it is not only an index of secondary modernization, but it also can directly influence fertility.
types of effects can be hypothesized:

Two

a quantitative rela-

tionship in which extent of infant mortality determines the
number of surviving children a couple has;

and a motiva-

tional relationship where it influences the couple's desire
for having children.

The index is operationalized as the

percentage of all pregnancies that have been spontaneous
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abortions, still births, and deaths of infants, four years
and below.
Infant mortality viewed as an index of modernization
implies that as a society progresses, the extent of infant
mortality experienced by families can be expected to
decrease.

Though rural and urban areas, representing tradi-

tional and modern contexts, do not differ significantly in
their infant mortality (Table 14) the intervening variables--socioeconomic status characteristics, age at marriage, and the background variables--are significant determinants of fertility within each area.
In the cities, higher social status of the husband,
measured by his education and occupation, is significantly
associated with lower mortality (Tables

9, 10).

More ·effi-

cient health care and improved sanitation facilities are
available in the cities than in the rural areas.

But in

these modernizing cities, it is the husband or the head of
the household who generally initiates and maintains contacts
with non-familial institutions, such as the hospital; hence
the relevance of husband's status to urban infant mortality.
Higher education of the husband may represent health care
values, such as beliefs in preventive care and in modern
systems of medicine that are more easily available in the
cities.

Further, since most of the urban wives do not work,

their husband's occupational status will determine the family's accessibility to modern health care.
On the other hand, it is the wife's characteristics--
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-her education, her age at marriage, and her age at the time
of the interview--and the modern items index representing
the economic status of the family as a unit that are relevant correlates of rural infant mortality.

In the tradi-

tional rural society where familial roles are segregated,
childbearing and childcare are relegated primarily to the
wife.

Improvements in the rural woman's status, therefore,

tend to be associated with more efficient use of health care
and ultimately lower infant mortality.

Moreover, with the

meager health services, poor living conditions, and generally low socioeconomic status in the rural areas, the economic means of a family (modern items index) will determine
whether it can afford immediate treatment and care either in
the rural area itself or in the nearby city.7 Finally, older
women and those who married early have experienced longer
periods of childbearing and, therefore, more pregnancies.
The possibility that such women have also experienced higher
infant mortality in the rural areas than found in the city
is explained by the poorer health care and economic conditions in the villages.
Analysis of the relationships between infant mortality
and the family size variables will help specify further the
impact of modernization on infant mortality and ultimately
fertility itself (Tables 9, 10).

7

It may be hypothesized

Economic status was a stronger correlate of rural actual
family size too.
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that the higher the infant mortality experienced, the larger
the family size idealized.

Conversely, as the society pro-

gresses and rates of infant mortality decrease, smaller families would be preferred.

Lower infant mortality could also

be expected to motivate couples to have fewer children and
consequently have smaller gaps between their ideals and
actuals.

A purely quantitative relationship, however, could

reverse the direction of the relationship:

a higher rate of

infant mortality would result in fewer surviving children.
As per the data, only actual family size and, therefore, the
gap between ideal and actual family size are influenced by
infant mortality in the cities, while the direction of the
relationship (-.14) indicates a quantitative association.
This is further supported by the absence of the influence of
infant mortality on ideal family size, the motivational
aspect of family size.
In the initial stages of modernization, reductions in
infant mortality may have a quantitative effect on fertility.

Only when a certain threshold level of modernization

has been crossed and substantial reductions in infant mortality have been achieved, will its effects be felt at the
motivational level.

Kerala's modernization and infant mor-

tality, which although the lowest in India in 1971 at about
~1

per 1000 (United Nations, 1975:

134), are not sufficient

to have motivational impacts on fertility.

In the rural

areas where modernization is yet in its early stages, infant
mortality does not have much influence.

Even the quantita-
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tive effect of infant mortality, therefore, will not be evident until a certain a threshold level of modernization (as
in the cities) has been attained.

Results of the analysis

of infant mortality, viewed as an index of modernization,
fits the transitional nature of India's modernization.
Social Psychological Characteristics
Conjugal Role Relationships
Another medium through which the relationship between
modernization and fertility can be specified is the social
psychological level.

Modernization influences fertility

through the values, attitudes, and capabilities that individuals acquire in the context of development.

A shift from

an attitude of resignation to a sense of control over one's
life, including the number of children born to a couple and
reflected in active decision making are two examples of such
modern attitudes.

Flexibility of role prescriptions, espe-

cially in the family and the ability of the couple to interchange roles are yet other modern traits.

A traditional

conjugal role pattern is charcterized by division of labor
where the husband performs the male jobs of breadearning and
decision making and the wife, the household tasks.

In con-

trast, modern conjugal role relationships reflect joint participation in interchangeable functions and decision making
(Bott, 1971: 53).

The modern woman would also have a strong

interest against a large family which would conflict with
her role obligations outside the home.

Therefore, families
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where the wife participates in decision making and where
there is communication, discussion, and sharing between the
couple will succeed in limiting their family size.
As discussed in Chapter III, conjugal role relationship is a cumulative index of seven individual dimensions
with a higher score indicating greater jointness in relationships.8 Consistencies in the indices are evident in the
significant positive correlations among the seven indices
(Table 18).

In other words, joint participation in decision

making, in dealing with outsiders, and in religious activities is associated with more sharing, lesser disagreements,
greater tendency to resort to discussion and compromise in
the event of disagreements, and to contain solving disagreements within the family.
If role relationship is an index of advanced secondary
modernization, significant differences may be expected
between rural and urban couples in the nature of their
respective role relationships (Table 19).

Urban wives do

participate jointly with their husband to a more significant
extent than their rural counterparts.

Extent of joint par-

ticipation in religious activities is one of the three
scales that does not differentiate the rural and urban couples.

Hinduism (the majority religion in the sample) is an

individualized religion which may explain the infrequency of

8 A detailed description of the seven indices is available
in Appendix A.
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TABLE 19
HAXJMJM, MINIMUM, AND MEAN SCORES ON 'IHE ROlE
RElATIONSHIP INDICES BY AREA OF RESIDENCEl

Role Relationship Indices

Rural X
(N = 214)

Maximum-Minimum

Urban X
(N = 326)

Decision Making

55 - 0

32.3

39.10a

Extent of Sharing

55 - 11

26.5

29.2a

Dealing \vith Outsiders

30 - 5

16.2

19.3a

Religious Participation

18 - 0

10.8

11.0

Extent of Disagreem:mts

42 - 6

32.6

34.5b

Outcome of Disagreem:mt

4 - 1

1.8

1.9

Pattern of Solving Disagreements

7 - 1

6.0

6.2

CRR (Composite)

126.2

211 - 24

1 a = Rural-Urban differences significant at
b = Rural-Urban differences significant at
c -- Rural-Urban differences significant at

<
<
<

.001 level
.01 level
.05 level

14l.Oa

1-'

\..0

0
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joint participation in religious activities.
is related to the different

When religion

role relationship indices, the

only significant difference between the two religious groups
is on the religious participation index.

Christian couples

(mean=14.4) tend to participate in religious activities more
jointly than the Hindus (mean=l0.7) confirming the individualistic nature of Hinduism and the community orientation
of Protestantism.
Another dominant pattern in the data on role relationships can be seen if the mean scores are compared to the
maximum and minimum that could be attained theoretically
(Table 19).

In general, respondents tend to lean away from

the jointness end of the continuum, a pattern that is consistent with the modernizing status of the society.

The

absence of significant differences between the rural and
urban areas in the outcome of disagreements, once again,
reflects the prevalence of traditional role structure in the
family, even in the cities.

Although the urban couples have

a greater degree of concurrence (extent of disagreement
index) than the villagers, in the event of disagreements the
husband's opinion still prevails in both the cities and
rural areas.

On the other hand, in the villages as in the

cities, disagreements tend to be solved predominantly within
the conjugal family.

Thus, some progress has been achieved

in breaking the traditional segregated conjugal role structure, although it has not been substantial.
Differences in socioeconomic status between the urban
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and rural areas are also seen in their influence on role
relationships (Table 20).

Higher socioeconomic status of

the family and the wife is more conducive to jointness in
role relationships while lower status is associated with
segregated relationships.

Higher educational, occupational,

and economic status creates an egalitarian and open atmosphere where restrictive customs can be modified to suit the
changing times.

These adaptations seem to be accomplished

more easily in the cities than in the rural areas as the
stronger urban correlations between socioeconomic status and
role relationships indicate.

Another reason why the rural

correlations are weaker is the traditional nature of its
socioeconomic and conjugal role structure.

In short, rural

households with higher socioeconomic status are not markedly
different from the rural households with lower status.
Peculiarities in the wife's labor force participation,
especially in the rural areas, are reflected in their influence on role relationships.

Wife's labor force participa-

tion is related to role relationships in the cities but not
in the rural areas.

(The average scores on the composite

conjugal role relationships index is 155.9 for the working
wife in the cities and 138.1 for the non-working wives in
the cities.)

Two aspects of the rural wife's socioeconomic

status need to be recalled here:

(1) although more rural

women than urban women are employed, a majority of the rural
women were in lower status occupations;

(2) the lower the

occupational status of the rural husband and the lower the

TABLE 20
CORRELATIONS OF TilE CONJUGAL ROLE RELATIONSHIP L.""'DICES WI'IH SELECTED
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(Rural)
ROLE RELATIONSHIPS

(I)

H

f
§

·r-l
(I)

•r-l

C)

~

Husband's Education
Husband' s Occupation
llidem I terns Owned
Respondent 's Education
Respondent's Occupation3
Age at "M:lrriage
Infant MJrtality
Family Planning Attitudes
Parity of FP Initiation
Family Planning Effectiveness
Ideal Family Size
Actual Family Size
Gap

.2Qb
.10
.24a
.27a
.24~

.18
-.07
-.04b
-.21
.35a
-.14c
-.3oa
-.24a

.~

~

4--1
0

~
~
.39a
.29a
.39a
.48a
.43a
.2Sa
-.07
-.13C
-.27a
.44a
-.08
-.26a
-.23a

~
•r-l

a-£
Cll

·~

§
·r-l

~

.~
C)

•r-l

~
t:l-t

I I I
~
(I)

•r-l

t:::l

g

4--1
0

]

•r-l
r-l

~
~

.22b
.lsc
.2sa

.13c
.1sc

.30~

.18b
.33
.11
-.03
-.12c
-.24a
.37a
-.004.
-.1sc
-.14c

.~

.4~

.16
-.06
-.12c
-.23a
.3la
-.15~

-.19
-.12C

•bb
~

.1~

.27a
.26a
.26a
.30a
.39b
.19b
-.06
-.12C
-.27a
.27a
-.07b
-.22
-.18b

~

,......

·r-l

~

·r-l

4--1
0

·r-l

0

Cll

t:::l

~

a
C)

.26~
.22
.28a
.39a
.54~

.22
-.01
-.01
-.2Qb
.34a
-.07
-.13c
-.11

(I)

t:::l

·W
r-l

Q)

-1-J
(I)

!
...........

c51

~

.22b
.24a
.18b
.24a
.34b
.07
.OS
-.11
-.16b
.2ob
-.08
-.19b
-.13c

.32a
.24a
.34a
.4la
.47a
.24a
-.07
-.13c
-.3la
.4sa
-.13c
-.3la
-.2sa

~

\,()

w

TABLE 20
(Continued -- Urban)

ROLE RELATIONSHIPS

§

-E
§

I

~·

·M

.32a
Husband's Education
.25a
Husband's Occupation
.3oa
l'bdern Items Owned
Respondent's Education
.40~
.35
Respondent 's Occupation 3
.23a
Age at Marriage
-.04
Infant tvbrtality
-.2la
Family Planning Attitudes
-.44a
Parity of FP Initiation
.43a
Family Planning Effectiveness
-.01
Ideal Fanily Size
-.29a
Actual Family Size
-.3la
Gap
1.

2.
3.

~

obO

~.s

~~
.42a
.35a
.33a
.sla
a
.43a
.27
-.04
-.28a
-.49a
.soa
-.2oa
-.40a
-.3la

·~

·M

til

.~~

r--4tll

~8

a
.40a
.33
.35a
.47~
.36
.27a
-.08
-.27a
-.soa
.s2a
-.loc
-.39a
-.36a

til
g.~

•rl 0

bO·r-l
•M -i-J

..-4fit

~I

0 (],)

~~
.j.JtfJ

&P-I

rn~

.24a
.23a
.24a
.24a
-.00
.llc
-.07b
-.13
-.24a
.22a
-.06
-.19a
-.1sb

.4la
.36a
.39a
.44~
.35
.12c
-.07
-.23a
-.4oa
.4sa
-.21a
-.35a
-.2sa

.j.J

~~

,..._

m

~~
0 ctl

bl (],)

3

•rl

til

A

·~ ru
b5B

~~

.29a
.21a
.2la
.36a
.29c
.27a
-.03
-.09C
-.35a
.26a
-.1sb
-.2sa
-.18a

.35a
.3oa
.32a
.34~
.3lb
.16
-.01
-.28a
-.27a
.3la
-.llC
-.23a
-.17b

.45a

;goo
•r-l

a=
< .001 level of significance; b = < . 01 level of significance; c
N - Urban= 326-305; Rural= 214-206
N in the case of wife's occupational status - Rural ·= 63-56; Urban = 59

..-4tll

=

< . OS

.37~

.13
.s2a
.42a
.26a
-.07
-.28a
-.52a
.54~

-.14
-.4la
-.35a
level of significance
t-'
\.()

+:-

195
family's economic status, the greater the tendency for the
wife to be employed.

Urban women's employment, on the other

hand, is more a matter of choice than economic necessity.
These differences in motivation combined with the wider
range of occupations in which women are engaged may explain
why women's labor force participation plays an important
role in modernizing conjugal role relationships only in the
cities.

Yet, higher occupational status of rural women,

when it is achieved, does lead to jointness in relationships
which is significantly higher than lower status women and
comparable to higher status urban women (Table 20) Socioeconomic modernization, thus, has its correlates in social psychological modernization, of which role relationships is one
aspect.
Aside from its demographic impact on fertility, age at
marriage could have social psychological effects too, especially through its influence on conjugal role relationships
(Table 20).

The strong positive correlations between

socioeconomic status and age at marriage lend further credibility to this hypothesis.

In other words, women with

higher social status tend to marry late, to be more independent and less likely to let themselves be dominated by their
husband.

When the age at marriage is low, as in the tradi-

tional setup, the role relationships tend to be more segregated.

Since the variation in age at marriage is typically

greater in modernizing cities stronger urban correlations
are to be expected.

In the more traditional rural areas, in
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contrast, where women generally get married at a relatively
younger age, the respondents do not differ as much in their
role relationships.

Yet, as the significant rural correla-

tions reveal, age at marriage does have its modernizing
impact on role relationships.

An example is the disagree-

ment index where the rural correlation is stronger than the
urban.

In a culture (especially the rural) where age at

marriage and the status of women are low, higher age at marriage, if it can be achieved, promotes lesser disagreement
among the couples.

Even in the rural areas, the potential

for the spillover effects of modernization in one aspect
into other aspects related to fertility does exist.

To com-

plete the description of the extent of social psychological
modernization, it is also necessary to examine the influence
of caste--an important feature of the Indian social structure--on role relationships and the trends in patterns in
role relations over time.
When caste status is related to role relationships,
the only index on which both the rural and urban castes differ among themselves is the religious participation index
(Table 21).

It is the religious aspect of caste that is

reflected in the Christian caste groupings scoring higher on
the scale than the Hindu castes.

Further, while the urban

castes differ only on the extent of sharing index, it is the
disagreement index that is important among the rural castes.
Sharing (indicating harmony in relationships) is a modern
trait while disagreement (or family discord) is more typical

TABlE 21
MEANS AND RESULTS OF PNJVA ON CONJUGAL ROlE RElATIONSHIPS BY CASTE AND AREA OF RESIDENCEl

AREA

Index of Role

Marthomites/
Jacobite
C.S.I.

Bralunin

Extent of Sharing

29.9

29.4

31.9

32.5

27.7

27.7

Dealing \vith Outsiders

19.4

18.5

22.1

12.0

18.0

15.4

17.ob

Religious Participation

12.0

10.6

14.7

15.0

10.7

13.8

10.4b

Extent of Disagreenent

35.6

35.0

33.6

37.0

32.9

35.2

31.9b

Outcome of Disagreement

2.4

1.9

2.2

2.0

1.7

2.2

1.8b

143.6

138.6

138.5

133.4

133.7

127.3c

(60)

(162)

(2)

(156)

(20)

(122)

Religious Participation

8.2

10.8

-

15.0

10.6

13.7

Extent of Disagreernent

36.6

33.6

-

37.0

31.7

35.3

30.6

(5)

(67)

(0)

(2)

(82)

(19)

(39)

Extent of Sharing

29.9

30.6

31.9

-

29.5

35

26.7c

Religious Participation

12.4

10.4

14.7

-

10.8

15

10.8b

N

(55)

(95)

(9)

(0)

(74)

(1)

(83)

Nair

.

General

CRR (Composite)
N
Rural
N

156
(9)

Urban
1b =p

Scheduled
Caste
25.9b

Relationships

<

.01; c = p

<.05

Ezhava Nadar

9.6b

~

\.0

'"-.1
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of the traditional rural culture, especially the lower status cultures.

On both indices, Christian castes are more

joint in their

relationshi~s

than the Hindu castes indicat-

ing that caste is not totally devoid of its religious connotation.

Within each religious group, however, higher status

is associated generally with joint role relationships, an
expected pattern given their higher socioeconomic status.
Nairs and Nadar Christians in the cities who have the highest scores are exceptions.

The dominant caste status of the

urban Nairs and the Anglican leaning of the Nadar Christians
may explain their modern role relationships.

Once again,

the caste differentials in socioeconomic modernization are
evident at the social psychological level too.
There are no differences between the older and younger
couples in their role relationships in the urban areas, continuing the pattern discussed earlier of selective participation of the upper status groups in modernization trends.
In contrast, though class and caste biases in modernization
do exist, some modernization in role relationships has also
occurred in the rural areas (r=-.16).

One factor responsi-

ble for this pattern is the closing of the age gap between
the husband and wife in the rural areas over time.

It is

only in the rural areas that the age gap between the husband
and wife is much smaller for the younger cohorts than for
the older (r=.l2).

In a culture where age and sex are

important criteria for respect and authority, marriages in
which the husband is much older than the wife tend to be
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traditional, reflected especially in the subordinate status
of women.

The data indicate some improvement in women's

status over time in the villages.
If the repercussions of social and economic modernization are felt in the area of conjugal role relationships,
then modernization should have some effect on fertility orientations and actual fertility.

Couples with joint role

relationships will not only want smaller families, but will
also have better success in limiting their achieved family
size to their ideals (Table 20).

Pearson correlations

between role relationships and fertility variables indicate
that women who are equal partners in the conjugal role relationships tend to idealize smaller families, actualize those
smaller ideals, and consequently experience smaller gaps
between their orientations and behavior.

Further, respon-

dents in joint role relationships do not differ from those
in segregated relationships as systematically in their
ideals as in their actual family size.

This pattern pro-

vides further evidence for the general trend toward accepting the small family norm.

In general, social psychological

modernization does contribute to modernization of values and
behavior.
Additional proof for this influence can be obtained by
c:omparing rural-urban differences in the correlations.

If

modern role relations are effective in reducing fertility
the urban correlations should be stronger than the rural.
Urban respondents not only have higher average scores on the
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role relationship indices but also vary more among themselves compared to the rural sample.

While there is general

support for this argument in the data on actual family size
and the gap, certain differences exist in the case of ideal
family size.

Rural ideals can be differentiated only in

terms of the respondent's status on two indices--decision
making and dealing with outsiders--which are also more
effective in the rural area than in the cities.

The indices

significant in the cities (all except decision making) deal
with the husband and wife's

particip~tion

in carrying out

the family functions (behavior aspect of roles).

Decision

making involves verbal interaction between the husband and
the wife.

In the rural area, where women's status is gener-

ally low, ability to participate in decision making and
dealing with outsiders may represent the starting point in
the shift toward egalitarian relationships.

When women

enjoy a comparatively higher status, as in the cities,
jointness in role relationships does not contribute to lower
ideals unless there is a shift from verbal equality to
equality in behavior.

In general, the data on role rela-

tionships in the sample fit the modernization thesis and its
effect on fertility.
Intervening Normative Family Size/Family Planning Indices
Thus far the analysis concentrated on the role of modernization in reducing fertility.

Family planning--both at

the normative and behavioral levels--forms the other aspect
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of the problem and is the focus of the second part of the
model.

In fact, the family planning variables, since they

directly impinge on fertility, bring the model closer to the
problem of lowering family size.

They are also a medium

through which modernization affects fertility.

Ideal family

size, as noted in Chapter III, is one of the normative variables.

The other normative variable included at this stage

is the respondent's attitudes toward family planning.
Respondent's Attitudes Toward Family Planning
Favorable attitudes toward family planning methods is
considered a basic prerequisite to the use of family planning.

This intervening variable is measured at the ordinal

level with the respondents' attitudes ranging from indispensable (value of 1) to totally opposed (value of 8).
Attitude to family planning is conceived as a consequence of modernization so that as the society develops family limitation methods will be perceived more favorably.

If

this is true, then, cities, with their higher levels of
socioeconomic development should differ from the rural areas
where development is comparatively limited.

However, Chi

square tests indicate no significant differences between
rural and urban samples in their attitudes.

Almost 50% of

the respondents in both the rural and urban areas are favorable to using some method, while only about 10% in the
rural areas and 15% in the cities are not favorable or
totally opposed to it.

The side effects of most methods
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seem to dampen the enthusiasm of nearly a third of the
respondents regarding family planning in both the samples.
Religion and caste, the two other structural variables, also
do not differentiate among the respondents' attitude to family planning.

This general acceptance of the importance of

family planning, irrespective of the socioeconomic development at the structural level, may be the result of the
intense family planning program in Kerala, especially in its
informational content.
It is also necessary to look at the individual level
differences in attitudes within each area to determine
whether socioeconomic distinctions exist.

Since attitudes

to family planning are influenced by modernization, it is

.

logical to assume that as the social and the economic status
of the families and of the women rise they tend to become
more favorable to family planning (a modern attribute).
Correlations between attitude to family planning and socioeconomic characteristics--both family's and the respondent's-- substantiate this argument (Tables 9, 10).

These

associations are also stronger in the cities with their
transtional social and economic structures.
Analysis of the influence of the social psychological
manifestations of modernization on attitudes to family planning also indicates that the more modern (joint) the respondent's role relationships, the more favorable is her attitude to family planning (Table 20).

Wife's labor force

participation is the only factor that is not significant,
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probably due to the sMall proportion of working women in the
cities and due to the lower status jobs of majority of rural
women.

Further, urban respondents with higher status differ

more systematically in their attitudes from the lower status
urban women compared to the rural variations (Table 10).
This pattern, once again, indicates the transitional nature
of the cities and the traditional status of the rural areas,
particularly with regard to the lower status ruralites.
Within this traditional context, however, rural respondents
in higher status jobs, if they can achieve it, do have modern attitudes too.
These status variables affect fertility by influencing
the motivations of individuals and couples.

But age of the

respondent, her age at marriage, and infant mortality, not
only have motivational effects, but also have quantitative
effects on fertility.

For example, an older woman or a

woman who married early can have more children because of
her greater exposure to childbearing.9 The quantitative
reality of these three variables may explain why they are
not significant differentiating factors in respondents'
attitudes to family planning--a motivational factor (Table
10).
It was indicated in Chapter III that smaller family
size norms can, theoretically, be viewed as an important

9 In fact, as will be shown in Chapter VII, these variables are significantly related to fertility even after the
effects of the status variables are removed.
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prerequisite for favorable dispositions to deliberate control of fertility behavior through the use of family planning.

Women with small family size norms are more favorable

to using birth control methods to limit their actual family
size in both the cities and in the rural areas (Table 10).
In short, there exists a congruence in the norms regarding
family planning and a family size, which suggests the crystallization of modern attitudes, particularly under the
influence of the family planning program.
What effects do these attitudes to family planning
have on their actual fertility?

Although rural women with

small family size norms do favor using family planning to
control fertility, these attitudes are not translated into
practice (the non-significant rural correlation between family planning attitudes and actual family size ) probably due
to the lack of opportunities and willingness to act on their
attitudes.

In contrast, the opportunities available in the

cities and the motivation derived from their higher socioeconomic status may explain why urban women with modern family planning attitudes have smaller achieved families and
gaps between ideal and actual family and vice versa.
Despite these deviations, the general pattern that emerges
from this analysis is consistent with the modernization thesis discussed thus far:

there is a clear association

between favorable attittudes to family planning and individual modernization on the one hand and fertility orientation
and behavior on the other.
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Intervening Family Planning Usage Variables
This set of variables concerns the extent to which
respondents have used methods of family planning and how
effectively they have used them.

Having established the

modernizing influence of family planning attitudes on fertility, these indicators of the practice of family planning
further specify this relationship.

The first variable in

this set is the parity at which the respondent started using
a method.
Parity Of Family Planning Initiation
Parity of family planning initiation is measured as
the birth after which the method was adopted.

As with the

other variables, the first step is to determine the influence of modernization on parity of family planning usage.
Contrary to expectations, the traditional hypothesis that
rural and urban areas will differ in the parity of family
planning use of its members is not supported (Table 14).
That rural and urban areas are different on none of the family planning variables--attitude to family planning and parity of initiation--is further evidence of the effectiveness
of the family planning program, irrespective of the structural levels of development.

However, since these areas

differ in their levels of modernization of its members, it
can be expected that individual modernization will have an
influence on parity.
The socioeconomic status of the respondent and her
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family are significant predictors of the parity at which a
woman used birth control for the first time (Tables 9, 10).
As expected, higher educational and occupational status of
the husband and wife and higher economic status are associated with earlier initiation of birth control.

Since rural

and urban areas differ in their earlier socioeconomic distributions, socioeconomic variations in parity of family
olanning usage within these areas may be different.

Analy-

sis of the data support this expectation; but unlike the
preceding sets of variables, rural correlations are stronger
than the urban.

Despite the wider range of the urban

socioeconomic distribution, urban respondents do not differ
among themselves as much as the rural respondents.

Selec-

tive acceptance of the family planning program by higher
status women is more pronounced in the rural areas.
nately,

Alter-

lower class rural women initiated family planning

much later in their pregnancy history compared to their
urban counterparts.

Cities provide greater freedom and

opportunities to its residents, especially the women, which
may explain why lower status urban respondents are comparatively more modern in their family planning usage than the
rural women with similar status.

Primary modernization

tends to be more of an equalizing force in the cities in
influencing the availability and access to different family
planning methods.
Peculiarities in the labor force participation of
women in the sample is reflected on parity of family plan-
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ning usage (Table 22).

In the cities, as might be expected,

working women started using birth control one parity lower
than the non-workers.

On the contrary, rural non-workers

started using birth control earlier than the rural workers,
a pattern that may be explained if it is remembered that a
majority of rural women work in lower status occupations.
Despite these deviations, rural/urban differences in modernization are generally reflected in their family planning
status too.
It is also necessary to move further in the model to
examine the implications of demographic modernization on
parity of family planning initiation (Tables 9, 10).

The

data indicate that women who marry earlier tend to postpone
using family planning methods compared to those who marry
later.

Unlike primary modernization (socioeconomic), once

early secondary modernization has been achieved, even if it
is only among certain segments in a society, it does have an
equally strong effect on parity of family planning initiation in both the cities and the rural areas.
Social psychological modernization (role relationships), in contrast, has a stronger correlation with parity
of family planning initiation in the urban areas (Table 20).
Aside from its intervening influence in the socioeconomic
status-practice of family planning relationship, role relationships can be expected to have a direct influence on parity of initial family planning use.

Joint role relation-

ships, as the data suggest, provide an advantageous

TABlE 22
MEANS AND RESULTS OF PNJVA ON PARITY OF FAMILY
PLANNING INITIATION AND FAMILY PLANNING EFFECTIVENESS
BY WIFE'S lABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND AREA OF RESIDENCEl

Parity of Family
Planning Initiation

Family Planning
Effectiveness

a= p

b =p
c =p

Wife's Labor Force
Participation

General

Wife Einployed

2.93
(120)

(N)

Rural

Urban

(N)

(N)

3.7
(63)

2.12a
(57)

Wife Unemployed

3.3
(420)

3.0
(151)

3.5
(269)

Wife Einployed

2.6
(120)

2.2
(63)

3.15b
(57)

Wife Unenployed

2.5
(420)

2.3
(151)

2.6
(269)

< .001
< .01

< .05

N
0

CX>
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framework for the initiation of family planning early in the
marriage.

Discussions about family planning are still

socially taboo and the women still play a predominantly subordinate role in the Indian family.

Under these conditions,

unless the role relations are relatively joint, early initiation of family planning will be difficult both for the husband and the wife.

Given the direct influence of role

structures in family planning usage and the wider range in
role relationships available in the cities, the stronger
urban correlations are to be expected.
Another aspect of the traditional rural structure is
also evident in the association of infant mortality and
ideal family size with the initiation of family planning
(Tables

9, 10).

As the stronger positive rural correlations

suggest, rural women who have experienced high infant mortality and who idealize larger families postpone using birth
control much more than their urban counterparts.

Tradi-

tional rural respondents, especially, seem to desire to
insure that they have a sufficient number of children to
make up for the loss through child mortality and to realize
their family size norms.
On the other hand, correlations between attitudes to
and use of family planning are weaker in the rural areas
than in the cities suggesting inconsistencies in rural norms
and behavior.

Urban respondents who are favorably disposed

to use of family planning translate these values into practice.

The comparatively greater inconsistencies between
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norms and behavior in the rural areas indicate that even if
values have been modernized to the extent found among the
urbanites, partly as a result of the family planning program, they have yet to govern behavior.

At the same time,

women who have used methods such as sterilization, IUDs, and
pills early in the marriage may develop unfavorable attitudes due to the side effects of these methods, thereby
weakening the correlations in both the rural and urban
areas.
Before the importance of parity in determining family
size is assessed, another set of relationships need to be
analyzed.

It is necessary to discuss how the background

variables--age of the respondent, religion, and caste--influence parity.

The importance of an effective family plan-

ning program can be seen in the cohort differences in the
parity of family planning use (Tables 9, 10 ).

10

Older

respondents tend to have initiated use of some method of
birth control later in their childbearing history than the
younger respondents.

Yet, the older and younger cohorts do

not differ in their socioeconomic and demographic status.
This pattern may be attributed partly to the role of the
organized family planning program initiated on a large scale
since the early seventies in creating opportunities for

10

Again, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter,
the role of family planning progr~~s in influencing family
planning practices can only be deduced directly from the
literature.
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exposure of the younger cohorts earlier in their pregnancy
histories.

Moreover, it is the traditional status of the

older rural women reinforced by the low socioeconomic development in rural areas and the lack of early exposure to family planning that is reflected in the stronger rural correlations.
There were no significant differences among the religious groups in their attitude to family planning.

But they

can be differentiated in their family planning behavior, at
least in the cities.

As might be expected on the basis of

their relatively higher socioeconomic status, urban Christians tend to be more modern in family planning usage (mean
parity=l.8) than the Hindus (3.27).

Caste status of the

respondents, as in the case of the earlier family planning
variables, is not a significant differentiating element in
either the rural or urban areas.

The practical ethic of the

Protestants and the Western influence in their religion,
irrespective of their caste status, may be relevant factors
in the religious distinctions in the practice of family
planning.
If parity of birth control initiation is an index of
modernization and the effectiveness of the family planning
program, it may be expected to affect family size too
(Tables 9, 10).

As hypothesized, women who initiated birth

control later tend to have significantly more children than
those who started planning their families early in the cities and in the rural areas.

Of all the indices of modern-
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ization and family planning considered thus far, the timing
of family planning use is the most influential in determining actual fertility.

Further analysis will, however, be

presented in the later chapters to detemine the exact
nature of its impact on actual family size.

Yet, the

strength of the correlation suggests that early initiation
of birth control may be one of the most effective ways of
controlling fertility.

In the case of the influence of par-

ity of family planning use on the gap between the ideal and
actual family size, the patterns can, once again, be
explained with the help of its component parts, ideal and
actual fertility.

For example, the larger gaps between the

ideal and actual fertility of late users of family planning
is due to their actual family size far exceeding their lowe red ideals.
In general, controlling pregnancies at earlier stages
in the pregnancy history does reduce the achieved family
size and the gap between ideal and actual considerably.
Thus, early use of family planning plays an important role
along with socioeconomic development in achieving fertility
reduct ions.
Family Planning Effectiveness
It is not just the timing of birth control use that is
important in its relationship to family size, but also the
general effectiveness with which the methods are used and
pregnancies planned.

Modernization could be expected to
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increase individual's effectiveness in planning their
families and consequently realizing their ideals.

In order

to operationalize family planning effectiveness, each pregnancy is classified as (a) planned, (b) accidental,
(c)unintended (where some method was being used but had to
be stopped for various reasons), (d) unintended, yet no
method was used, and (e)

'never-thought-of-it' pregnancies.

The index of family planning effectiveness is defined as the
weighted average of the proportion of pregnancies that
belong to the five types.

According to the formula, which

is stated as ((a*5)+(b*4)+(c*3)+(d*2)+(e*l)/total pregnancies), a higher score on the index implies greater effectiveness while a lower score represents lesser effectiveness.
Family planning effectiveness can be discussed in the
context of modernization before its influence on fertility
is analyzed.

Unlike the other family planning variables,

when rural and urban differences in family planning effectiveness are analyzed, respondents in the cities have significantly higher mean effectiveness than the rural areas
(Table 14).

This pattern suggests that if the effective

planning of the entire childbearing history is to be
achieved, an organized family planning program in itself is
not sufficient; socioeconomic modernization is an important
catalyst to the success of the program.
Religious and caste differences in family planning
effectiveness also substantiate the influence of moderniza-
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tion on the success of the program (Table 23).

It is only

in the cities that Christians and higher castes are significantly more effective in planning their pregnancies than
Hindus and the lower castes respectively.

It is also in the

cities that Christians and higher castes have significantly
higher status than the Hindus and lower castes respectively.
Cohort differences in family planning effectiveness
exist only in the rural area where the older respondents
tend to be less effective in planning their families (Tables

9, 10).

In this case, two factors reinforcing each other

may explain the traditional position of older rural women in
their planning effectiveness.

Rural areas were and still

are the least developed socioeconomically.

Further, older

rural women lacked the opportunities and exposure to family
planning knowledge that younger rural women have had since
the family planning program was initiated when the older
women were well into their family formation histories.
Thus, it can be argued that family planning is most effective only in the context of a certain level of socioeconomic
development.
Additional support for this thesis is available in the
influence of the individual's socioeconomic status on planning effectiveness (Tables 9, 10).

Irrespective of whether

the husband's or wife's status is used, higher status couples are more effective in their family planning (as in the
parity of family planning initiation) than the lower status
couples.

In the cities where the general level of modern-

TABlE 23
MEANS AND RESill..TS OF N!lJVA ON FAMILY PLANNING ~GriVENESS
BY RELIGION, CASTE, AND AREA OF RESIDENCE
RELIGION

CASTE

Marthomite/
Jacobite
C.S.I.

Ezhava Nadar

Scheduled
Caste

2.2
(2)

2.4
(156)

2.3b
(122)

-

2.2
(2)

1.9
(82)

2.6
(19)

2.3
(39)

3.6
(9)

-

2.8
(74)

4. 7
(1)

2.3c
(83)

Hindu

Protestant

Bralmrin

Nair

General

2.5
(509)

3.1C
(31)

2.7
(60)

2.7
(162)

3.6
(9)

Rural

2.2
(19Lt)

2.7
(20)

2.2
(5)

2.6
(67)

(O)

2.6
(315)

3.8b
(11)

2.8
(55)

2.8
(95)

Urban

1.

a= p
b = p
c =p

<
<
<

STATUS

(0)

2.7
(20)

.001
.01
.05

N

1-'

V1
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ization is higher, the differences among the higher and
lower status couples are not very pronounced.

But, rural

respondents with lower status are the least effective leading to the stronger rural correlations.

The lower socioeco-

nomic status of the couples hinders efficient utilization of
the family planning program in the rural areas.

More spe-

cifically, a fatalistic view of life and lack of planning,
characteristic of the traditional agrarian society, is
reflected in their family histories too.

On the other hand,

effectiveness of the higher status rural couples may be
attributed to the sense of control over one's life and of
planning and the desire and potential for improvement that
higher education and occupation (especially independent of
the agrarian economy) imbibe in them.

This is also seen in

the influence (or the lack of it) of wife's labor force participation on family planning effectiveness in the rural
areas where the majority of the women are in the lower status occupations.
Socioeconomic differentials in age at marriage can
also be seen in family planning effectiveness (Tables 9,
10).

Respondents who marry later tend to plan their fami-

lies more effectively than those who marry at a younger age.
Women who marry when they are older have the opportunities
for higher education and time to mature in the role of a
daughter before assuming an additional role, that of the
wife.

As a result, such women would have more defined atti-

tudes and plans for their family life which may partly
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explain their effectiveness in family planning.

With the

second demographic variable, however, the differences are
not significant (Tables 9, 10).

Two contradictory influ-

ences may provide an explanation.

On the one hand, modern-

ization which results in lowered infant mortality will also
enhance family planning effectiveness resulting in a negative relationship between infant mortality and family planning.

On the other hand, women who have experienced more

infant mortality would actively desire and plan their next
pregnancies to replac& the losses.

This argument, contrary

to the first, would lead to a positive relationship between
infant mortality and effectiveness.

Both these patterns

probably coexist in this sample, neutralizing each other and
leading to the insignificant correlation between infant mortality and family planning effectiveness.
Role relationships is another influential factor in
family planning effectiveness (Table 20).

Couples who par-

ticipate jointly in familial responsibilities, including
family planning, seem to be more effective in using contraception and planning their families.

That this relationship

is stronger in the urban areas may be attributed to the
wider range in the jointness-segregation continuum available
in the cities and the clustering of rural couples away from
the joint relationships.
Given the role of modernization in effective planning,
it is necessary to analyze the latter's relationship to
other family planning issues (Tables 9, 10).

In both the
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rural areas and the cities, women who idealize large families tend to have been less effective in planning their families.

This negative relationship between family size norms

and family planning effectiveness, once again, suggests a
congruence between fertility values and family planning
behavior that can help actualize these fertility values.
Respondents who are more effective in planning their
families also have favorable attitudes toward using contraception and started using some method earlier than the less
effective couples, both in the rural and urban areas.

Fur-

ther, respondents who are more effective planners have
achieved their smaller ideals, and consequently have smaller
gaps.

It is the combined effect, once again, of the higher

status and urban location of those urban women with high
effectiveness and small families that sets them apart
(stronger urban correlations) from the rest.

Aside from

socioeconomic, demographic, and social psychological modernization, early and effective use of family planning is,
thus, a valuable tool in achieving fertility declines.
Sterilization Status
Whether the respondent or her husband has undergone
sterilization is the last variable in the set.

Steriliza-

tion is similar to, yet very different from, family planning
effectiveness that was discussed in the previous sections.
While sterilization is the most effective way of avoiding
future births, it gives no indication of the status of plan-
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ning effectiveness as the couple moves along their pregnancy
histories.

Specifying the socioeconomic, demographic, and

family size characteristics of the sterilized and non-sterilized couples would have policy implications, especially in
identifying the target populations for such a specific program.
Sterilized respondents generally tend to be more traditional than the non-sterilized in the cities (Table 24).
They are of lower castes, are younger, of lower socioeconomic status,

11

were married at a younger age, have more

segregated relationships, are more unfavorable to family
planning use, started using family planning later, are less
effective in planning their pregnancies on the whole, and

.

have higher ideals and larger actual families, and larger
gaps between their ideals and actuals.
Accordingly, the conditions under which sterilization
is resorted to may be specified.

Sterilization is used when

the respondents face a longer period of childbearing.

They

are generally poorer so that they cannot afford to risk hav-

11

The Chi-square and gamma values for the relationship of
caste and husband's occupational status to sterilization in
the urban areas are as follows:
Caste and Sterilization:

Husband's occupation and
sterilization

Chi-square
Gamma

= p .001
= .39

Chi-square = p .001
= -.36
Gamma

TABLE 24
l·1EANS AND RESULTS OF T-TEST FOR SELECI'ED MJDERNIZATION AND
FAMILY PlANNING INDICES BY STERILIZATION STATUS AND AREA OF RESIDENCEl

Rural

Urban

Unsterilized Sterilized

Unsterilized Sterilized

General
Unsterilized Sterilized
Husband's Age
Wife's Age
Husband's Education
llidem Items CMned
Wife's Education
Age at First Marriage
Infant }brtality
CRR

Son-Preference
Parity of FP Initiation
rlP Effectiveness
Ideal Family Size
Actual Family Size
Gap
N

1.

a=p
b = p
c =p

43.1
35.7
9.2
2.6
7.7
19.8
13.2
139.5
8.8
3.0
2.7
2.8
3.3
0.6
265-261

40.6a
33.5a
7.2a
1.8a
6.3a
18.7a
9.8c

131.~

13.2
3.4b
?..3
2.9~

3.7
0.8
275-271

40.9
34.0
6.9
1.0
5.7
19.1
11.7
127.6
10.6
3.2
2.4
2.9
3.5
0.6
105-104

38.la
31.5b
5.3
0.8
5.4
18.5
11.3
124.9
14.7
3.1
2.2
2.9
3.5
0.6
109

44.4
36.8
10.8
3.6
9.0
20.3
14.2
147.4
7.6
2.9
2.9
2.7
3.2
0.5
160-157

42.3b
34.7:
8.4
2.5a
6.9a
18.~

8.8
135.2a
12.1c
3.5~
2.4
2.9c
3.8a
0.9c
166-164

< .001
< .01
<

.05

N

N

0
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ing more children, especially since they have an ineffective
planning history.

Their segregated relationships may par-

tially explain their ineffectiveness and delay initiation of
birth control.

Lack of knowledge about temporary methods in

general and lack of joint determination in using them consistently can further contribute to their poor planning status.

Further, they not only prefer larger families, but

also have exceeded their ideals and sterilization is an
effective and easier method of controlling their family
size.
Two additional characteristics need special consideration--infant mortality and attitude to family planning.
Respondents who are sterilized have experienced lesser
infant mortality than the non-sterilized.

The latter, con-

sequently, may fear the possibility of further deaths and
their inability to replace them if sterilization is adopted.
With regard to the conservative attitude of sterilized women
to family planning (Table 25), two explanations are possible.

They may be opposed to temporary methods, like the

Pills or IUDs, and favor sterilization.

On the other hand,

it could be that, though they have undergone sterilization,
the side effects (both physical and psychological) may cause
them to regret it.

In general, sterilization seems to

appeal to the lower stratum of the society in Kerala.
However, this is true only when the general level of
development is fairly high as in the cities.

Sterilized

respondents in the rural areas are significantly different

TABLE 25
DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY PlANNING ATTITUDES BY
STERILIZATION STATUS Al\JD AREA OF RESIDENCE

Area Of Residence

General

Family Planning Attitudes/
Sterilization Status

Favorable Indifferent

Sumna.ry Statistics

Unsterilized

54.4%

65.4%

40.6%

x2

Sterilized

45.6

34.6

59.4

Garrma

N

100%
(285)

100%
(26)

100%
(229)

Rural

Urban

Unfavorable

=

< .01

= .24

NS
Unsterilized

55.0%

68.4%

39.0%

x2 =

Sterilized

45.0

31.6

61.0

Gamna

N

100%
(171)

100%
(19)

100%
(136)

<

.01

= .27

N
N
N
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from the non-sterilized only in their age and family's
socioeconomic characteristics.

In other words, rural women,

like their urban counterparts, undergo sterilization at a
younger age and their families are poorer.

Thus, when the

level of modernization is low, sterilization is more uniformly acceptable.
This analysis suggests different family planning patterns in the modern and the traditional milieux.

In the

traditional context, respondents generally do not plan their
pregnancies until they seek an irreversible solution in
sterilization.

On the other hand, respondents in the modern

context, especially the upper status women, start planning
their families early and use temporary methods more effectively to maintain smaller families.

These patterns imply

the possible variations that may be required in the family
planning program content for different audiences.
Conclusion
Preliminary data analysis delineates two interrelated
dimensions of the population problem--modernization and family planning.

As expected, rural and urban areas are dis-

tinct in their modernization.

Cities, represent a higher

position on the modernizing continuum, irrespective of
whether the indices used are socioeconomic, demographic, or
social psychological.

At the same time, cities in Kerala

appear to be in a state of transition to modernized societies in contrast to the traditional nature of the villages.
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But the rural and urban areas cannot be differentiated on
any of the family planning factors, including fertility
norms and behavior.

This pattern could be attributed to the

role of family planning program in the state.

However, mod-

ernization and the family planning program are not independent solutions to the population problem.

Within both the

cities and villages, substantial modernization-fertility
differentials exist such that individuals who are modern on
the socioeconomic, demographic, and social psychological
dimensions are modern in their fertility orientations, family planning behavior and actual fertility.

Additional

oroof for the relevance of modernization to the success of
family planning is available in the greater effectiveness of
urban couples.

In short, family planning cannot be totally

effective unless it is accompanied by modernization.
Another pattern evident in this initial analysis concerns the relationship between the three family size indices:

ideal family size, actual family size, and the gap

between the two.

There seems to be a general convergence

towards the small family norm in the entire sample possibly
due to the impact of the family planning program, although
some status differences still remain.

But wider disparities

in actual family size accross different status groups
(defined in terms of both modernization and family planning)
exist.

Therefore, the status differences in the gap between

the ideal and actual family size are mainly a reflection of
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the variations in actual family size.

12

Despite the

increased popularity of the small family norm among the
lower status groups, their actual family size exceeds their
ideals.

Apart from the fact that the family planning pro-

gram has not been in effect long enough to affect changes in
actual family size, these discrepancies have a more basic
implication.

If modern family size norms are to be trans-

lated into practice and the gap between the norm and behavior closed, an effective family planning program has to be
evolved in the context of modernization.

That some status

differences still exist even in the ideal family size lends
further support to the complementarity of modernization and
family planning.

12

A comparison of the correlations of actual and ideal
family size with the gap also suggests the predominant role
of actual fertility in determining the size of the gap, both
theoretically and statistically. There is a very strong
association between actual family size and the gap between
the ideal and actual fertility (r= .85). In contrast, ideal
family size explains a significantly smaller proportion (r=
-.24) of the variation in the gap. Thus, the patterns in
the gap between the actual and ideal family size can be
lJnderstood by analyzing the patterns in the actual fertility
and to a lesser extent in the family size norms. Hence,
only ideal and actual family size will be used as indicators
of the level of fertility in the later analysis.

CHAPTER VI

CONGRUENCIES AND INCONGRUENCIES IN MODERNIZATION
AND FAMILY PLANNING:

EVIDENCE FROM

RURAL AND URBAN SAMPLES

According to the demographic transition theory, fertility declines will be an integral part of modernization in
a society.

As living conditions improve, voluntary control

of fertility (through the adoption of family planning methods) increases, resulting in the reduction of fertility.
Several studies (Amonker,

1973; Anker, 1973; Srikantan,

1977) using macro level data have shown the close correspondence between the level of development of an area and its
family planning performance.

In fact,

these studies imply

that the family planning program cannot be effective unless
it is administered in the context of a high level of development.

In this study, the cities represent a considerably

higher level of modernization than the rural areas; yet,
there are no significant differences in their family planning performance.

A clearer understanding of the absence of

rural-urban differences on the family planning dimensions
can be achieved if the four subsamples--two rural and two
urban-- are studied separately.

These four areas represent

a gradient in the extent of their modernization.
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They,
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thus, present an ideal framework for a natural experiment to
test the nature of the relationship between modernization
and family planning performance at the aggregate level.
Based on the transition theory and other related studies, it
can be hypothesized that areas with higher levels of socioeconomic development will have experienced higher levels of
family planning performance and lower fertility.
Capital City
Trivandrum city, the administrative capital of Kerala,
is the most modern of the four areas, both on the modernization and family planning variables.

When the family's

socioeconomic status indices are used, this sample has the
highest mean education and ownership of modern items (Tables
26 and 27).

As might be expected in a modernizing city,

this sample also represents a wide range of occupations with
a major concentration in upper white collar and professional
sectors-- typifying an administrative and educational structure.1
Commensurate with their families' status, the women in
the Capital City have the highest education and 80% of the
working women are concentrated in the upper white collar and
professional jobs (Tables 26 and 28).

That only 17% of its

women are in the labor force fits in with the modernizing
status of this city.

1

In such a transitional set up, job

The median occupation is clerical/service jobs in the
Capital city-- refer to Table 28

TABLE 26
MEANS AND RESULTS OF T-TEST FOR SELECTED MODERNIZATION
AND FAMILY PLANNING INDICES BY AREA OF RESIDENCE
VariaoTes_____

----

a. Modernization Variables
Education of Husband
Ownership of Modern Items
Education of Wife
Age at First Marriage
Infant Mortality
Conjugal Role Relationship

•

CapiEal ·clty-UCommerCTaT-- Comirie-rciar- -AamTniSTrat1ve
City
Rural Area
Rural ·Area
N (168 - 152) N (158-143) N (109-93)
N (105-92)
11.3abc
4.labc
8.9abc
20.oabc
10.4
148.8abc

7.7de
1.9de
6.8de
18.9
12.6
133.1

6.1
1.1
5.5
18.8
11.2
125.4

6.1
0.8
5.5
18.9
11.9
127.1

b. Family Planning Variables
12.9
Son. Preference
11.9
8.ocb
12.5f
2.5a
3.4e
2.1
Parity of FP Initiation
3.lf
_
abc
2 .5·
2.1
2
2.2
Family Planning Effective
3
2.7ac
2.9
2,87
2.93
Ideal Family Size
3.3a
3.5
3.5
Actual Family Size
3.8
1 a = Capital City significantly different from Commercial City.
b = Capital City significantly different from Commercial Rural Area.
c = Capital City significantly different from Administrative Rural Area.
d = Commercial City significantly different from Commercial Rural Area.
e = Commercial City significantly different from Administrative Rural Area.
f = Commercial Rural Area significantly different from Administrative
Rural Area.
N
N

00

TABLE 27
STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND RESULTS OF F-TEST FOR SELECTED MODERNIZATION
AND FAMILY PLANNING VARIABLES BY AREA OF RESIDENCEl
Variables
a. Modernization Variables
Ea\ication of Husoan
Ownership of Modern Items
Education of Wife
Age at First Marriage
Infant Mortality
Conjugal Role Relationships
~·

Capital City
N (168 -152)
. .,ac
2.9abc
4.4ac
4.2c
17.5
25.9a

Commercial
City
N (158-143)

1:9d
3.5
3.9
18.9
37.lde

Commercial
Rural Area
N (109-93)
4--.~zp:
1.4f
4.1
3. 7
16.4
30.2

Administrative
Rural Area
N (105-92)

:r:-s

1.2
3.7
3.4
16.9
28.8

Family Planning Variables

Son Preference
Parity of FP Initiation
Family Planning Effective
Ideal Family Size
Actual Family Size

20.4
2.0 b
1.5a
o.8a
1.6

18.6
2.2e
1.3
1.0
1.8d

18.1
1.9
l.2f
0.86f
l. 38

18.3
1.8
1.4
0.9
1.9

la = Capital City significantly different from Commercial City.
b = Capital City significantly different from Commercial Rural Area.
c = Capital City significantly different from Administrative Rural Area.
d = Commercial City significantly different from Commercial Rural Area.
e = Commercial City significantly different from Administrative Rural Area.
f = Commercial Rural Area significantly different from Administrative Rural
Rural Area.
N
N
\0

TABLE 28
DISTRIBUTION OF HUSBANDS' AND WIVES' OCCUPATIONAL STATUS
STATUS BY AREA OF RESIDENCE

Occupational
Categories
Unemployed
Unskilled Labor
Skilled Labor
Clerical and
Service Occupations
Managerial and Professional Occupations
N

Unemployed
Unskilled Labor
Skilled Labor
Clerical and
Service Occupations
Managerial and Professional Occupations
N

Capital
City
1. 8%
16.6
8.3

26.1

Husbands' Occupation
Commercial
Commercial
City
Rural Area
1. 9io
. . ,
25.9
41.4%
12.0
30.3

43.7

47.0
100%
(:l68)

.

11.1

16.4
14.7
100%
100%
(109)
(158)
Wive?' QccuQation

13.3%

44.4%
3.5

80.0%
2.0

26.7

31.0

4.0

60.0

llm~

( 30)

24.1

100%

( 29)

14.0

100%
( 50)

Administrative
Rural Ar~a
• • .

62.9%
9.5
17.2
10.5
100%
(lOS)

.

61.6%

38.4

lUU%

( 13)

N

w
0
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opportunities, especially for women, will be limited with
women playing a predominantly housekeeping role.

But, when

they do seek employment, it is generally in the higher status occupations.
Capital City, corresponding to its high status on
socioeconomic modernization, is also the most modernized at
the demographic and social psychological levels (Table 26).
Its members tend to marry the latest and have experienced
lesser infant mortality than the other areas.

Jointness in

role relationships is more common among couples in the Capital City than elsewhere.

At the same time, this area has

the widest range on most of these modernization indices,
once again, characterizing a modernizing society.
Capital City's performance on the family planning
indices parallels its achievements in modernization (Tables
26 to 29).

Its members not only have the most favorable

orientations to family size and family planning (son preference and family planning attitudes), but are also one of the
most modern in the practice of family planning (parity of
family planning initiation and family planning effectiveness).
An important structural feature that may provide an
additional explanation is the caste composition of this
city's sample.

Nairs, among Hindus, and Harthomites/Jaco-

bite Christians among the Protestants form the largest proportion of this sample (Table 30).

Both these castes are

the dominant castes in Kerala in terms of economic, politi-

TABLE 29
ATTITUDE OF RESPONDENTS TO USE OF FA}1ILY PLANNING BY
AREA OF RESIDENCEl
.

Areq of Residence
Family Planning
Attitudes

Administrative
Rural

Commercial
Rural

Commercial
City

Capital
City

61.0%

45. 9i.,

39.9%

64.3%

Indifferent

2.9

3.7

7.6

4.2

Unfavorable

36.2

50.5

52.5

31.5

Favorable

N

100%
(105)

x2

a

Gamma

-.08

1 a = Significant at

<.

100%
(109)

100%
(158)

100%
(168)

001 level.

N

w
N

TABlE 30
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENI'S BY RELIGION, CASTE,

Religion

1
A..WA OF RESIDENCE

Conm=rcial
Rural Area

Adm.:inistrative
Rural Area

100%

98.1%

95.2%

81.0%
3.rlo

Brahmin

10.2%

25.3%

Nair

45.5

12.7

10.1

53.3

Ezhava

21.6

25.3

65.1

10.5

Scheduled Caste

18.6

34.7

Christian

4.8

-

1.9
2.0

C.S.I.

-

-

-

Nadar
Christians

0.6

-

-

100%
{158}

100%
{150}

100%
{109)

15.2
19.0

3.6

100%
{1682

1.0%

21.1

Mlrthomites/
Jacobites

100%
~{1682
lMissing Values: 8 in Corrnercial City

N

Cornrercial City

Area of Residence/ Capital
Caste
City

Hindu

A.~

100%
(109)

1.9
18.1
100%
(105)

100%
(105)
N

w
w
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cal, and social power.

The higher average age of this sam-

ple (36.5), another structural factor, may be a function of
selective retention of older couples in the Capital City,
especially since seniority is still an important criterion
for the upward movement in the occupational ladder.
Thus, this profile of Capital City characterizes it as
the executive core of administrative life with an upper
class of professionals, a middle class consisting of white
collar workers, and a lower working class.

It is, at the

same time, a modernizing city in which modern and traditional elements coexist.
Commercial City
Cochin--Commercial City--from which the second subsamole was drawn is the commercial center of Kerala and forms
part of its industrial belt.

Unlike the wide range on the

stratification system available in the Capital City, the
Commercial City consists of a small enclave of wealthy business families as well as executives employed in the government owned large scale industries and a large mass of lower
class population.

This polarization is reflected in its

modernization and family planning status.
Commercial City occupies an intermediate position in
the extent of its socio-economic modernization.

It ranks

below the Capital City in the educational status of its residents; yet, it is more modern than the rural areas (Tables
26 and 27).

Two factors need special consideration.

As in
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the Capital City very few women in the Commercial City are
employed (17.7%).

This relatively low labor force partici-

pation of these urban women may again be attributed to fewer
employment opportunities, the dominance of the

t~aditional

homemaker's role, and the nonavailability of outside help in
the household chores.

However, when the women are employed,

they are concentrated in unskilled labor (modal occupation)
or in the clerical and other service jobs (Table 28).

Hus-

band's occupational distribution follows a similar pattern
(also in Table 28).

Almost

44% of the heads of the house-

holds are engaged in white collar occupations along with
another 15% in managerial or proprietary jobs.
time, nearly 30% are blue collar workers.

At the same

This combination

of blue collar and white collar (both upper and lower) occupations reflects the industrial, commercial, and financial
basis of the economy of Commercial City.

In general, occu-

pational status of Commercial City's respondents is lower
2
than that in the Capital City.
It is also evident that Commercial City is midway
between the Capital City and the rural areas in its demographic (especially age at marriage) and social psychological (role relationships) modernization (Tables 26 and 27).
For example, respondents here get married later than rural
women although they are not as modernized as women in the

2 The median occupation is lower service occupations in
the Commercial City.
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Capital City.

They are also more traditional than Capital

City's women in their preference for sons;

yet, they have

less intense preferences for sons compared to the rural
areas.
From this point onwards, however, the Commercial City
deviates from its intermediary status.

Of all the four

areas, its respondents have experienced the highest infant
mortality rate, a possible reflection of the crowded and
unsanitary living conditions of the poorer segments of this
city (Tables 26 and 27).

Even more interesting is that the

Commercial City tends to be the most traditional in its residents' attitudes toward family planning and also their utilization of family planning.

Among all the areas, it

includes the largest proportion of respondents who are
either indifferent to, unfavorable to or totally opposed to
family planning (Table 29).

Conversely, it has the smallest

percentage of respondents favorable to family planning.

A

close correspondence also exists between their attitudes and
behavior.

Its residents initiated birth control latest and

are one of the least effective groups in overall effectiveness in planning families (Table 26).
Commercial City's caste composition may have some
impact on its paradoxical status alignments (Table 30).
Brahmins, Ezhavas, and Scheduled castes predominate in this
city's sample.

Status incongruencies in the case of the

Brahmins, who head the ritual hierarchy but not the secular
ranking, may lead to an ambivalence in their life patterns.
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Lower caste status of the Ezhavas and Scheduled castes on
both the ritual and secular ranking may reinforce each other
in creating traditional behavior patterns.
Thus, little correspondence exists between the Commercial City's status on the modernization indices and its family planning performance.

It was in this city that the

first mass sterilization camps of one day and one month
durations were undertaken.

But the researcher's personal

observations in the field during which she worked closely
with the health workers associated with the family planning
centers may provide a clue to this unique pattern.

The

overall administration of the family planning information
and services did not appear to be as effective as, for example, in the Capital City.

Sporadic provision of certain

kinds of services (such as the vasectomy camps) is definitely not a sufficient tool in achieving a reduction in
family size.

What is also necessary is the continued effec-

tive administration of the family planning program.
Corroborating evidence for the ineffectiveness of the
family planning program in Ernakulam district in which the
Commercial City is located is available in a study on program administration conducted by Valsan (1977).

Extensive

interviews with family planning acceptors, medical personnel, politicians, social workers, and civil servants
revealed sharp contrasts in the organization of the steriliztion camps and that of the regular program.

The manage-

rial and organizational abilities, and the planning and
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leadership qualities of the district collector (the highest
civil officer in the district who was also responsible for
the organization of the family planning camps) were chiefly
responsible for the success of the sterilization campaign.
But when the camps were terminated, the responsibility was
shifted to the regular district level family planning organization.

Interview data from Valsan indicated that the per-

sonnel, both higher and lower level, lacked the dynamism and
morale to carry on the intense grass-roots campaign necessary for the successful implementation of the program.
Another serious limitation on the program effectiveness was
the lack of coordination between the family planning and
other development programs--a finding that highlights the
complementarity of modernization and family planning.
Commercial Rural Area
This rural area is part of
Commercial City is located.

Ernakulw~

district in which

Consequently, both the Commer-

cial City and the rural area fall under the jurisdiction of
the same district family planning organization.

Spillover

effects of the Ernakulam-Cochin-Alwaye region in the district--the financial and commercial belt of Kerala--may also
be reflected in this rural sample.
As might be expected, the Commercial Rural Area, does
differ significantly from the Commercial City in the level
of its socioeconomic status (Table 26).

Rural residents

have a lower mean education, both husband's and wife's, and
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own fewer modern items than the residents of Commercial
City.

A similar pattern is evident in the case of their

occupational status too (Table 28).

Almost

husbands are unskilled or skilled laborers.

65% of the rural
In

contrast~

more than half of the heads of households in the Commercial
City are concentrated in the middle of the occupational
stratum (ranging from skilled to other services).
larly~

Simi-

while more women in this rural area (40%) are in the

labor force than any

other~

the majority of them are uns-

killed workers compared to the wider distribution of Commercial City's workers (Table 28).
Yet~

deviations from the traditional rural structure

are evident in this sample suggesting spillover effects from
the Commercial City.

Consequently~

rural~

Area is not merely

the Commercial Rural

but is in the initial state of

transition from the traditional homogenous structure.

For

example, this rural village, inspite of the low general
level of

education~

exhibits wider variations in the educa-

tional distribution of its residents than the Commercial
City (Table 27).

There is also a larger proportion of rural

husbands who are semi-professionals or professionals

(~able

28) •
While the Commercial Rural Area has a significantly
lower socioeconomic status than the Commercial City, they do
not differ much in the demographic (age at marriage and
infant mortality) and social psychological aspects of their
modernization (Table 26).

It indicates that the level of
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socioeconomic modernization in the Commercial City and its
rural area (but the City especially) is not strong enough to
induce modernization in other sectors of these societies.
These rural respondents also tend to be traditional in their
orientation to and practice of family limitation as the
urbanites (Table 29).

That the Commercial Rural Area and

the City are served by the same family planning organization
may further explain the ineffectiveness of the rural sample
on the family planning measure.

Low levels of modernization

and inefficient family planning program administration that
characterize the Commercial Rural Area together explain its
residents' ineffectiveness in planning their families.
Additional support for the complementarity of modernization and family planning is evident in the comparison of
Commercial Rural Area to the Capital City (Tables 26 to 29).
The Commercial Rural Area is markedly different from the
administrative city not only in its socioeconomic status but
also in its demographic and social psychological modernization and family planning performance.

Significantly lower

levels of educational, occupational, and economic statuses,
lower age at marriage, and more segregated conjugal role
relationships typify the rural respondents.

Corresponding

to this traditional status is a conservatism in their attitude toward and their practice of family planning.
This conservatism is reinforced by the caste composition of this sample (Table 30).

Ezhavas and Scheduled

castes--the two lowest groups in the secular and ritual
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hierarchy--form 86% of its population.

Ezhavas, who unlike

the Scheduled castes are not protected by the government,
tend to be in the least favorable position with regard to
development.
The Commercial Rural Area is closer to the Commercial
City than it is to the Capital City, not just geographically, but also in its social profile.

Both these areas

appear to be in the initial stages of transition, although
their starting points differ.

For the Commercial City, it

is the beginning of a transition from an urban center to a
modernizing society.

In the case of the rural area, the

initial shift is away from the rural organization towards a
more diversified socioeconomic structure.
Administrative Rural Area
Administrative Rural Area, the last sample in the
study, is along with the Capital City, a part of Trivandrum
district.

With regard to its general level of moderniza-

tion--socioeconomic, demographic, and social psychological--the Administrative Rural Area has a significantly lower
status than that of the administrative city (Tables 26 and
27).

Its residents not only have lower education and own

fewer modern items than their city counterparts, but almost
60% of the heads of households are engaged in lower status
occupations--unskilled labor and small scale farming (Table
28).

Like their husbands, most of the employed women (12.

4% of the sample) are also engaged in either unskilled labor

242
or petty business.

However, the semi-professional status of

the rest of the employed women may be a carry over from the
Capital City.
Given the low socioeconomic developmer.t level of the
Administrative Rural Area, its traditional profile in terms
of age at marriage and conjugal role structure is to be
expected (Tables 26 and 27).

What is surprising is its high

level of family planning performance, a level comparable to
the Capital City.

Almost 61% of these rural respondents (as

high a proportion as in the Capital City) are generally
favorable to using some method of family limitation while
only 36% are either unfavorable or totally opposed to it
(Table 30).

Further, the administrative rural respondents,

like their urban counterparts, initiated use of family planning very early (Table 26).

These deviations may also be

explained in terms of the personal observations of the
researcher during the fieldwork concerning the administration of the family planning program in this area.

Continu-

ous and intensive grass-roots level contacts in this area
were maintained, through regular field visits, by the family
planning health assistants.

Coupled with this was the

interest and cooperation of the medical personnel in charge
of the primary health center for family planning.

A family

planning program can, therefore, be quite effective even
when the level of modernization is low.
However, if the program is to effect basic and overall
changes in the planning of and control over family size, a
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modernizing context is necessary.

Inspite of the relatively

effective administration of the family planning program, the
overall effectiveness of the administrative rural respondents in planning their pregnancy histories is still low
compared to the Capital City (Table 26).

Similarly, the

intensity of preference for sons among these rural respondents is the highest of all the four areas.

A strong desire

for sons is rooted in the agrarian social structure of the
rural area.

Table 28 indicates that almost 29% of its

respondents are farmers, both small and large, compared to
3.6% in the Commercial Rural Area, 2.5% in the Commercial
City, and none in the Capital City.

Modernization, as dem-

onstrated in the case of the Capital City would, therefore,
prove an effective catalyst in realizing the full potential
of the family planning program.
Just as with the Commercial Rural Area, the Administrative Rural Area differs from the Commercial City in its
socioeconomic modernization, but not in its demographic and
social psychological aspects (Table 26).

Educational, occu-

pational, and economic statuses of the administrative ruralites are significantly lower when compared to the Commercial
City's population.

But the rural area, despite its low

level of development, is more effective in the field of family planning than the Commercial City.

This is especially

so with regard to attitude to family planning and parity of
initiation of birth control (Table 26).

For instance, while

52.5% of the Commercial City's sample is opposed to the use
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of family planning, the corresponding proportion in the
Administrative Rural Area is only 36%.

Conversely, the

rural respondents have more favorable attitudes than the
commercial urbanites.

Corresponding to these favorable

attitudes, the rural respondents on the average initiated
practice of family limitation one pregnancy earlier than the
Commercial City's sample.

Yet, the two samples do not dif-

fer in the overall effectiveness in planning their families.
A major impediment to the effectiveness of the program in
the Administrative Rural Area may be its traditional social
structure.

These findings further confirm the independent,

yet complementary nature of modernization and family planning, the two major means to controlling population growth.
Additional support for the distinctiveness (even if
limited) of family planning is available in the comparison
of the two rural samples.

While the two areas are basically

similar in their levels of modernization, the Administrative
Rural Area is the more typically rural area of the two, at
least in its socioeconomic status (Table 27).

It has more

clustered distribution than the Commecial Rural Area in the
educational (husbands') and economic statuses of the family.
Occupational concentration of the Administrative Rural
Area's respondents in unskilled labor and farming denotes an
agrarian and non-industrial structure (Table 28).

In con-

trast, unskilled and skilled laborers predominate in the
Commercial Rural population.

And, it also includes petty

businessmen and professionals in larger proportions than the

245
Administrative Rural Area, reflecting industrial and commercial influences on its structure.
Inspite of the similar, if not more, traditional
structure of the Administrative Rural Area, it differs considerably in its family planning status from the Commercial
Rural Area.

Administrative Rural Area--the most typically

rural--is the more effective of the two, both in its orientation to and practice of family planning (Tables 26 and
29).

In other words, the effective family planning program

in the Administrative Rural Area is a major reason for its
high performance on the family planning dimensions.
A contradictory profile, thus, emerges from the analyses of the Administrative Rural Area's position on the modernization and family planning indices.

Caste structuring

of this sample may be a further explanatory factor (Table
j0).

Of all the four areas, this sample has the largest

proportion of Nairs (53.3%), the dominant secular caste in
Kerala.

While they may be restricted in their modernization

by the traditional structure in which they operate, they
seem to exercize greater control over a personal dimension--family size.
Relevance Of The Varied Profiles For Family Size
Comparative analysis of the two urban and two rural
areas precludes a unidirectional and linear relationship
between modernization and family planning status.

It is

necessary at this point to assess the implications of these
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mixed profiles for the phenomenon that impinges directly on
population growth--family size.
In all the four areas, both the average ideal family
size and especially the actual family size exceed replacement level fertility which is the goal of the family planning program (Table 26).

What is even more significant is

that the traditional rural/urban differences in family size
are not evident in these populations.

Commercial City and

Capital City seem to differ most in their ideal and achieved
family sizes.

As might be expected, Capital City, with its

highest level of modernization and an effective family planning program, has the lowest mean ideal and actual family
size.

Commercial City is at the opposite extreme with its

highest ideal and actual.

Once again, the level of modern-

ization in the Commercial City proves insufficient to effect
modernization of fertility orientations and behavior.

It

may also imply a short term rise in fertility in the initial
stages of socioeconomic development as suggested by Tsui and
Bogue (1978:

19, 24).

In between these extremes lie the two rural areas.
Although the Commercial Rural Area has a slightly smaller
ideal than the Administrative Rural Area, the latter has a
smaller achieved family size.

However, only the Administra-

tive Rural Area has a significantly higher ideal family size
in comparison to the Capital City.

A higher preference for

sons, the variable on which only the Capital City and Administrative Rural Area differ, may explain the higher rural
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ideal.

Yet, the administrative rural sample has the small-

est gap between its ideal and actual family size suggesting
closer correspondence behreen family size norms and performance.
Until 1970, very little difference was found between
rural and urban fertility in India, partly because of the
unique nature of its urbanization.

Since then declines in

urban fertility vis-a-vis rural fertility have been documented (Rele and Kanitkar, 1974:

229).

The absence of the

traditional rural-urban fertility differentials in Kerala is
in conformity with the mixed modernization-family planning
profiles documented in its two cities and the two rural
areas.
Conclusion
Several writers have pointed out recently that the
process of demographic transition and modernization in
developing countries need not follow the same pattern as the
Western transitions.

In fact, due to the variations in the

starting points, in the culture and social structure of each
society, each national transition is bound to develop its
unique features in the timing, sequence, and interplay of
the traditional and modern elements.

Teitelbaum (1975:

176-177) speaks of several factors that may contribute to
the uniqueness of the demographic transitions of these modernizing societies.

Of particular relevance to this study

are the increased planning abilities of the national govern-
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ments of which the organized family planning program in
India is an example, increased acceptance of the small family norm, and easier access to different methods of fertility control.
At the aggregate level, family planning performance in
this sample appears to be divorced from modernization status.

Commercial City, although advanced in its socioeco-

nomic modernization, is very traditional in its family planning achievements.

At the opposite extreme lies the

administrative village, the least modern area in the sample;
yet, it has a high family planning performance status.
These findings are at variance with studies that posit modernization as a necessary prerequisite for the success of
the family planning program.

Similarities in the small size

of the average actual fertility, particularly between the
rural areas and Capital City which have different levels of
development, is another indication that family planning programs can be relatively effective under different levels of
modernization.

At the same time, the limited success of the

program, in the absence of modernization, can be seen, for
example, in the higher average ideal family size of the
administrative rural area compared to the Capital City.
A comparison of the four areas with different levels
of development provides a convenient set up for a natural
experiment of the relationship between modernization and
family planning performance.

The results presented in this

chapter substantiate the analysis at the individual level
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presented in Chapter V.

Hodernization and family planning

seem to be complementary, yet independent at the aggregate
level also.

The specific combination of these two dimen-

sions evident in the four subsamples lends credence to the
notion of individual demographic transitions suggested by
Teitelbaum and others.

CHAPTER VII

MODERNIZATION AND FAMILY PLANNING:

AN ASSESSMENT OF THEIR

CONTRIBUTIONS IN REDUCING FERTILITY

Both the fertility literature and the preliminary
analysis, particularly at the aggregate level, presented in
the preceding chapters suggest the complementary, yet separate influences of modernization and family planning on fertility.

A more stringent test of the nature of the comple-

mentary relationship between modernization and family
planning in their effects on fertility behavior and their
relative independent contributions to fertility reductions
is possible through the use of path analysis.

Following the

procedures outlined in Asher (1976) and Kerlinger and
Pedhauzur (1973), a path analysis of the fertility model
detailed in Chapter III was carried out.

The model includes

four structural variables-- rural urban area of residence,
religion, caste status, and age of the respondent--which are
hypothesized as influencing the two indices of primary modernization, the respondent's and her family's socioeconomic
status.

These status characteristics, in turn, would deter-

mine the extent of secondary modernization in a family,
measured by the respondent's age at marriage, the extent of
infant mortality experienced by the couple, and the social
250
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psychological manifestation of modernization indexed as the
nature of the role relationships.

These modern characteris-

tics are further conceptualized as influencing the respondents' norms regarding family size and family planning and
consequently their family planning behavior.

Ultimately,

modernization and family planning are expected to determine
the number of children each couple has.
Results from the path analysis suggest that family
planning behavior and indicators of secondary modernization,
such as age at marriage and infant mortality, which have a
quantitative impact on family size are some of the most
direct determinants of fertility behavior.

As might be

expected, family planning which involves a deliberate control of fertility has a stronger influence on family size
than modernization.

Further, the indirect effect of modern-

ization through family planning is as strong (if not
stronger) as its direct influence on actual fertility.
Thus, even though the practice of family planning presupposes modern traits and values, the role of modernization as
a tool in reducing fertility is strengthened when it is
accompanied by the appropriate family planning behavior.
Family planning programs aimed at popularizing the concept
and use of family planning methods among all social and economic classes will speed up the fertility declines.
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A Methodological

Note

As a first step in delineating the path model, each of
the endogenous variables were regressed on the causally preceding independent variables.
trimming the model:

Two criteria were used in

(1) paths were dropped if their values

were smaller than .05, the magnitude often recommended as a
criteria for deleting paths (Kerlinger and Pedhauzur, 1973:
~18);

(2) paths were also deleted at each step using the .05

level of significance for the path coefficients.

Path coef-

ficients above the value of .05 were omitted only when they
were insignificant at the .05 level.

Once the non-signifi-

cant paths were deleted, the regressions were rerun until
the final path model was ascertained.
In the course of the regression analysis, family planning effectiveness (see Appendix B for description of this
variable), the last of the family planning variables in the
causal order, was dropped from the model for several reasons.

When actual family size was regressed on all the

independent variables in the model, the coefficient for the
direct path from family planning effectiveness to actual
family size was not only insignificant at the .05 level of
significance but was only .04 in magnitude.

Secondly, the

correlation between the parity at which use of family planning was initiated and family planning effectiveness was a
high -.62.

Hence, all the influence of family planning

effectiveness on fertility behavior (r=-.46) is because of
the influence of the antecedent variable, parity of family
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planning initiation, on effectiveness.

1

Measurement of fam-

ily planning effectiveness also required the respondent to
recollect the contraceptive circumstances preceding every
pregnancy, rendering reliability of recall problematic.

In

the case of parity of family planning initiation, however,
only one point in time in their pregnancy history needed to
be remembered.

The chances of accurately recalling one such

event rather than several are much higher.

Parity of family

planning initiation was, therefore, chosen over family planning effectiveness, as a more reliable index of family planning behavior.
Once the path model was determined, the next methodelogical step was to test its adequacy.

Correlations between

all the independent and the dependent variables at each
stage in the causal order were recalculated and are presented in Appendix D along with the original correlations.
With two exceptions, all the reproduced correlations were
either identical with or very close to the original suggesting that the model presented in Figure 2 is a tenable one.
Sizeable discrepancies between the actual and implied corre-

1 rncidentally, the correlations of family planning effectiveness with age of wife (r= -.07), age at marriage (r=
.26), infant mortality (r= -.06), ideal family size (r=
-.18), and sterilization status (r= -.14) are small. Hence,
it is possible to attribute the original relationship
between family planning effectiveness and fertility to the
effect of parity of family planning initiation on planning
effectiveness. The indirect causal role of family planning
effectiveness in family size determination will be analyzed
further at a later time.
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of correlations among the background variables need to be
distinguished.

The correlations among the three dummy vari-

ables are completely spurious or non-causal as defined by
Nie, et. al

(1975:

389-390).

These non-causal correlations

will form part of the spurious effects in a correlation.

In

other words, although they are mathematically a part of the
equations, these correlations cannot be interpreted substantively.

On the other hand, the relationships of the three

dummy variables representing area of residence with religion, caste, and age of the respondent and the covariations
among the last three represent 'unanalyzed correlations'
(Nie, et.
specified.

al,

1975:

389) with no direction of causation

Such analyzed correlations introduce ambiguities

into the model because one-way causations are not implied in
the relationships among the exogenous variables.
Since no unidirectional causality is implied among the
background variables, these covariations provide a basic
description of the sample.

Capital City does not differ

from the other areas in its religious composition, but does
have a higher proportion of upper castes 4 and older women.
On the contrary, Commercial City has more Hindus compared to
the other areas, but there are no significant caste and age
differences between the Commercial City and the other areas.
The differences in caste composition among the two cities

4

The correlation between Capital City and caste is negative because caste status is ranked in such a way that a
lower value (for example, 1) indicates higher caste status.
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may be a reflection of their economic structure.

Since a

higher proportion of upper castes reside in Capital City,
the administrative capital of Kerala, perpetuation of the
traditional situation where upper castes were privy to
higher education and non-commercial white collar occupations
can be expected.

Such caste polarization is not evident in

the Commercial City, the more cosmopolitan of the two cities.

Further, the commercial and industrial base of the

Commercial City's economy does not preclude the participation of any caste group.

Caste distinctions (implying the

preponderance of some castes over others in comparison with
the other areas) are also absent in the Administrative Rural
Area although it has a larger proportion of Christians and
younger women.

Differences in the age composition of the

Capital City and its rural area might be a consequence of
the higher and lower fertility of the rural and urban areas
respectively.
Upper castes in the Hindu tradition occupy a higher
status in the ritual hierarchy than the Christian upper
castes.

This is evident in the relatively higher caste sta-

tus of the Hindus compared to the Christians (r= -.10).
Further, while there are no significant religious distinctions between older and younger respondents, caste distinctions do exist.

A larger proportion of older women belong

to the upper castes with the lower caste respondents being
vounger.

This younger age structure of the lower castes may

be attributed to their traditionally higher fertility.
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Aside from providing background information on the
sample, these covariations present conditions that may
either dampen or enhance the effect of modernization on fertility.

For example, a large number of residents in Capital

City belong to the upper castes.

It can be hypothesized

that both these traits will reinforce each other in reducing
fertility.

At the same time, although modern fertility

behavior can be associated with upper castes, their older
age composition will diminish the effects of the higher
social status associated with upper castes.

Such correla-

tions will play an important role in determining the nature
of the influence that modernization and family planning
exercize on fertility.
Primary Modernization
Family's Socioeconomic Status
Educational accomplishments of the head of the household (H), the index of a family's socioeonomic status, is
the first endogenous modernization variable in the model.
As might be expected, families in the Capital City enjoy a
higher status than families in other areas, even after controlling for the effect of the higher caste status of Capital City's families (path HDl = .46).

Commercial City is

also characterized by higher social status (path HD2=.14),
although it is not as distinctly different as Capital City
is from the rural areas.

These results, thus, validate the

findings presented in Chapter VI where Capital City was
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characterized as the most modern of the two cities.
Further, despite public policies designed to mitigate the
discrimination against the lower castes, lower caste status
is still associated with lower social status (path HC=-.24).
As noted in the earlier discussion of the exogenous
variables, the relationships among them also present certain
indirect links in the effect of the background factors on
husband's education.

For example, families in the Capital

City or upper castes generally have a higher status (measured as husband's education) partly because many upper
castes tend to reside in Capital City (path HDl.rDlC= -.o8 5
or path HC.rCDl=.04).

In short, urban families and upper

caste groups still occupy the higher rungs of the socioeconomic order in Kerala.
Educational Status Of The Wife
While the family is the unit of procreation, the wife
is the most directly involved in the childbearing process.
As such her socioeconomic characteristics have an additional
significance in determining family size.
Wife's education (H) is the first index of her socioeconomic status in the model.

A causal link cannot be estab-

lished between husband and wife's education because the man
and the woman enter the marriage market with their educa-

~Path HDl.rDlC= -.08 refers to the product of the unanalyzed correlation (r) between caste status (C) and residence
in the Capital City (Dl) and the path from Capital City to
Husband's education (H).
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tion.

No doubt, in contracting a marriage, parity in the

educational qualifications of the husband and wife is
stressed and the man's decision or choice generally prevails.

Yet, it is not possible to stipulate that husband's

education causally determines the wife's educational status.
It was, therefore, decided to exclude husband's education
from the analysis of the determinants of wife's education
and to allow the residuals in the two be correlated.

6

There is no difference in the causal structures of the
respondent's and her husband's education.

Like their hus-

bands, women residing in the two cities and upper caste
women have higher education in comparison with rural and
lower caste women respectively.

Similarities also exist in

the sizes of the path coefficients for husband and wife's
education.

Despite differences in the levels of education

among men and women (see Chapter V), traditional structural
biases (such as caste status and area of residence) are
equally strong in creating disparities in the educational
accomplishments of both men and women in Kerala.

This rela-

tive absence of sex bias in educational advancement can, to
a large extent, be attributed to the programs of free education in Kerala to which

39% of Kerala's budget is devoted

(Visaria and Visaria, 1981:

9).

Consequently, Kerala also

6The residuals were allowed to be correlated only to
facilitate the recalculation of the implied correlation
between husband and wife's education. Hence, it does not
affect the original estimation of the path coefficients.
See Sewell, et.al, 1970 for a similar approach.
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has the highest literacy rate among all the states in India
both for men and women:

74% of Kerala's men as opposed to

the national average of 47% and 65% of its women compared to
25% of the women in the nation are literate (Visaria and
Visaria, 1981:

9).

There are still differences in the edu-

cational achievements of men and women.

But the patterns in

their education, i.e., factors accounting for disparities in
educational accomplishments, are the same for both sexes.
Age of the respondent is the fourth determinant of her
educational status.

Many younger women, irrespective of

their area of residence and their caste status, have higher
education compared to their older counterparts (path
WA=-.08).

Such improvements in th~ status of women over

time is another important aspect of the modernizing trends
in Kerala today.
In the preliminary analysis of the data, however, the
insignificant simple correlations between age of wife and
her education (r=.05) suggested there had not been any significant improvements in women's social status over time.
Two factors were responsible for this misleading conclusion.
Many older women live in the Capital City where women have a
higher educational status (path WDl.rDlA=.09).

Some older

women also belong to the upper castes and upper caste women
generally have higher education (path WC.rCA =.04). 7 Two

7

since there are no significant age distinctions among
women in the Commercial City, the path from Commercial City
is minor.
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traditional factors, urban residence and upper caste status,
thus, obfuscate the real improvements gained by women over
time in the field of education.
Correlations among the determinants of wife's education also provide additional insights into the coexisting
traditional and modernizing elements in Kerala.

For exam-

ole, continuing the traditional pattern found in the case of
men, upper caste status women who reside in the Capital City
also have higher education.

Many women in the Capital City

belong to the upper castes who are privy to higher education
(path WC.rcD1=.04).

Alternately, many upper caste women

reside in the Capital City where residents generally have
higher education compared to the Commercial City and rural
women (path WDl.rDlC=-.07).

Age composition of upper caste

women and those residing in Capital City, on the other hand,
slightly weakens the traditional monopoly of Capital City
and upper caste status on higher education.

For example,

Capital City has many older women who, in turn, have lower
education, leading to the lower educational status of some
residents in the Capital City (path WA.rADl

=

-.02).

Such

contradictory patterns where the traditional and the modern
intermingle is, again, a characteristic of a modernizing
society.
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Women's Occupational Status
Employment of women (0), like education, exposes women
to a wider range of ideas, opinions, and behavior patterns.
It limits the time women can devote to their families while
providing an effective alternative to large families and
even to childbearing.

Hence, women's occupational status

will have a significant influence on their family size decisions.
Analysis of the factors determining women's occupational status reveals trends that undercut the improvements
achieved in the field of education.

For example,

women in

both the Capital and Commercial cities and upper caste women
tend not to be employed.

8

It is still neither customary nor

socially desirable for urban women and those of the upper
castes to seek outside employment.

The low rate of employ-

ment of these women is also due to the limited job opportunities, particularly in the white collar sector, of an
industrializing society.

Within an agrarian economic struc-

ture, rural and lower caste women can be expected to seek

8 since very few women in the sample work (23% are
employed), a negative association will be more a reflection
of not being employed than being in lower status occupations. As noted in Chapter V, women's occupational status
ranges from unemployed (coded as 0) to professionals (coded
as 12). A drawback of this measure lies in considering
unemployed women as the lowest ca~egory in the occupational
structure. A majority of these women belong to the upper
social and economic strata. They do not work because it is
socially undesirable to do so or because of the difficult
job situation, particularly for the educated. It would have
been more appropriate to use a dummy variable involving
employed and unemployed women.
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employment to supplement the family income.

They also have

definite functions in the agricultural process which
explains why rural women tend to be employed more than their
city counterparts.

In the case of lower caste women, their

higher occupational status also suggests increased opportunities to overcome discrimination and to participate in the
economic progress.
Another aspect of women's employment and a possible
consequence of the traditional nature of the economy is the
importance of seniority as opposed to merit in determining
movement up the occupational ladder.

Not only are more

older women employed but they are employed in higher status
occupations compared to the younger women, inspite of the
latter's higher education.

In general, the structural fac-

tors (or characteristics of the groups to which these
respondents belong)--area of residence, caste, and age
cohort--have a traditional influence on women's occupational
patterns.
Individual achievements, such as education, have, on
the contrary, an opposite impact on women's occupational
status.

Once the traditional influence of the background

factors is controlled, women with higher education tend to
be employed in higher status occupations.

What is even more

significant is that education, an individual characteristic,
is a more dominating influence on women's occupational status compared to their group traits.

The significance of

individual initiative in determining women's participation
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in the occupational structure represents another important
aspect of modernization in Kerala.
Aside from these direct effects, several indirect
paths further specify the conditions that encourage or
hinder women's employment and their employment in higher
status jobs.

Higher education of urban residents and of

upper caste women, is a very strong facilitator of women's
employment.

For instance, women in Capital City have a

higher education in comparison with women in other areas and
consequently tend to be employed in higher status jobs (path
OW.WD1=.20).

This may be due partly to the increased avail-

ability of higher status jobs in the Capital City.

Simi-

larly, higher education also enables women in the Commercial
City and upper caste women to be employed and to be employed
in higher status occupations.

In fact, the intervening

influences of education in facilitating women's employment
more than offsets the direct traditional effect of urban
residence and upper caste status on women's employment.9
Yet, when urban and upper caste women do overcome the social
restrictions in the field of employment (a modern pattern),
it is under circumstances that perpetuate caste and urban
monopoly over development.

This is evident in the case of

upper caste women who live in the Capital City, where women
have higher education and, therefore, are employed in higher

9The direct path coefficient ODl is equal to -.12 in contrast to the indirect path OW.WD1=.20).
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status jobs (path OlV.WDl.r-DlC=-.04).

In shor-t, higher-

education does incr-ease the chances of women being employed;
but such oppor-tunities ar-e still limited to ur-ban and uppercaste women who tr-aditionally have had special access to
higher- socioeconomic status.
Age distinctions in women's employment status pr-ovides
another- instance of the coexistence of the tr-aditional and
the moder-n in Ker-ala.

Aside fr-om benefitting directly from

the principle of seniority (path OA=.lO), older women have
higher status jobs because they reside in the Capital City
where women generally have higher education (path
OW.WDl.rDlA=.05).

On the other hand, when younger women are

in higher status jobs, it is because of their individual

.

achievements (higher education).

There have been improve-

ments in the educational and, therefore, occupational opportunities available to younger women over time (path
OW.WA=-.04).

Yet, the limited nature of this progress over

time is evident in the small size of these paths compared to
the direct effect of seniority (path OA=.lO).

Further, many

of these women work in a predominantly agrarian occupational
structure which would limit their access to upper white collar and professional jobs.

Though these women are employed,

such employment may not constitute a major break from their
traditional roles of mother and housewife.
Analysis of the interrelationships among the indices
of primary modernization trends in Kerala thus far presents
a mixed picture.

On the one hand, substantial advancements
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have been achieved by women in improving their socioeconomic
status.

A fair correspondence also exists between urbaniza-

tion and socioeconomic modernization.

Nonetheless, tradi-

tionally restrictive forces, such as caste status, still
play a sizeable role in excluding the lower castes from participating in the general economic and social progress that
has been achieved.
Secondary Modernization
~

At Harriage

While primary modernization is a pre-requisite for
changes in fertility values and behavior, its effect is
mediated through various channels, one of which is secondary
modernization.

Secondary modernization refers to the conse-

quences of urbanization, industrialization, and the concommitant improvements in the socioeconomic status of individuals and families.

The first set of indices of secondary

modernization are basically demographic variables--age at
marriage and infant mortality.

Age at which a woman marries

(M) can be hypothesized to have a quantitative influence on
fertility by determining the number of reproductive years.
At the same time, age at marriage also has a socioeconomic
connotation.

It denotes a set of values and beliefs associ-

ated with social and economic modernization as it influences
age at marriage.
As hypothesized, the most significant aspect of primary modernization that determines the age at which a woman
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marries is her socioeconomic status.

Women with higher

education tend to postpone marriage at least until after
completing their education (path MW=.35).

Employment is

another factor contributing to late marriages (path M0=.22),
although its effect is not as strong as that of education.
Women's employment is still not very widespread in Kerala, a
factor limiting the impact of occupation on age at marriage.
Further, families wait until after a girl completes her education before they get her married.

Her employment, on the

other hand, is not that strong a deterrent to her marriage,
reflecting the stronger significance attached to women's
education over her occupation.

Yet, working women tend to

marry later than the non-working women for several reasons.
They may wait until they are settled in their jobs before
getting married because it increases their bargaining power
in the marriage market.

Still more important is that a per-

manent job places restrictions on the geographical area
within which their search for a suitable partner will have
to be confined.

Such restrictions will tend to postpone

their marriages even further.
It is also true that women with higher education tend
to postpone their marriage because such women also have
higher status jobs (path MO.OW=.l2).

In other words, the

problem of finding a suitable partner, both in terms of
their educational and occupational statuses becomes compounded in such instances.

Higher education and employment

also modernize the values and ideas of these women and their
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families concerning themselves and their role in their marriages and in the society.

Such changed concepts may per-

suade them to break away from the traditional customs of
early marriage, motherhood, and housekeeping as their sole
purpose in life.

Improving the socioeconomic status of the

women, therefore, modifies marriage practices that have a
direct bearing on fertility.
Infant Mortalit¥
What are the implications of the mixed patterns of
primary modernization discussed earlier for rates of infant
mortality (I), the second index of secondary modernization?
Like age at marriage, inrant mortality is a demographic
variable with quantitative and motivational effects on rertility.

The number of inrant deaths will numerically deter-

mine the size
tions

or

or

the family.

high rates

or

At the same time, under condi-

infant mortality, couples may be

motivated to have a large ramily as an insurance for the
survival of at least a few.

Hence, inrant mortality is a

crucial factor in fertility analysis.
Inrant mortality, in turn, is both a biological and
social class phenomenon.

The survival rate of infants is

partly determined by the health of the mother and physical
conditions, such as sanitation and availability of medical
care, in which inrants grow.

For instance, age of the

respondents is a significant predictor of her rate
mortality.

or

infant

Older women tend to have experienced a higher
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proportion of infant deaths in their pregnancy histories
than the younger cohorts (path IA=.lO).

Several explana-

tions can be provided for this pattern, not the least of
which is the cohort effect.

Prior to Independence in

1947

and even in the post-independence era, when the majority of
older women had their children, health and living conditions
were poor and medical services meager.

Health care and san-

itation facilities have since been improved considerably for
all segments of society.

Such improved health conditions

may contribute to the lower infant mortality rates experienced by the younger women.

Older women also have longer

childbearing histories, compared to the younger women.

As a

result, the likelihood of older women experiencing more
pregnancies, and consequently more infant deaths are
greater.

10

Despite the significant advances in health care and
living conditions in Kerala, social class still influences
access to and effective utilization of these services.

Even

after the effect of age of wife is controlled, her family's
socioeconomic status influences the rate of infant mortality
in the family (path IH=-.11).

Specifically, upper class

families experienced fewer infant deaths, probably because
they have easier access to modern and improved health care.

10

However, at this stage of the analysis only the recursive link from infant mortality to actual fertility was
included. The non-recursive relationship between infant
mortality and actual fertility will be analyzed at a later
time.

r
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Higher education may also involve a change in the perceptions about health and disease and a shift in the emphasis
from curative to preventive health.
In short, younger women experienced fewer child losses
in their pregnancy histories reflecting either the improvements in living and health conditions or fewer pregnancies
among younger women.

Yet, class distinctions in infant mor-

tality experienced by these women still persist.

Narrowing

such class disparities have to be an integral part of modernization and indirectly of the population control program
in Kerala.
Conjugal Role Relationships
Conjugal role relationships (L), the

~hird

index of

secondary modernization, is another means of specifying the
possible influence of socioeconomic factors on fertility.
Unlike age at marriage and infant mortality which are primarily demographic factors with quantitative influences on
fertility, conjugal role relationships is a social psychological phenomenon.

Conjugal role relationships refer to a

system of values and attitudes about marriage and family
that govern the nature of the relationships between the husband and the wife and their familial roles.

Modernization

expressed in terms of conjugal role relationships can be
conceptualized as a family situation, in which the husband
and the wife share equal, yet interchangeable responsibilities in family affairs.

Such shared participation is prima-
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rily a reflection of the equality in the status of the man
and the woman.

In a traditional society, where women play a

subordinate role, having a large family becomes an important
source of prestige for them.

Hence, improving women's sta-

tus will also have to be a critical goal of the population
program.
What are the conditions under which modern conjugal
role relationships and improved status of women occur to
enable joint participation of women with their husbands in
carrying out familial activities?

The most significant cor-

relate of jointness in role relationships is higher education of the wife (path LW=.48).

Higher education exposes

women to ideas, roles, and functions that are effective
alternatives to the subordinate familial roles traditionally
prescribed for them.

Such women also seem to translate

these notions into practice within their family as expressed
in their joint role relationships.

Another factor that

determines the nature of role relationships between the husband and the wife is residence in the Capital City (path
LD1=.13).

Couples who live in the Capital City participate

jointly in decision making and familial responsibilities to
a larger extent than non-residents.

Capital City offers its

residents greater and varied exposure to modern ideas and
'

behavior patterns through mass media of communication, such
as radio, the press, and the cinema.

Limited housing condi-

tions in the city largely precludes the maintenance of an
extended family.

Family pressures from the older generation
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to preserve the traditional division of labor will, therefore, be relatively absent in an urban setting.
But the opportunities for individual advancements that
exist in the Capital City have a stronger effect in modernizing role relationships than the direct effect of mere residence in Capital City.

Capital City's respondents enjoy a

higher educational status and consequently have joint relationships (path LW.WD1=.18).
A third factor that differentiates couples in their
role relationships is their religious background.

Christian

respondents, possibly due to the Western component in Christianity, tend to be more joint in their relationships than
the Hindus (path LR=-.08).

Unlike Hinduism, Christianity is

a highly organized religion stressing group participation in
religious activities, an emphasis obviously carried into the
secular life of its adherents.
Improving the educational standards of women, in general, is an effective tool in raising their status within
the family.

It is highly probable that the opportunities

for equal participation in family affairs that higher education provides women will play a major role in modernizing
their fertility values and behavior.
Another aspect of the patterns in primary and secondary modernization that requires special mention is the significant disparity in the extent of development in the rural
and urban areas in Kerala.

As noted in Chapter VI, Capital

City is the most advanced of the four areas with Commercial
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City occupying an intermediate position.

In contrast, the

two rural areas are traditional and very similar in their
social and economic structures.

Thus, involving the rural

areas in the modernization trends is one of the major challenges that faces Kerala.
Family Size Norms
Ideal Family Size
In the fertility model presented in Chapter III, modernization was hypothesized as influencing family size
through the intervening set of family planning indicators.
Researchers such as Davis (1975) and Schutzer (1978) have
emphasized the need for evaluating the relationship of norms
regarding family size (N) to fertility behavior.

From a

policy perspective, the argument is that couples have many
children because they desire large families.

Until there is

a shift in desires or norms from large to smaller families
no major change in fertility behavior can be expected.
It is, therefore, necessary to analyze the correlates
of ideal family size to determine how women with low ideals
differ from those with high ideals.

Women who marry late

tend to idealize smaller families compared to those who
marry young(path NM=-.09).

When these women conceptualize

the family size that would be ideal for them, they take into
account the length of their reproductive span.

Since women

who marry when they are older also have a higher socioeconomic status, they probably are aware of the dangers to
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their health and the health of their children posed by
pregnancies in the later years of the reproductive period.
such women, because of their educational and occupational
backgrounds can be expected to have similar aspirations for
their children, aspirations which can be effectively fulfilled only if they have a small family.
It is this emphasis on upward mobility that is
reflected more strongly in the influence of the family's
social status on ideal family size (path NH=-.19).

Smaller

families tend to be idealized more by women with a higher
social status than by women from the lower strata.

Apart

from the mobility aspirations upper class women may have for
their children, their upper class status does not require
them to be dependent on their children in their old age.
There has also been a general shift toward smaller
family size norms in more recent years, possibly due to the
influence of the family planning program.

Irrespective of

their class backgrounds, younger women have smaller family
size ideals than older women (path NA=.l7).
Religion, the final correlate of ideal family size,
presents an anomaly.

Earlier, it was noted that the Chris-

tian respondents tend to be more modern in their relationships than their Hindu counterparts.

Yet, Christian women

idealize larger families (path NR=-.09).
Christian families in Kerala

The upper caste

(35% of the 31 Christian

respondents are upper castes) are predominantly a land owning class for whom large families are almost an economic
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necessity.

On the other hand, more than half the Christian

respondents (65%) belong to the lowest castes in the hierarchy, a position compounded by their lower class status.
Thus, while the joint role relationships among the Christians is a consequence of the organized nature of Christianity, their traditional family size norms is a more socioeconomic phenomenon.

This discrepancy explains the

contradictions in their role structure and ideal family
size.
Family Planning Norms
Attitude To Use Of Family Planning
While improvements in the standards of living, raising
the status of women, and modern family size norms provide a
conducive framework for limiting the size of the family,
such reductions can be achieved only through deliberate control of reproduction.

The variety of family planning meth-

ods available enables couples to effectively control their
pregnancies.

Nonetheless, efficient use of family planning

presupposes a favorable disposition towards the methods (D).
One determinant of family planning attitudes of women
in Kerala is their family size norms.

As might be expected,

women with modern (smaller) family size ideals also tend to
be favorable to using family planning to achieve those small
11
ideals effectively (path DN =.08).
Correspondence between
11 Family planning attitudes is scored in such a fashion
that a lower score implies favorable dispositions.
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family size norms and favorable dispositions to the means of
actualizing those norms suggest a crystallization of modern
family planning concepts.
Women with higher education also appear to favor use
of some method(s) of family planning to control pregnancies
in contrast to the less educated women.

Limiting their fam-

ily size can be expected to be more imperative to higher
educated women (path DW=-.19).

Women with higher education

would have similar aspirations for their children, a goal
which can be accomplished more effectively if they have
fewer children.

Besides, these women would be more capable

of evaluating objectively the usefulness and side effects of
different methods rather than form hasty judgements based on
hearsay.

Contrary to the expected pattern, however, resi-

dents of Commercial City tend to be less favorable to the
use of family planning compared to women from other areas
(path DD2=.15).

It was in the Commercial City that the

first mass sterilization camps and other propaganda campaigns were conducted.

Some of the adverse reaction of its

residents may be a backlash against imaginary and real problems, such as harmful side effects, that accompany the initiation of such massive programs.

Education allays some of

these fears, even in the Commercial City.

In other words,

when respondents in the Commercial City have higher education themselves, they are more favorable to the practice of
family planning (path DW.WD2=-.03).

Such differentials in

perception of family planning methods exemplify the modern
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values that accompany educational developments in the course
of modernization.
Practic·e Of Famil:z Planning
Parit:z Of Famil:z Planning Initiation
Whether couples practice family planning or how effectively they use the method(s) of their choice would provide
the proof of the intensity of the favorable disposition to
family planning and consequently their modern status.

Use

of family planning early in the reproductive history (P)
reflects the couple's desire to have control over their
pregnancies and not to leave them to chance.

As hypoth-

esized, women who view family planning favorably initiated
birth control much earlier than women who are opposed to it
(path PD=.ll).

Similarly, women with smaller family size

ideals also started family planning early in their pregnancy
histories (path PN=.07).

These women not only desire small

families but attempt to actualize their norms.

Early initi-

ation of family planning is an effective tool in realizing
their desires.

Such congruity between attitudes and prac-

tice, although not widespread, once again, denotes the crystallization of modern fertility values and behavior.
Another, and even stronger precondition for early use
of birth control is joint participation in familial roles by
the couple (path PL=-.25).

In contrast, when there exists a

traditional division of labor between the couple in terms of
the duties of the man and the wife, birth control is post-
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noned.

Joint participation by the couple essentially

implies equality of the husband and wife's position in the
family.

It is not surprising that women who play an equal

role tend to use family planning early.

Women have more at

stake in a pregnancy and their chances of using birth control to limit the size of the family to the size they desire
are greater if they have an equal voice in the matter.
Thus, the influence of role relationships on the timing of
birth control is a consequence of the status of women in the
family.
Age at marriage, like conjugal role relationships, is
another significant correlate of family planning behavior
(path PM=-.27).

Just as with joint role relationships, late

marriages are a consequence of the improved social and economic status of the women.

This improved status influences

their fertility behavior too.

In other words, the higher

status of women who marry at a later age predisposes them to
control their births early in order to minimize accidental
pregnancies.
A fifth factor that determines how early a couple initiates use of family planning is the extent of infant mortality the couple has experienced.

Specifically, women who

have lost children tend to postpone deliberate control of
pregnancies in order to replace the child deaths.

Or they

may desire to have a large number of children to insure
against further losses.

If early and effective use of fam-

ily planning is to become more widespread, living standards
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will have to improve so as to minimize child losses.
Yet another index of the timing of family planning
initiation is the status of the respondent's family.

Cou-

ples with an upper class background started controlling
their pregnancies earlier than the poorer respondents (path
PH=-.20).

Higher social status and early use of family

planning are interrelated aspects of modern predispositions
and behavior.

Even more significant is the implication of

the relative weakness of the impact of the husband's social
status on family planning in comparison to the other indices
of women's social status (particularly age at marriage and
role relationships).

It is surprising that in a male domi-

nated society, the indices of women's social status are
stronger correlates of family planning behavior.
The patterns delineated thus far suggest a definite
class bias in the practice of family planning.

However,

changes in family planning behavior that surmount the class
distinctions have occurred over time.

It is evident in the

strong impact of age of wife on the practice of birth control (path PA=.35).

It is to the credit of the family plan-

ning program initiated in the late sixties and early seventies that younger cohorts have departed from the traditional
pattern and initiated birth control much earlier than their
older counterparts •.
One of the most unexpected findings in the study is
the effect of residence in the Administrative Rural Area on
family planning practice.

These rural residents generally
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initiated family planning earlier than the residents of the
cities.

Like age of the respondents, this pattern reflects

the relative independence of family planning from modernization.

Specifically, it is the family planning program in

this area that is responsible for the widespread early adoption of birth control.

Further, since women in the Adminis-

trative Rural Area tend to be younger, they have also benefitted from the more recent trend toward early use of
family planning (path PA.rAD3=-.05).
Aside from these indirect links provided by the background variables, those traceable through the indices of
primary and secondary modernization are very insignificant.
Had the rural area been more developed, these modernization
oaths would have been significantly stronger, indicating
once again, the complementarity of family planning and modernization.
In general, the differentials in the timing (parity)
of the initiation of family planning signify the role of
both modernization and the family planning program in modernizing family planning behavior.

Moreover, in the realm

of modernization, improving the status of women is an important precondition of early and efficient use of family planning.
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Sterilization Status
Sterilization (S), aside from being a method of family
planning, is of interest because it is a terminal method
and, therefore, presents one of the most effective means of
shortening the reproductive span.

It is also significant

because the poorer segments of the population most frequently resort to it.

As such, sterilization is different

from the other reversible methods of birth control.

While

the timing and the use of temporary methods are indices of
modernization, the use of sterilization presents an opposite
pattern.
Couples who initiate family planning later in their
reproductive span tend to resort to sterilization to a
larger extent than those who started birth control earlier
(path SP=.l2).

Sterilization, thus, becomes the final

resort of couples who virtually had an uncontrolled pregnancy history and who in all probability have much larger
families than they desired or could even sustain.
A more compelling argument for the attractiveness of
sterilization to the lower class is evident in the effect of
the family's social status on sterilization.

It is the

poorer segments of society that have resorted to the terminal method (path SH=-.14).

In the absence of systematic and

early control of reproduction, a permanent method that
involves a single application seems most convenient for the
lower class.

In other words, couples who are poorer tend to

postpone deliberate family planning until late in the preg-
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nancy history when they decide to resort to sterilization
(path SP.PH=-.02).
Sterilization has become more widespread only in
recent years which is evident in the age of the respondents
who have adopted it.

As might be expected, the younger

cohorts appear to favor sterilization more than the older
women (path SA=-.24).

But, when higher status involves mod-

ern fertility behavior, such as early initiation of family
planning, younger women tend to accept the temporary methods
(path SP.PA=.04).
One basic theme that exists among these contradictory
patterns is that sterilization is the poor person's contraceptive, adopted as a last resort in the face of uncontrolled childbearing.

Eventhough it is an almost perfect

contraceptive, its role in reducing the family size is
undercut by the fact that most couples who accept it, do so
very late in their childbearing history.

Further, despite

its popularity in recent years, women with modern family
planning behavior patterns utilize methods other than sterilization.
Actual Family Size
Actual fertility, the central concept in this study,
is the most important element of the population problem in
India.

In the final analysis, it is the number of children

each couple has that will determine whether India's population will continue to grow or remain stable.

It is, there-
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fore, imperative to identify the social, economic,
demographic, and family planning factors that fertility
behavior is responsive to.

To pose the issue differently,

given the nature and degree of development and family planning practice in Kerala, what kind of family size patterns
can be delineated?

From a policy perspective, identifying

the characteristics of the couples with small families will
provide guidelines as to the directions the population program should adopt.
To begin with an aspect closest to fertility behavior,
the influence of sterilization status on family size confirms its appeal to the less modernized segments of society.
In other words, couples who have accepted sterilization are
not only poorer and traditional in their family planning
behavior, they also tend to have large families (path
FS=.06).

On the contrary, early initiation of family plan-

ning is a very strong predictor of small family size (path
FP=.64).

In fact, a couple which initiated family planning

after their second child would have one child more than a
couple who started family planning before the first pregnancy.

Thus, a convincing case exists for the effective

role of family planning in checking actual fertility.

Early

use of birth control also implies consistent and efficient
planning throughout the pregnancy history.

(The correlation

between parity of family planning initiation and overall
family planning effectiveness is -.62).

The strength of the

direct influence of family planning practice on actual fer-
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tility, after the effect of modernization has been controlled suggests the significant role of family planning in
the noteworthy reduction in Kerala's population growth rate
between 1961 and 1981.
Norms regarding family size is another deciding factor
in the size of a couple's family.

Women who idealize small

families tend to conform to those norms and have smaller
families (path FN=.08).

In other words, subscribing to a

small family norm generally provides the motivation to actualize those desires.

Women with small family norms also

tend to have initiated family planning earlier and have
lower actual fertility (path FP.PN=.05).

Early initiation

of family planning is a more concrete proof of the intensity
of motivation of the couples who desire small families.
Whatever the reason, these patterns support the theoretical
argument presented in Chapter II that actual fertility can
be reduced if couples desire smaller families.

Yet, small

family size norms are not sufficient conditions for reducing
the family size.

Under the influence of the family planning

propaganda, there is a general consensus on the desirability
of the small family, a factor contributing to the small size
of the path from fertility values to fertility behavior.
Additional factors, from the realm of modernization are necessary to explain the differences in achieved family size.
It would, therefore, be simplistic to assign exclusive
credit to family planning in slowing the population growth
rate in Kerala.

In the first place, modernization was found
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to be a significant correlate of family planning practice in
the discussion of family planning presented earlier.

Sec-

ondly, and perhaps of greater significance, modernization,
even if it is at the secondary level, does directly affect
the number of children a couple has.

As noted at the begin-

ning of this chapter, three indices of modernization, age of
the respondent, age at marriage, and infant mortality, that
directly determine actual fertility have quantitative influences on fertility.

Aside from their socioeconomic implica-

tions, the respondents' age and her age at marriage represent the number of years of the reproductive span available
to the woman.

The extent of infant mortality, similarly,

quantitatively determines the number of surviving children.
In short, the motivational aspects of modernization affect
fertility by determining the amount of time a woman spends
in reproduction or the number of surviving children.
A better understanding of the dynamics of family size
can be achieved through a detailed analysis of the influence
of the three indices of modernization on fertility behavior.
Among the three factors, infant mortality, an index of economic development and health conditions, presents a unique
case.

According to the insurance and replacement hypoth-

eses, couples who have experienced larger numbers of infant
deaths can be expected to replace these losses or have many
children to ensure the survival of a desirable number.
ther of these patterns is directly evident in Kerala.
the contrary, in the short run, infant mortality can be

NeiOn
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expected to have a negative impact on effective fertility by
reducing the number of surviving children.

It is this short

run influence that is evident in the negative direct relationship between infant mortality and family size (path
FI=-.27).
When couples experience child deaths, they do not seem
to replace all of their lost children.

Part of the explana-

tion for the short term effects or the absence of influence
of infant mortality could be found in the low level of
infant mortality in Kerala coupled with the recency of the
major decline in infant mortality since the 1960s.

During

1974-76 Kerala had an infant mortality rate of 55 per 1000
live births compared to the national average of 132 per 1000
for the same period (Visaria and Visaria, 1981).

At the

same time, it is also probable that couples do have many
insurance births and consequently experience more infant
deaths.

They, however, do not replace all the deaths

because they may be fairly satisfied with the surviving number of children.

Some concrete evidence of this motiva-

tional impact of infant mortality is also available.

Cou-

ples who have experienced higher infant mortality postpone
using birth control so as to either replace their lost children or to have insurance births.

Consequently, such cou-

ples do have higher fertility (path FP.PI=.07).

Such con-

trasting and coexisting patterns (viz. quantitative and
motivational) in the impact of infant mortality on fertility
may be a reflection of the modernizing status of the soci-
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significantly lower fertility than those who enjoy a modern
status.

Consider two women with similar social statuses.

If one of these women initiated family planning earlier than
the other, the former, according to the data has a significantly smaller family size than the latter.

Differences in

fertility between two women who initiated birth control at
the same time, but have different social and economic status, on the contrary, are not as pronounced.
Nonetheless, those women who adopted birth control
early are generally more modern than the late

init~ators.

But the relative weakness of the impact of modernization on
family planning initiation and on actual family size (compared to that of family planning on fertility) suggests that
there are women from less modern backgrounds who initiated
birth control early and consequently have lower fertility.
It is also probable that some higher status women 'initiated
family planning later in their pregnancy histories and had
large families.

Thus, contrary to the predictions of the

modernization and family planning perspectives, both modern
family planning behavior and modern social and economic status have contributed to lower fertility in Kerala.
One of the principal contributors to the effective
family planning status of the less modern women is the widespread availability of contraceptives made feasible by the
family planning program.

It is also possible to attribute

the major credit for the reductions in fertility and in the
rate of population growth in the 1970s in Kerala to the fam-
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ily planning program which played an effective role in modernizing family planning behavior.
Despite its comparative weakness, modernization in
itself has also been an important factor in controlling fertility.

It has been equally effective in reducing family

size by modifying birth control practices as is evident, for
example, in the similarities of the strength of the direct
effect of age at marriage on fertility (-.20) and its indirect effect through family planning initiation (-.18).

As

Kerala develops further, modernization can be expected to
play a stronger role in curtailing fertility.
in point is infant mortality.

A good case

The short term effects of

lower infant mortality rates in increasing the family size
by increasing the survival rates are predominant at present.
At the same time, lower rates of infant mortality, even if
to a lesser extent, does motivate couples to initiate family
planning early in order to have smaller families.

As docu-

mented by the Demographic transition theory, with the progress of modernization, such motivational influences of
infant mortality in reducing the size of the family will
become stronger.
Finally, there is a general and increasing consensus
among the younger age groups, irrespective of their class
and caste status, on the small family as the ideal for families for Kerala.

Status differences still pervail in the

family size norms; yet, they are not too prominent.

Conse-

quently, the impact of the family size ideals on the prac-
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tice of family planning and actual fertility is not that
strong.

In other words, even though many couples idealize

small families they not only do not practice family planning
early in order to conform to those ideals but their actual
fertility exceeds their ideals.

Again, as the society

develops and early adoption of birth control becomes more
widespread the gap between the low ideals and actual fertility will be narrowed.
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The Modernization And Family Planning Perspectives:
Reassessment

A

Research in the modernization and family planning traditions are generally conducted with the Demographic transition theory as either an explicit or an implicit organizing
framework.

Transition

theorists~

however, support only the

broad thesis that societies experience demographic transitions from high mortality and fertility levels to low vital
rates in the process of modernization.

Aside from these

broad patterns, not much uniformity exists in the actual
process of the transitions of the developed and developing
societies.
In the context of these broad processes, Coale (1974:

65) specified three conditions that will facilitate the
decline in fertility.

According to Coale, conscious fertil-

ity decisions must be an acceptable behavior pattern in a
society; small families must be perceived as economically
and socially advantageous; and birth control information and
methods must be readily and easily available to the motivated couples.

How can these conditions be achieved in a

given society?

The modernization and family planning per-

spectives are competing interpretations of the task of ereating the motivation for small families and the desire to
use family planning to limit family size.
exponents of the modernization

approach~

According to
improvements in the

economic and social status of families will create the motivation to limit family size.

In contrast, the family plan-
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ning theorists postulate that family planning programs can
create the required 'cognitive preparation' (Tsui and Bogue,
1979:

104) for accepting the small family norm and can also

provide the birth control methods and services.

In fact,

family planning programs, they argue, can be successful even
in societies with low levels of modernization.
Critical analysis of previous research cited by the
family planning camp and the findings of the present study
suggest the complementarity of modernization and family
planning in reducing fertility.

The uniqueness of individ-

ual or regional transitions will arise from the specific
combinations of the extent of modernization and the effectiveness of the family planning programs.

While developed

nations completed their transitions during their modernization, trends in today's developing countries indicate possibilities for variations.

Teitelbaum (1975:

one such important feature, among others:

177) points out
the role of gov-

ernments in the national family planning programs of developing countries which can provide the methods of family
planning and also legitimize the small family norm.
thus,

presents a unique situation.

Kerala,

It is highly developed

in the fields of education and health care even though its
per capita income and gross national product are considerably below the national average.

At the same time, it also

has a state wide family planning program providing services
in both the rural and urban areas.

With these patterns as a

backdrop, this study provides evidence as to the specific
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process through which Kerala has succeeded in reducing its
fertility in an attempt to complete its transition.
Comparisons of the four areas representing different
levels of modernization suggested that an effectively organized and implemented family planning program can be successful in modernizing family planning attitudes and behavior
even in a rural area, such as the Administrative Rural Area.
In contrast, respondents from Commercial City, where the
regular family planning organization lacked leadership and
dynamism, were comparatively traditional in their family
planning norms and practices.

Development in itself is,

thus, insufficient to induce modern family planning behavior.

However, the results also indicate the importance of

modernization to the overall family planning histories of
women in Kerala.

As the data from Capital City suggest, a

family planning program will be most successful if it is
introduced in a relatively modern context in which couples
can be assumed to be motivated to adopt family planning to
limit their family size.

Yet, as the experience of the

Administrative Rural Area indicates it is not necessary to
postpone introducing a family planning program until a society is well advanced in its modernization.

To sum up, con-

trary to the expectations of the modernization perspective,
even the modern couples will not adopt family planning
unless the methods and services are readily available.

On

the contrary, family planning programs, however effective,
are not sufficient to sustain the motivation and desires for
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small families.
What roles do modern status and family planning behavior play in determining the fertility patterns among couples
in Kerala?

The data presented in this study indicate that

family planning practices and modern status are synergistic
in explaining differentials in fertility behavior.

Initia-

tion of family planning, particularly in the early stages of
the pregnancy history, explains to a major extent why many
women in Kerala have smaller families than others.

Even the

residents of the Administrative Rural Area--the least modernized of the four areas--started using family planning
much earlier than residents of the cities and the Commercial
Rural Area.

Such patterns appear to support the family

planning perspective.
But, modernization--operationalized as higher socioeconomic status of the family, higher age at marriage of the
wife, fewer child losses, and joint role relationships
between the husband and the wife--has been an important
prerequisite for the early initiation of family planning.
Women with modern characteristics, such as those younger
women with a higher education (compared to the older women)
and women who married when they were older, generally have
fewer children.

These modern women have lower fertility

because they had also started family planning early in their
childbearing process.

Thus, fertility reductions in Kerala

can be attributed to the interplay of modernization and family planning.

Stated differently, the 'cognitive prepara-
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tion' for accepting the small family norm and the means with
which to actualize these norms have been created by both
modernization and family planning programs in Kerala.
How can existing fertility patterns in Kerala be characterized?

According to Schutzer's theory of demographic

development (1978), Kerala's fertility levels are in the
second stage of demographic development when achieved family
size exceeds family size desires.

It presents an opportune

situation for the vigorous implementation of a family planning program at the grass roots level which would provide
birth control information and methods and would continue to
legitimize the small family norm.

It is to the credit of

the existing program that many younger women, irrespective
of their socioeconomic backgrounds, idealize smaller families in contrast to older women.

Social class differen-

tials, however, exist in the family size norms of women in
Kerala.

Such class distinctions in ideal family size cou-

pled with the class differences in family planning and fertility behavior suggest fertility in Kerala is in the process of changing from a predominantly biological to a
socioeconomic phenomenon.

That the transformation is, how-

ever, not complete is evident in the influence of infant
mortality on actual fertility.

Lower infant mortality

results in the survival of a larger number of children
implying that the actual family size is, to a limited
extent, determined by biological factors outside the control
of the couple.

But, lower infant mortality motivates cou-
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nles to have fewer children by initiating family planning
early.

As modernization progresses and as infant mortality

is reduced further, the motivational influences of infant
mortality in reducing family size will become stronger.
Improvements in the educational and occupational status of women are another aspect of modernization relevant to
fertility.

Although the socioeconomic status of women does

not directly influence their fertility behavior, it is indirectly relevant.

The more modern woman marries when she is

older and consequently reduces her reproductive span and
family size.

Many such women who marry late are also more

modern in their family planning behavior and, therefore,
have fewer children.

Another medium through which higher

educational status of women affects family planning behavior
and ultimately fertility (as suggested also by van den Walle
and Knodel, 1980) is conjugal role relationships.

Women

with higher education tend to participate jointly with their
husbands in family matters.
planning more favorably.

They also tend to view family

Many such couples initiate family

planning early in their childbearing history resulting in
lower fertility.

Improvements in the opportunities for

women to participate in non-familial and familial sectors,
could, therefore, be a significant method of achieving
smaller families.
Easier access to sterilization, a permanent method of
birth control, is yet another factor that will curtail fertility.

Sterilization in Kerala, however, has been the poor

~01

person's contraceptive.

It is also more popular among the

younger cohorts of women.

Resumption of the mass vasectomy

camps and the provision of the opportunities for post partum
sterilization in the hospitals of Kerala, along with monetary and other incentives, will further reduce the rate of
population growth.
Another interesting pattern, which is perhaps a
reflection of modernization achieved in Kerala thus far, is
the limited role of background factors in explaining fertility differentials.

Area of residence of the respondents and

their caste and religious backgrounds do not affect their
fertility behavior directly.

But membership in these groups,

still, to a large extent, determines access to the progress
achieved in the state.

For example, city respondents, upper

caste women, and urban Christians have a higher socioeconomic status than the rural, lower caste, and rural Christian women respectively.

And it is these individual mani-

festations of modernization and family planning that
influence actual fertility.

In traditional Kerala, and for

that matter in India with its strong collectivistic orientation, the social groups an individual belongs to determined
many aspects of his life.

The relative importance of indi-

vidual traits over group attributes, is an indication of the
modernization of the society and the concommittant attenuation of the influence of the group over the individual.
Variations in modernization, family planning, and fertility among the different age groups also exemplify the
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declining importance of the influence of groups on individual behavior.

Many younger women, despite their rural resi-

dence and lower caste status, have a higher socioeconomic
status than the older women.

Again, compared to the older

cohorts, many younger respondents are more modern in their
family size norms, family planning behavior, and actual fertility.

These cohort differences suggest the progress in

modernization that has been achieved over time, the success
of the family planning program in the past decade, and the
declining significance of social groups in determining participation in that progress.
In short, the results of this study support the revisionist version of the Demographic transition theory which
upholds the concept of individual or regional transitions.
Modernization, particularly improvements in the status of
women and in health conditions, have contributed to Kerala's
fertility declines.

Family planning programs have rein-

forced the motivation for small families induced by modernization and have also provided the methods to actualize the
desires for small families.
Major Policy Implications
On the basis of these results, several ways of improving programs designed to curtail fertility in Kerala can be
suggested.
1 •

Rural areas should be involved in the modernization trends in Kerala to a greater extent.
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2.

More opportunities need to be provided for the
lower castes to participate in the general social
and economic progress.

,.

Further improvements in the status of women are
necessary to encourage modern family planning
practices and lower fertility.
a) Higher education of women is a significant factor in improving the status of women.
b) Increased job opportunities that constitute a
break from the traditional roles of housewife
and mother, particularly for the educated
women, are another means to improve their status in the family and in the society.
i)

Education and employment of women will
modify marriage practices, such as age at
marriage, which reduce the reproductive
span and family size.

ii)

Improving the socioeconomic status of
women will also facilitate their equal
participation in family affairs leading
to modern family planning practices and
lower fertility.

4.

Further reductions in infant mortality need to be
achieved so that couples are motivated to have
small families.

5.

The mass vasectomy camps and hospital facilities
for post partum sterilization should be revital-

i04
ized, along with monetary and other incentives for
acceptors.

6.

Concurrently, continued and effective administration of the existing family planning programs are
also required.
a) Such programs will include regular field visits
by the family planning workers to maintain continuous and intensive contacts with individual
couples, particularly the poor.

These periodic

visits will sustain their interest in family
planning and will motivate them to persevere in
using birth control to curtail their family
size.
b) The family planning health centers will also
make the information regarding temporary birth
control methods and services readily and easily
available.
Both modernization and family planning policies, thus,
will be necessary to speed up the rate of fertility decline
in Kerala.

But, modernization cannot be achieved overnight.

In the short run, therefore, it is necessary to coordinate
the family planning programs efficiently so that the methods
and services are available to all segments of the society.

~05

Limitations Of The Study
Although these patterns shed some light on the decline
in the rate of population growth in the past decade, some
caution needs to be exercized.

This study uses cross-sec-

tional data to evaluate the impact of modernization and family planning on fertility in Kerala.

Time series data cov-

ering a span of at least two or three decades would have
been more appropriate in assessing fertility trends.

But

such data, particularly at the individual level, is not
available.

Further, eventhough some trend data at the

aggregate level is available, it is limited to the indices
of socioeconomic modernization, such as education and infant
mortality.

Data on social psychological modernization (role

relationships) can be attained only at the individual level
of analysis.
Another limitation of the study can be found in the
use of only women as respondents.

The problem is particu-

larly relevant to the social psychological variables, such
as role relationships, and the attitudinal indices, ideal
family size and family planning attitudes.

Since women were

the subjects of the interview, responses to these issues are
basically the wives' family planning attitudes, their family
size norms, and their perception of the kind of role relationships that they experience.

Despite the validity of

their perceptions, their husbands' opinions will also have
an important bearing on their fertility.

But interviewing

men on private issues such as family planning use is nearly
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impossible for a female researcher while financial limitations precluded the hiring of a male interviewer.

Hence,

the decision was made to limit the study to the wives, who
are directly involved in the process of childbearing.
Some Directions For Future Research
With these reservations in mind, it can be concluded
that the practice of family planning has indeed considerably
enhanced the effect of modernization.

It would be interest-

ing to examine the extent to which these relationships hold
in the other states of India.

In the absence of survey data

for the other states, another possibility would be to use
aggregate indices of fertility, of socioeconomic development, and of family planping programs and practices to
determine the role of modernization and family planning
among the states in India.

A major advantage of using

aggregate data is the availability of time series data.
Three groups of states can be identified in terms of their
population growth patterns.

The first group consists of

states similar to Kerala in that their populations grew by
less than 2% per year during the 1971-1981 decade despite
growing at the average rate of over 2% during 1961-71.
Tamil Nadu, Orissa, and Kerala are the three states which
have succeeded in reducing their population growth rates
over the last twenty years.

At the other extreme are states

such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Andhra Pradesh which while
having experienced average growth rates of lower than 2%

307
during 1961-71, grew by more than 2% during 1971-81.

A

third group consists of Karnataka, West Bengal, Maharashtra,
and Gujerat, which have maintained above 2% average annual
growth rates both during the 1961-71 and 1971-81 decades. 1
Relevant data can be collected for the states and the administrative districts within each state.

Such analyses will

aid in the identification of the elements that have hindered
some states and aided others in controlling their growth
rates.

Family planning indicators can be expected to exert

a more direct influence on fertility at the aggregate level
also, with modernization being an important yet indirect
influence on fertility.
Another interesting finding of this study that needs
to be further researched is the nature of family planning
organization and its administration in Kerala.

Every dis-

trict has its own family planning board which oversees the
implementation of the program.

An earlier study by Valsan

(1977) on two districts, Ernakulam (which is included in the
present research) and Malappuram, documented a major difference between the two.

Despite the low level of socioeco-

nomic development of the Malappuram district, the leadership
qualities of its medical personnel and the interest of its
health staff were considered significant contributors to the
practice of family planning among a large section of the

1The data on population growth rates for India were
obtained from Pravin Visaria and Leela Visaria, 1981.
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eligible couples.

In Ernakulam district, in contrast, the

lack of dynamic leadership was often cited as a problem in
the implementation of the family planning policies.

Some

indication of the poor performance in Ernakulam district is
available in this study too.

The respondents from the

Administrative Rural Area, despite their lower socioeconomic
status, were more modern in their family planning practices
when compared with the sample from the urban and rural areas
of Ernakulam district.

Informal discussions and observa-

tions of the researcher during the fieldwork, in which the
family planning health workers provided much assistance,
revealed the enthusiasm of the medical leadership and the
health staff in the urban and rural areas of Trivandrum district.

Thus, further research into the administrative

aspects of the family planning program in all the districts
of Kerala will aid in improving the implementation of the
program in districts that lag behind.

Detailed analyses of

the districts with effective family planning programs will
suggest specific incentives and means of popularizing family
planning.

For, while modernization is an important indirect

catalyst of lower fertility, the short run and immediate
approach to the population problem lies in the effective
organization and implementation of the family planning program.
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CONJUGAL ROLE RELATIONSHIPS AND ITS INDICES
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playing with children, and discussing family planning problems.

The responses are measured as (1) never, (2) rarely,

(3) occasionally, (4) frequently, and (5) always.
Dealing with outsiders index refers to the roles the
husband and the wife play in visiting in-laws and relatives,
visiting friends, entertaining friends, keeping contact with
children's school authorities, and employment of servants.
The responses are ranked as follows:

(1) husband always,

(2) wife always, (3) husband visits and entertains his
friends and relatives and contacts son's school authorities
while the wife visits and entertains her relatives and
friends and contacts the daughter's school authorities, (4)
husband more than wife, (5) wife more than husband, and (6)
husband and wife together.
The fourth index--participation in religious activities--covers family prayer, going to church or temple, and
offering special prayers or poojas.

On the religious par-

ticipation index, the responses are ranked as (0) no belief
in religion, (l)husband alone/husband and children, (2) wife
alone/wife and children, (3) husband alone/wife alone, (4)
husband more than wife, (5) wife more than husband, (6) husband and wife together/whole family.
The extent of disagreement index includes disagreement
between husband and wife on matters such as financial
affairs, leisure time activities, jobs to be done by the man
in the home, dealing with in-laws, bringing up children, and
household matters in general.

The responses range from (1)
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always (least joint), (2) to a very large extent, (3) to a
large extent, (4) somewhat, (5) to a small extent, (6)to a
very small extent, and (7) never (most joint).
'11he

outcome of disagreements index is defined as what

happens when there are disagreements between the husband and
the wife.

The responses to this index are ranked as (1)

wife gives in and acts according to husband's wish, (2) husband gives in and comes around to wife's way, (3) sometimes
the husband gives in while sometimes the wife gives in, and

(4) discussion and compromise.
The final index, the pattern of solving disagreements
is operationalized as how contained within the conjugal unit
is the disagreement solving network.

The responses are (1)

mediation by friends, relatives, and children (most open),
(2) mediation by children and relatives, (3) mediation by
friends, (4) mediation by relatives, (5) mediation by children, (6) solve between themselves and mediation by children, and (7) solve between themselves.
includes two criteria:

Containment

(1) how close to the conjugal pair

is the problem solving network; and (2) how many different
roles (both conjugal and non-conjugal) are involved in the
mediation.

According to the first criterion, mediation by

children is closer to the conjugal pair than is mediation by
relatives.

On the basis of the second criterion, response

number 2 implies more openness than mediation by relatives
alone (response 4) or by children alone (response 5).

How-

ever, response 6 was ranked before the last (and most closed
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item) because it, unlike others, partially included problem
solving between the couples too.
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FAMILY PLANNING EFFECTIVENESS

Family planning effectiveness refers to the extent to
which couples have succeeded in preventing unplanned or
unwanted conceptions (Stokes, 1973:

300).

Following

Stokes, family planning effectiveness can be measured by
classifying as planned or unplanned each pregnancy.

The

pregnancy is planned if use of family planning devices is
not initiated so as to have a child or deliberately stopped
to have a child(A).

The rest of the pregnancy categories

denote lack of planning in different ways.

It is unplanned

if the pregnancy occurred eventhough some method(s) was
beintf- use<1 regularly, in which case it is termed an accidental pregnancy (B).

A pregnancy is defined as unintended (C)

if it occurred while use of some method had to be stopped
for reasons such as health, side effects, running out of
supplies, religious considerations, etc.

If the pregnancy

occurred before a method was used, but the child was not
wanted immediately, it is called an unintended 'D' pregnancy.

Finally, the 'never-thought-of-it' pregnancies are

those which just happened in the course of the marriage
without any of the above considerations.
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FAMILY SIZE DECISIONS IN KERALA, INDIA

Schedule No.
Tvm.Rural ( )
Tvm. Urban ( )
Ekm.Rural ( )
Ekm.Urban (

IDENTIFYING INFORMATION
Al. Name of the Head of the Household:
A2. Name of the Respondent:
A3. Address:
A4. Religion:
A5. Caste:
A6. Do you possess the following items?
l.A.C.

( ); 2. Car ( ); 3. Telephone ( );

4. Refrigerator ( ); 5. Motor Cycle ( ); 6. Radio ( );
7. Flush Latrine ( ) ; 8. Shower Bath ( ) ; 9. Geyser ( ) ;
10. Cooking Range ( ); 11. Bicycle ( ); 12. Clock ( );
13. Steel Utensils ( ); 14. Settee ( );
15. Transistor ( ).

328
B. Household Composition:

Form I.

+----------------------------------------------------------+
!
!
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Relation

Sex

Age

to H.H.

Educ-

Occu-

Monthly

ation

pation

Income

------------------------------------------------------

!

!

+----------------------------------------------------------+
B2. How old were you when you got married?

B3. Have you or your husband undergone sterilization?
Husband:

Yes ( ) No ( ); Wife

Yes ( ) No ( )

.
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C. Pregnancy Record:

Form II.

+----------------------------------------------------------+
+----------------------------------------------------------+

!

Sl.

Date of

Type of

If alive,

Age, if

If dead,

No.

termin-

termin-

sex

living

Age at

ation

at ion*

death

------------------------------------------------------

!
!

+----------------------------------------------------------+
* Type of Termination:

(l)Live birth; (2) Still Birth;

(3)

Induced abortion; (4) Spontaneous abortion.

(Go over the Pregnancy Record.

Ask Cl to C2 if there is an

interval of two years or more between two pregnancies or
since the last pregnancy.

Ask Cl and C2 for each such rela-

tively long pregnancy interval.)
Cl.

After the ---th delivery, ----years seem to have lapsed
before you got pregnant the ---th time.

Did we miss

any pregnancies that occurred in this period?
Yes ( ); No ( ).
C2.

(If yes, mark in Form B.)

If no, was there any special reason why you did not
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become pregnant for such a long time?
1. Husband away ( ); 2. Used birth control ( );
~.

Had some difficulty in having children ( );

4. Any other (specify)
C3.

Are you pregnant now?

( ).
Yes ( ); No ( );

Do not know ( ).
C4.

If yes, when is the baby due?
Year (

); Month (

).

D. Family Size
Inspect the pregnancy record and count the number of living
sons and daughters.
No. of Sons (

)

No. of Daughters ( ).
Ask Dl to D3 to the non-sterilized respondents:
Dl.

How many (more) children do you want to have?

D2.

Among these, how many boys and how many girls
do you want to have?
---boys; ---girls; ---either sex O.K.

D3.

Why do you want ---more children and not
more or less?

For both sterilized and non-sterilized respondents:
D4.

If your married life were to start all over again,
you have as much money as you possibly need,
and you could have just the number of
children you want, how many would you want to have?

D5.

Among these, how many boys and how many girls
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would you want to have?
---boys; ---girls; ---either sex O.K.
D6.

Why do you want ---children and not more or less?

D7.

How many children would your husband want
to have?

DB.

Among these, how many boys and how many girls
would he want to have?
---boys; ---girls; ---either sex O.K.

D9.

Why does he want ---children and not more or less?

(Refer to the beginning of Section D and
fill
Actual family Size (

~

the following)
);

Ideal Family Size (

).

If actual is equal to ideal:
ask sterilized respondents Dl3 to Dl5 (b)
ask non-sterilized respondents DlO (a) to DlO(e).
DlO (a) After the birth of the last child, have you
been doing or will you be doing anything to
avoid having any more children?
Yes ( ) Specify;
DlO (b) If not, why not?

No ( ).
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DlO (c) Are you satisfied with the sex combination
of the number of children you have?
Yes ( ); No ( ).
DlO (d) If yes, is it because you are satisfied
with the sex combination that your ideal has
corresponded with your actual family size?
Yes ( ) ; No ( ) •
DlO (e) If no, what are the other reasons?

(If actual is greater than ideal, ask both
sterilized and non-sterilized respondents)
Dll (a) After the birth of any child, did you feel
you had enough children and that you did not
any more?
Yes ( ) ; No ( ) •
Dll (b) If yes, after the birth of which child
did you feel you wanted no more children?
---th child.
Dll (c) After the birth of that child, did you do
anything to avoid having more children?
Yes ( ) Specify;

No ( ) •

Dll (d) If no, why did'nt you?

Dll (e) Did the difference in sex combination
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affect your decision concerning the actual
number of children you have?
Yes ( ); No ( ).

(For sterilized

respondents~

to Dl3 to Dl5 (b)).

(If actual is less than ideal, ask non-sterilized
respondents only)
Dl2 (a) Do you intend to complete the ideal number
you would like to have?

Yes ( ); No ( ).

Dl2 (b) If yes, why?
Dl2 (c) If not, why not?

(If actual is less than ideal, ask sterilized
respondents only).
Dl3.

Why did you decide not to have any more
children and go in for sterilization?
1. biological difficulty ( ); 2. satisfied
with the number of children(

); 3. Satisfied

with sex combination ( ); 4. Any other ( )
Dl4

Who took the final decision regarding
sterilization?
1. Husband ( ); 2. Wife ( ); 3. Together( );
4. Others (specify).

Dl5 (a) Have you ever regretted your decision
regarding sterilization?

Yes ( ); No ( ).
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Dl5 (b) If yes, give

Ask both

~easons.

and

ste~ilized

child~en,

Dl6 (a) How many

on the whole ideal
place?

ou~

non-ste~ilized

~espondents.

do you think would be
fo~

an

family in

ave~age

----child~en.

Dl6 (b) Among them, hm'l many should be boys and

Dl7

how many

gi~ls?

---boys;

---gi~ls;

Why do you
fo~

an

conside~ ---child~en

ave~age

family in

child~en

Dl8 (a) How many

as ideal

place?

ou~

do you think would be

on the whole ideal
you~s?

sex O.K.

---eithe~

fo~

a family like

----child~en.

gi~ls?

Dl8 (b) Among them, how many boys and how many
---boys;
Dl9

gi~ls;

Why do you think
family such as

---eithe~

child~en,

1.

a~e

is ideal

---child~en

fo~

you~s?

D20 (a) Do you think it is allright
couples who

sex O.K.

fo~ ma~~ied

physically able to

p~oduce

to choose to have none at all?

all~ight

( ); 2. Not

~ight

( )

a
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~.Any

othe~

(specify).

020 (b) Why do you think so?

021

How many

yea~s/months

should come the
022

What is the

D23

How many
son

o~

baby?

fi~st

inte~val

between child

afte~ ma~~iage,

you would

p~efe~

bi~ths?

child~en

daughte~

would you like

you~

to have?

E. Family Planning Effectiveness
El

How would you

desc~ibe

each of

Select one of the following

you~

p~egnancies?

~esponses.

A) Planned--Use of family planning devices
eithe~

not initiated

o~ delibe~ately

stopped

to have a child.
B) Accidental--With use of family planning method.
C) Unintended--Use of family planning methods
stopped

fo~

~easons

conside~ations,

of supplies,

such as health

side effects,

~eligious

~unning

conside~ations.

D) Unintended--Without use of family
planning methods.
E)

Neve~-thought-of-it.

out

FORM III.

+----------------------------------------------------------+
!
!
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Serial No.

Description of pregnancy

+----------------------------------------------------------+
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E2.

What is your attitude and your husband's
attitude towards the use of family planning
methods to prevent pregnancy?

+----------------------------------------------------------+
!
!
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Attitude

Wife

Husband

Indispensable
Favorable
Indifferent
Unfavorable
Totally Opposed
Conditional

!
!

!

+----------------------------------------------------------+
E3

If conditional, explain:

E4 (a) Is there anyone in this household who
disapproves of your using family planning
methods to prevent or postpone pregnancy?
Yes ( ); No ();Do not know ( ).
E4 (b) If yes, what is the reason for disapproval?
E5

What is your total monthly expenditure?

E6

Do you have (a) savings?

E7

Interviewer's Assessment of the respondent's status:

(b )debts?

1. Upper class ( ) ; 2. Upper middle ( ) ;
1. Lower middle ( ); 4. Lower ( )
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E8

Housing condition:
(a) Roof-----l.Thatched( ) 2.Tiled( ) 3.Terraced ( )
(b) Wall-----l.Mud

( ) 2.Brick( ) 3.Plastered( )

( c ) Flooring-l.Cowdung( ) 2.Cement( ) 3.Mosaic
(d)Latrine---l.Open

F

( ) 2.Pit

( ) 3.Flush

( )
( )

How are decisions on the following matters taken in
your family?

Choose from one of the following:

(l).Husband always; (2). Husband more than wife;
(3). Husband and wife together; (4). Wife more
than husband; (5) Wife always; (6) Any other
(specify)
1 .Management of financial affairs. i.e., who decides about
spending money for various family needs:
2.Choice of things/shopping for day to day needs such as
provisions, clothes, etc.:
~.Buying

and selling property, building a house

and purchase of other costly items:
4.Wife or husband taking up a job:
5.Education of children, i.e., matters such as the school
or college to which they go, choice of subjects:
6.Training and disciplining children:
7.Marriage of children, i.e., choice of partner, marriage
marriage expenses, etc.:
8.Number of children (Family Size):
9.Use of family planning methods:
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lO.Going for films and other forms of recreation:
ll.Allowing relatives to stay at horne:

G.

To what extent do you and your husband share
the following activities?

Would you say:

(l)Never; (2)Rarely; (3)0ccasionally;
(4)Frequently; (5)Always.

l.Discussing work problems:
2.Daily chores in the horne, such as preparing food,
cleaning up, minor repairs, shopping for
provisions:
~.Looking

after children:

4.Teaching children at horne:
s.settling quarrels and training children:
6.Religious training of children:
7.Taking meals:
8.Spending free time, such as chatting together,
listening to the radio, going to the park, etc.:
9.Going for films or festivals:
lO.Playing with children:
ll.Discussing family planning problems (family size,
use of family planning methods:

H. In dealing with outsiders, what part do you play
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along with your husband?

Would you say:

(l)Husband always; (2)Husband more than wife:
(3). Husband and wife together; (4)Wife more

than husband; (5)Wife always.
l.Visiting in-laws and relatives:
2.Visiting friends:
3.Entertaining visitors:
4.Keeping contact with children's school
authorities:
S.Employment of servants:

I. How does your family participate in the
following activities? Would you say:
(l)Husband alone; (2)Husband more than wife;
(3)Both together; (4)Wife more than husband;
(5)Wife alone; (6)Wife and children;
(7)Husband and children; (8)Whole family
l.Family prayer:
2.Going to church or temple:
i.Offering of special prayers or poojas:

J.

To what extent do you have disagreements with
your husband on the following matters?
say:

Would you

(l)Always; (2)To a very large extent;

(3)To a large extent; (4)Somewhat; (5)To a small
extent; (6)To a very small extent; (7)Never.
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!.Financial matters:
2.Leisure-Time activities:
i.Jobs to be done by the man in the house:
4.Dealing with in-laws:
5.Bringing up children:
6.Household matters:

K. When there are disagreements between you
and your husband, what usually happens?
l.You give in and act according to his wish ( )
2.He gives in and comes around to your way

(

)

1.Sometimes one way and sometimes the other ( )
4.Discussion and come to a compromise

L. How do you solve your disagreements?
1. Mediation by friends

(

2. Mediation by relatives

(

3. Mediation by children

(

4 • Solve between yourselves

Date:

(

)

APPENDIX D

ORIGINAL AND REPRODUCED CORRElATIONS IN 'lliE FERTILITY IDDELl, 2 • 3

Dl

n2

D3

R

c

A

H

w

0

.4444

.3211

.0929

~

1.0

-.4232 -.3341

.0239

-.1790

.2492
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1.0

-.3121

.1000

.0505

.0403
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A
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.1604
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.0496
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-.0245

.0014
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...

.0242

.0483

-.0324
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. 3309

.0509

.0759

.7508

.2939

1.0

. ..

.4664
1.0

10rigi.nal correlations are above the diagonal; reproduced correlations are belc:M the diagonal .
w

t;

ORIGINAL AND REPRODUCED OORREI.ATIONS (Continued) l

p

M

I

M

1.0

-.0019

I

-.0340

1.0

-.0702

L

.2317

-.0407

1.0

N

-.1510

.0357

-.0842 1.0

D

-.0983

.0195

-.1144

.1180

p

-.3993

.1834

-.3833

.2297

.2095 1.0

s

-.0991

-.0894

-.1136

.0196

.0446

.0763

F

-.4556

-.1368

-.2809

.2764

.1613

.7501

L

l\{

.2674 -.1468
.0325
-.1439

D

-.0499 -.3959

s

F

-.1509

-.4643

.1822

-.0891

-.1449

-.1417 -.4233

~.1294

-.3524

.2402

.1031

.2870

.2250

.1119

.1372

.0734

.7519

.0497

.1300
1.0

1.0
.1121

.1269
1.0

10rigina.l correlations are above the diagonal; Reproduced correlations are below.
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ORIGINAL AND REPRODUCED CORRELATIONS (Continued) 2

M

I

L

N

D

p

s

F

Dl

.1358

-.0529

.2852

-.0964

-.1316

-.1106

.00

-.0720

n2

-.0326

.0479

-.0467

.0553

.1577

.1148

.00

.0846

D3

-.0561

.0114

-.1225

.0384

-.0828

-.0670

.00

-.0169

R

-.0049

-.0441

-.0505

-.0928

.0527

.0479

.0558

-.0304

c

-.1189

.0427

-.1643

.0739

.1242

.1105

.1403

.0891

Dl

.1319

-.0243

.2852

-.0552
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-.0920
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-.0426

n2

-.0125

.0114

-.0691

.0111

.1541

.0974

.0101

.0705

D3

-.0543

.0057

-.0913

.0378

-.0703

-.0831

.0446

-.0634

R

.0176

-.0080

.0505

-.0997

-.0025

.0098

.0003

-.0076

c

-.1012

.0192

-.1428

.0503

.0612

.0875

.0906

.0490

2.

Top panel contains the original correlations ; Bottom panel contains the reproduced correlations.
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ORIGINAL AND REPRODUCED CORRElATIONS (Continued) 2

M

I

L

N

D

p

s

F

A

.0383

.0816

.0136

.1273

.0537

.3313

-.2289

.3689

H

.3239

-.0927

.4540

-.1847

-.1683

-.3466

-.2156

-.2741

w

.4488

-.0887

.5192

-.2048

-.2055

-.4277

-.1654

-.3632

0

.3781

-.0076

.2386

-.0929

-.0366

-.2141

-.0841

-.1854

A

.0341

.0854

.0592

.1339

.0078

.3240

-.2255

.3649

H

.3328

-.0962

.4156

-.1933

-.1660

-.3564

-.2085

-.2643

w

...

-.0794

.5191

-.1762

-.2030

-.4063

-.1565

-.3401

0

...

-.0295

.2362

-.0840

-.1002

-.2159

-.0866

-.2021

2.

Top panel--original correlations; Bottom panel--reproduced correlations
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3. DJ.---Capital City

n2---Ca:rmarcial

City

D3---Achninistrative Rural Area
R---Religion
C---Caste
A---Age of Wife
H---HUsband's Education
W---Wife's Education
a---Occupation of Wife
M---Age at M3.rriage
I---Infant MOrtality
L---Conjugal Role Relationships
N---Ideal Family Size
D---Family Planning Attitudes
P---Parity of Family Planning Initiation
S---Sterilization Status
F---Actual Family Size
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